CHAPTER III

THE ORIGIN OF THE RELIGIOUS IDEA

Two principal instincts in man; the craving to find a cause for every effect, and the prosecution of an ideal of perfection-Analysis of consciousness-Rudimentary beliefs-The belief in causation - The idea of cause not simple-Is it trustworthy?-Necessary for the development of mankind-The belief in causation makes man seek a cause for every effect man sees-He believes this cause to be a will resembling his own-The ideal of perfection—The selective faculty-The imagination — Is the imagination illusive ?-Concurrence of thought and sentiment in religion - Necessity for their co-ordination-Directions taken by the great races of mankind in the pursuit of the ideal.

A

MONG the instincts of humanity, not shared by the brute creation, and which have no directive action on the material life, and exert but a secondary and subsidiary influence over social progress, are two which demand a close scrutiny.

The first of these instincts is the craving man feels to discover a cause to account for every phenomenon. The second is the prosecution of an ideal of perfection. We shall examine each of these instincts in turn. Man's consciousness has been divided by Sir William Hamilton into cognitions, feelings, and volitions. He does not affirm that these three operations-thinking, feeling, and acting— make up the sum total of the conscious life, but that they constitute the broad and clearly-defined groups into which

the data of consciousness may be sorted. This arrangement is more perfect than that of Reid, who divided the powers of the mind into understanding and will-comprehending under the latter, not only the active force precipitating action, but also the affections and passions.

The cognitions may be subdivided into presentations, external and internal; representations, including remembrances and acts of imagination; and lastly, notions, or thoughts proper.

The external presentations are those in which the mind by means of a sense is brought in contact with some external object, and from it receives an impression. In such, the sense is the vehicle through which mind and matter are brought into relation; and where a sense is deficient the corresponding ideas cannot be formed. Thus, the man born blind cannot conceive what is meant by the term scarlet.

The internal presentations are those in which the mind is brought into contact with the self, the indivisible being which constitutes our individuality. Such are the percepts of pleasure, anger, desire.

These perceptions are simple and indivisible, and escape definition. They are the ultimate atoms of the inner consciousness, ready to enter into endless combinations and undergo countless permutations, but not reducible to any prevenient ideas.

Built up on these precepts are certain rudimentary beliefs, so universal and so early acquired, that they deserve to be considered as the radicals of other beliefs.

Such is the belief in causation. An instinct prompts man to seek a cause, because he is strongly convinced of the truth of the doctrine of causality. Without this belief he would make no progress in the world, for the

world would be to him but an assemblage of chance results, and ethics and science would cease to be studied.

What do we mean by cause? All that makes a thing pass from not being to being is a primary cause; all that raodifies an already existing being is a secondary cause. If a body in motion impinge on another body at rest, and disturb it, the secondary cause is the motive force of the former. But there is a presumption that some cause set the first body in motion. Secondary causality represents a concatenation of objects forming a series, which terminates in the first cause; and man instinctively gropes up the chain of secondary causes in search of the self-generating spring of motion which he calls the first cause.

The idea of cause is not a simple idea, for it contains (1) The idea of being; and (2) the relation of that which passes from not being to being. The idea of being is not sufficient to constitute the idea of cause, for it is quite possible to conceive being apart from causative force. A thing is: we cannot define what we mean by this statement, but it conveys to us a perfectly intelligible proposition. Let us abstract all that is not it, and let us endeavour to suppose no other being which may have produced it, or taken part in its production. The possibility of transition from not being to being becomes to us utterly inconceivable. We not only do not see the possibility of the emergence of being out of not being, but we see in this idea the impossibility of this emergence. They are ideas which exclude one another.1

Whatever passes from a condition of not being to being requires something distinct from itself to produce this transition. Such is a primary belief of mankind, a belief wholly ineradicable, upon which even those metaphysicians 1 Balmez: Fundamental Philosophy, book x.

who deny causality are constrained to act at every moment of their lives.

Is the belief in causation a trustworthy belief, or is it an illusion?

Mr. J. S. Mill adopts the latter view. He says: "The law of causation, the recognition of which is the main pillar of inductive science, is but the familiar truth, that invariability of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature, and some other fact which has preceded it; independently of all consideration respecting the ultimate mode of production of phenomena, and of every other question regarding the nature of things in themselves.'

The idea of causality he derives from experience of a regular succession of phenomena which we suppose will continue permanently successive.

It is neither our purpose, nor is this the place, to combat this view; we will merely note a few facts tending to confirm the popular conviction in the reliability of the belief in causality.

An infant has from the beginning an idea of cause. It will shrink when carried down stairs, though it has never experienced injury from a fall. It is curious to observe in the growing mind of an infant how invariably it looks for a cause to all that affects it. Moreover, perception of cause does necessarily attach itself to one term in a repeating series of two, and not to the other. The change of the moon and the flow of the tides have been observed to synchronize. Men attribute the tidal flow to the influence of the changing moon; but cannot suppose that the waxing and waning of the luminary are ruled by the ebb and flow of the tide.

1 Mill Logic, i. 359.

Successions have been observed to be invariable, and it is presumed that they will maintain their invariability; and yet the idea of cause has not attached itself to either of the phenomena. Day follows night; and yet, as has been observed by Reid, man does not regard night as causing day.

The belief in causation grows stronger by experience; indeed, experience educates the belief, just as sensation educates the animal instinct. If experience did not exist, we should not know that causality was possible, because the idea of being does not necessarily embrace the idea of force. Force might be conceived, but we could not know whether anything in reality corresponded with it. We should thus have the notion of the force, but not the notice of its existence.

The belief in causation is necessary for man's development-not for his animal development, but for the progress of his higher being. The brute has little idea of cause; it perceives only secondary causes. Experience teaches the rook, e.g., to dread a gun. It knows that a shot from the barrel causes pain and death, but it does not care to inquire why it does so; consequently, a brute will never discover the composition of gunpowder. If causation be an illusive belief, it is singular that it should have not broken down under the experience of millions, and that it should have led man out of barbarism into civilization. According to the zeal with which man investigates causes, so is his progress. The savage who halts at secondary causes is in the same position as the beast.

The rudest mind is conscious of having force located in it, and it recognises the will as the seat of this force. From no other source can man's acts, even the most trifling, be deduced. Though his consciousness is not always sufficiently