LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. LECTURE I. PHILOSOPHY-ITS ABSOLUTE UTILITY. PHILOSOPHY: its benefits and plea sures. (A.) SUBJECTIVE. Gentlemen—In the commencement of a course of instruction in any department of knowledge, it is usual, before entering on the regular consideration of the subject, to premise a general survey of the more important advantages which it affords, and this with the view of animating the student to a higher assiduity, by holding up to him, in prospect, some at least of those benefits and pleasures which he may promise to himself in reward of his exertions. The exhibition of these, why peculiarly requisite. And if such a preparation be found expedient for other branches of study, it is, I think, peculiarly requisite in Philosophy, Philosophy Proper, the Science of Mind. For, in the first place, the most important advantages to be derived from the cultivation of philosophy, are not, in themselves, direct, palpable, obtrusive: they are, therefore, of their own nature, peculiarly liable to be overlooked or disparaged by the world at large; because to estimate them at their proper value requires in the judge more than a vulgar complement of information and intelligence. But, in the second place, the many are not simply by negative incompetence disqualified for an opinion; they are, moreover, by positive error, at once rendered incapable of judging right; and yet, by positive error, encouraged to a decision. For there are at present afloat, and in very general acceptation, certain superficial misconceptions in regard to the end and objects of education, which render the popular opinion of the comparative importance of its different branches, not merely false, but precisely the reverse of truth; the studies which, in reality, are of the highest value as a mean of intellectual development, being those which, on the vulgar standard of utility, are at the very bottom of the scale; while those which, in the nomenclature of the multitude, are emphatically, distinctively, denominated the Useful, are precisely those which, in relation to the great ends of liberal education, possess the least, and least general, utility. Utility of a branch of knowledge of two grand kinds lute and Relative. Abso In considering the utility of a branch of knowledge, it behooves us, in the first place, to estimate its value as viewed simply in itself; and, in the second, its value as viewed in relation to other branches. Considered in itself, a science is valuable in proportion as its cultivation is immediately conducive to the mental improvement of the cultivator. This may be called its Absolute utility. In relation to others, a science is valuable in proportion as its study is necessary for the prosecution of other branches of knowledge. This may be called its Relative utility. In this latter point of view, that is as relatively useful, I cannot at present enter upon the value of Philosophy, -I cannot attempt to show how it supplies either the materials or the rules to all the sciences; and how, in particular, its study is of importance to the Lawyer, the Physician, and, above all, to the Theologian. All this I must for the present pass by. Absolute utility of two kinds Subjective and Objective. In the former point of view, that is, considered absolutely, or in itself, the philosophy of mind comprises two several utilities, according as it, 1°, Cultivates the mind or knowing subject, by calling its faculties into exercise; and, 2°, Furnishes the mind with a certain complement of truths or objects of knowledge. The former of these constitutes its Subjective, the latter its Objective utility. These utilities are not the same, nor do they even stand to each other in any necessary proportion. As the special consideration of both is more than I can compass in the present Lecture, I am constrained to limit myself to one alone; and as the subjective utility is that which has usually been overlooked, though not assuredly of the two the less important, while at the same time its exposition affords in part the rationale of the method of instruction which I have adopted, I shall at present only attempt an illustration of the advantages afforded by the Philosophy of Mind, regarded as the study which, of all others, best cultivates the mind or subject of knowledge, by supplying to its higher faculties the occasions of their most vigorous, and therefore their most improving, exercise. There are few, I believe, disposed to question the speculative dignity of mental science; but its practical utility is not unfrequently denied. To what, it is asked, is the science of mind conducive? What are its uses? Practical utility of Philosophy. I am not one of those who think that the importance of a study is sufficiently established when its dignity is admitted; for, holding that knowledge is for the sake of man, and not man for the sake of knowledge, it is necessary, in order to vindicate its value, that every science should be able to show what are the advantages which it promises to confer upon its student. I, therefore, profess myself a utilitarian; and it is only on the special ground of its utility that I would claim for the philosophy of mind, what I regard as its peculiar and preeminent importance. But -- The Useful. what is a utilitarian? Simply one who prefers the Useful to the Useless and who does not? But what is the useful? That which is prized, not on its own account, but as conducive to the acquisition of something else, the useful is, in short, only another word for a mean towards an end; for every mean is useful, and whatever is useful is a mean. Now the value of a mean is always in proportion to the value of its end; and the useful being a mean, it follows, that, of two utilities, the one which conduces to the more valuable end will be itself the more valuable utility. So far there is no difference of opinion. All agree that the useful is a mean towards an end; and that, cæteris paribus, a mean towards a higher end constitutes a higher utility than a mean towards a lower. The only dispute that has arisen, or can possibly arise, in regard to the utility of means (supposing always their relative efficiency), is founded on the various views that may be entertained in regard to the existence and comparative importance of ends. Now the various opinions which prevail concerning the comparative utility of human sciences and studies, have all arisen from two errors.1 Two errors in the popular estimate of the comparative utility of human sciences. The first of these consists in viewing man, not as an end unto himself, but merely as a mean organized for the sake of something out of himself; and, under this partial view of human destination, those branches of knowledge obtain exclusively the name of useful, which tend to qualify a human being to act the lowly part of a dexterous instrument. 1 With the following observations may be compared the author's remarks on the distinction between a liberal and a professional education, in his article on the study of mathematics, Edinburgh Review, vol. lxii., p. 409, reprinted in his Discussions, p. 263.-ED. |