The Second Nuclear AgeLynne Rienner Publishers, 1999 - 193 pages "Gray's iconoclastic analysis, which includes a rigorous examination of the major policy and conceptual issues associated with WMD, criticizes traditional approaches to nonproliferation and assaults as fallacious both the aspiration to "abolish" or "marginalize" nuclear weapons and the idea that there is a "nuclear taboo" in universal operation. The Second Nuclear Age dares to specify the policy merit in nuclear weapons today."--BOOK JACKET. |
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argue argument arms control ballistic BC weapons biological century challenge Chapter chemical weapons China claim Clausewitz clear Cold Cold War condition conflict cope curity defeat dominant fallacy friends and allies future global Gray hegemonic hypothesis information-led international security least less logic matter menace militarily missile defenses motives NATO Nonetheless nonproliferation North Korea nuclear acquisition nuclear armament nuclear deterrence nuclear option nuclear proliferation nuclear strategy nuclear taboo nuclear weapons nuclear-armed forces options peer competitor perils plausible policymakers political context potential probably problem Quinlan regional power reliable rence Revolution in Military risk rogue Russia Sagan scholars second nuclear age significant Soviet START II statecraft strategic culture strategic effect strategic history strategic nuclear superpower targets theorists theory third nuclear age tion toxin U.S. Congress U.S. conventional U.S. nuclear forces U.S. strategic unipolar United USSR virtual nuclear arsenals warfare weaponry Western world politics would-be
Fréquemment cités
Page 59 - The trouble with disarmament," he wrote in 1973, "was (and still is) that the problem of war is tackled upside down and at the wrong end.... Nations don't distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other. And therefore to want disarmament before a minimum of common agreement on fundamentals is as absurd as to want people to go undressed in winter.
Page 69 - If the theorist's studies automatically result in principles and rules, and if truth spontaneously crystallizes into these forms, theory will not resist this natural tendency of the mind. On the contrary, where the arch of truth culminates in such a keystone, this tendency will be underlined. But this is simply in accordance with the scientific law of reason, to indicate the point at which all lines converge, but never to construct an algebraic formula for use on the battlefield. Even these principles...
Page 41 - Strategic thought draws its inspiration each century, or rather at each moment of history, from the problems which events themselves pose...
Page 65 - We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France...
Page 88 - Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy.
Page 94 - ... small" nuclear war between regional rivals would have negligible, or world system-supporting, consequences. Scholartheorists like Kenneth N. Waltz probably are correct when they point to the readily confinable domain of a regional nuclear conflict. In Waltz's brutally realistic words: "If such [relatively weak] states use nuclear weapons, the world will not end. The use of nuclear weapons by lesser powers would hardly trigger them elsewhere.
Page 85 - Lest there be any misunderstanding, "virtual arsenals would identify as a goal a situation in which no nuclear weapon is assembled and ready for use." 21 Rephrased, "for nuclear-weapon states, creating such a cushion [of time between a given stage of nuclear technology and a deployed nuclear force] means banning the existence of assembled, ready-to-use nuclear weapons.
Page 88 - ... environment of effective deterrence policies: the apparent increase in threats posed by rogue states such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, China, and North Korea; the retraction of US forward-based armed forces; and the proliferation of WMD. Given these features of the second nuclear age, in comparison with the Cold War, US deterrence goals will have to be expanded: the list of players to be deterred has to be expanded, as do the types of behavior to be prevented.

