On What Matters: Volume OneOUP Oxford, 26 mai 2011 - 592 pages On What Matters is a major work in moral philosophy. It is the long-awaited follow-up to Derek Parfit's 1984 book Reasons and Persons, one of the landmarks of twentieth-century philosophy. In this first volume Parfit presents a powerful new treatment of reasons and rationality, and a critical examination of three systematic moral theories — Kant's ethics, contractualism, and consequentialism — leading to his own ground-breaking synthetic conclusion. Along the way he discusses a wide range of moral issues, such as the significance of consent, treating people as a means rather than an end, and free will and responsibility. On What Matters is already the most-discussed work in moral philosophy: its publication is likely to establish it as a modern classic which everyone working on moral philosophy will have to read, and which many others will turn to for stimulation and illumination. |
Table des matières
SUMMARY | 1 |
REASONS | 29 |
PRINCIPLES | 175 |
THEORIES | 273 |
APPENDICES | 420 |
Notes to Volume One | 452 |
References | 493 |
| 515 | |
| 523 | |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
accept According achieve act wrongly actual agony aims answer appeal apply argue argument assume avoid believe benefit better cause choice choose claim consent Consent Principle Consequentialism Consequentialists consider decide decisive decisive reasons depend desires desires or aims discussing disposition duty effects example facts fail false five follow future Gauthier give given greater happiness ideal ignore imagined impartial imply important impossible irrational Kant Kant’s formula Kantian kill kind later less lives maxim means merely moral Nature never normative objection ourselves pain people’s permitted person plausible possible practical preferences present principles promises question rationally rationally choose rationally consent Rawls reasons to want reject relevant respond revised Rule sense Sidgwick similar someone strong Subjectivists suffering sufficient reasons suggest Suppose theories things treat true truth universal law well-being White worse worth writes wrong