shocking to philanthropic sentiment. But it is of essential importance, in considering whether we should invoke the assistance of a foreign Power for a philanthropic object, that we should know whether its past and present conduct is of a nature to promote or to defeat that object. In the ordinary affairs of life we should scarcely entrust the property of the widow and orphan to any one whose antecedents would not bear the strictest investigation. Now, what are the antecedents of Russia?

manity.

The first point to be investigated before we Russian hucan safely call upon Russia to aid us in a humane undertaking is, whether Russia is herself a humane power. On this point the evidence is overwhelming. The story of the massacre of the Yomud Turkomans, as told by Mr. Schuyler, the historian of the Bulgarian massacres, has horrified all Europe, but as its significance in proof of the inhumanity of the Russian Government has been disputed, we will here briefly repeat it.

General Kaufmann, after the taking of Khiva, ordered the tribe of the Yomuds to pay a contribution within a period of fifteen days. This,

Interests of

Germany,

mining operations, and there can be no doubt that
so serious an impediment to commercial traffic on
the Danube will soon be overcome (as in the
recent case of Hell-Gate at the entrance of the
harbour at New York) by engineering skill.
Once this is done, both Pesth and Vienna would
be exposed to the danger of a Russian naval
attack. Even if we look at the matter only from
a commercial point of view, the damage which
would accrue to Austrian trade from a Russian
possession of the mouths of the Danube is suffi-
ciently obvious. Austria, moreover, as a country
largely interested in the commerce of Europe
with the East, would share with England in the
loss which would be caused by the destruction or
closing of the Suez Canal-a loss which would also
be more or less
less severely felt by Germany,

France, and Italy.

These Powers, though not so directly interested France, and in the Eastern Question as England and Austria,

Italy.

would each be likewise affected in other respects by the establishment of Russian power in Turkey. It is universally admitted by the German press that the extensive trade now carried on between

South Germany and the East, would be almost paralysed if the protective duties and vexatious customs regulations which now hamper the importation of foreign goods into Russia were introduced into the Danubian territories. Moreover, the political interests of Germany would be gravely endangered by Russian aggression in Turkey. Her frontier on the side of Russia is about 500 miles long, in a country well provided with railways and other means of communication, and not presenting any natural obstacles to an invader. Strategically speaking, Germany is more open to an attack from Russia than from any other Power; and now that the Czar has proclaimed himself the champion of Panslavism, it is impossible for Russia to attain the aims of her policy without coming into direct collision with German interests. For a considerable portion of Germany,* comprising one-third of her sea-board, is Slavonic territory, and is still to a great extent inhabited by a Slavonic population; while the Austrian provinces of

* Posen, West Prussia, East Prussia, and Prussian Silesia, all of which provinces formerly belonged to the kingdom of Poland.

Bohemia and Moravia, which would certainly be claimed by Russia as part of the Slavonic Empire of the future, contain more than half as many Germans as Slavs.

As to France and Italy, their position as Mediterranean Powers necessarily renders it of vital importance to them that Russia, with the fleet of ironclads which she is now building on the Black Sea, should not be mistress of the Dardanelles. If this were the case, their maritime power in the Mediterranean would at any moment be exposed to the danger of a hostile combination between Russia and England; for these Powers --England being in possession of the key of the Mediterranean at Gibraltar, and thereby enabled to isolate the French fleet in that sea,-might easily sweep from it the ships of both France and Italy. Further, if Russia obtained free ingress and egress in the Black Sea, her ports there would become great naval arsenals, and she herself a first-class naval power, with the safest of retreats in case of attack. Even if operating alone, therefore, against France or Italy, she would be a very formidable opponent. France

would see her great commercial ports of Toulon and Marseilles, and her colony of Algiers, threatened by Russian ironclads; and to Italy the danger would be even greater, for the whole of her extensive seaboard is in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean.

Question

It is evident, therefore, that each of the great The Eastern Powers of Europe has an interest in keeping from a phiRussia out of Turkey. "But," say

lanthropic

certain point of view. politicians of the humanitarian school, "our

our

what harm to

Mr. Freeman,

conduct should not be determined by
interests, but by our duty; we should do
what is right, no matter
ourselves may come of it."
whose great literary gifts only bring into
stronger prominence his want of political judg-
ment, has devoted many columns of effusive
declamation in his favourite newspaper to the
development of this self-evident proposition,
which is about as much to the point as the
maxim: "Cease to do evil, learn to do well," or
any other copy-book text that nobody has ever
dreamt of contesting.

We are all agreed that we should do right; but What is right?