iscence;1 and Michael Psellus, in his work on Various Knowledge.2 It is doubted, however, whether the two last be not the same person; and their remarkable coincidence in the point under consideration, is even a strong argument for their identity. They assign this recognition to a faculty which they call rò πроσEKTIKÓν,- that is TÒ проσEKTIKÒV μépos, the attentive part or function of mind. This is the first indication in the history of philosophy of that false analysis which has raised attention into a separate faculty. I beg you, however, to observe, that Philoponus and his follower, Michael Ephesius, do not distinguish attention from consciousness. This is a point we are hereafter specially to consider, when perhaps it may be found that, though wrong in making consciousness or attention a peculiar faculty, they were right, at least, in not dividing consciousness and attention into different faculties. But to return from our historical digression. < We may lay it down as the most general characteristic of consciousness, that it is the recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts or affections.' So far there is no difficulty and no dispute. In this all philosophers are agreed. The more arduous task remains of determining the special conditions of consciousness. Of these, likewise, some are almost too palpable to admit of controversy. Before proceeding to those in regard to which there is any doubt or difficulty, it will be proper, in the first place, to state and dispose of such determinations as are too palpable to be called in question. Of these admitted limitations, the first is, that consciousness is an actual and not a potential knowledge. Thus a man is said to know, i. e. is able to know, that 7+9 are =16, though that equation be not, at the moment, the object of his thought; but we cannot say that he is conscious of this truth unless while actually present to his mind.

The most general characteristic of consciousness.

The special conditions of consciousness.

1. Those generally admitted.

Consciousness implies, 1, actual knowledge.

3

The second limitation is, that consciousness is an immediate, not a mediate knowledge. We are said, for example, to know a past occurrence when we represent it to the mind in an act of memory. know the mental representation, and this we do immediately and

2. Immediate knowledge.

1 Rather in the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, usually attributed to Eustratius, p. 160, b. It is not mentioned in the Commentary on the De Memoria. - ED.

2 [P'sellus, De Omnifaria Doctrina, § 46:]

We

Προσοχὴ δὲ ἐστὶ καθ ̓ ἣν προσέχομεν τοῖς ἔργοις οἷς πράττομεν καὶ τοῖς λόγοις οἷς λέγομεν. - ED.

3 Compare Reid's Coll. Works, p. 810.- ED.

in itself, and are also said to know the past occurrence, as mediately knowing it through the mental modification which represents it. Now, we are conscious of the representation as immediately. known, but we cannot be said to be conscious of the thing represented, which, if known, is only known through its representation. If, therefore, mediate knowledge be in propriety a knowledge, consciousness is not coëxtensive with knowledge. This is, however, a problem we are hereafter specially to consider. I may here also observe, that, while all philosophers agree in making consciousness an immediate knowledge, some, as Reid and Stewart, do not admit that all immediate knowledge is consciousness. They hold that we have an immediate knowledge of external objects, but they hold that these objects are beyond the sphere of consciousness.1 This is an opinion we are, likewise, soon to canvass.

3. Contrast. Discrimination of one object from another.

The third condition of consciousness, which may be held as universally admitted, is, that it supposes a contrast, a discrimination; for we can be conscious only inasmuch as we are conscious of something; and we are conscious of something only inasmuch as we are conscious of what that something is, that is, distinguish it from what it is not. This discrimination is of different kinds and degrees.

In the first place, there is the contrast between the two grand

This discrimination of various kinds and degrees.

opposites, self and not-self,-ego and non-ego, -mind and matter; (the contrast of subject and object is more general.) We are conscious of self only in and by its contradistinction from not-self; and are conscious of not-self only in and by its contradistinction from self. In the second place, there is the discrimination of the states or modifications of the internal subject or self from each other. We are conscious of one mental state only as we contradistinguish it from another; where two, three, or more such states are confounded, we are conscious of them as one; and were we to note no difference in our mental modifications, we might be said to be absolutely unconscious. Hobbes has truly said, "Idem semper sentire, et non sentire, ad idem recidunt." In the third place, there is the distinction between the parts and qualities of the outer world. We are conscious of an external object only as we are conscious of it as distinct from others, where several

1 See Reid, Intellectual Powers, Essay vi. ch. 5, 1, 5. Works, pp. 442, 445. Stewart, Outlines of Moral Philosophy, part i. § 1, 2; Collected Works, vol. ii. p. 12. ED.

2 Elementa Philosophia, part iv. c. 25, § 5. Opera, ed. Molesworth, vol. i. p. 321. English Works, vol. i. p. 394.-ED.

distinguishable objects are confounded, we are conscious of them as one; where no object is discriminated, we are not conscious of any. Before leaving this condition, I may parenthetically state, that, while all philosophers admit that consciousness involves a discrimination, many do not allow it any cognizance of aught beyond the sphere of self. The great majority of philosophers do this because they absolutely deny the possibility of an immediate knowledge of external things, and, consequently, hold that consciousness in distinguishing the non-ego from the ego, only distinguishes self from self; for they maintain, that what we are conscious of as something different from the perceiving mind, is only, in reality, a modification of that mind, which we are condemned to mistake for the material reality. Some philosophers, however, (as Reid and Stewart,) who hold, with mankind at large, that we do possess an immediate knowledge of something different from the knowing self, still limit consciousness to a cognizance of self; and, consequently, not only deprive it of the power of distinguishing external objects from each other, but even of the power of discriminating the ego and non-ego. These opinions we are afterwards to consider. With this qualification, all philosophers may be viewed as admitting that discrimination is an essential condition of consciousness. The fourth condition of consciousness, which may be assumed as very generally acknowledged, is, that it in4. Judgment. volves judgment. A judgment is the mental act by which one thing is affirmed or denied of another. This fourth condition is in truth only a necessary consequence of the third, for it is impossible to discriminate without judging,- discrimination, or contradistinction, being in fact only the denying one thing of another. It may to some seem strange that consciousness, the simple and primary act of intelligence, should be a judgment, which philosophers, in general, have viewed as a compound and derivative operation. This is, however, altogether a mistake. A judgment is, as I shall hereafter show you, a simple act of mind, for every act of mind implies a judgment. Do we perceive or imagine without affirming, in the act, the external or internal existence of the object? Now these fundamental affirmations are the affirmations, -in other words, the judgments, of consciousness.

The fifth undeniable condition of consciousness is memory. This

5. Memory.

condition also is a corollary of the third. For without memory our mental states could not be held fast, compared, distinguished from each other, and referred to

1 See Reid's Works, pp. 243, 414, with the Editor's Notes.-Ed.

self. Without memory, each indivisible, each infinitesimal, moment in the mental succession, would stand isolated from every other,would constitute, in fact, a separate existence. The notion of the ego or self, arises from the recognized permanence and identity of the thinking subject in contrast to the recognized succession and variety of its modifications. But this recognition is possible only through memory. The notion of self is, therefore, the result of memory. But the notion of self is involved in consciousness, so consequently is memory.

LECTURE XII.

CONSCIOUSNESS,-ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS: RELATION TO COGNITIVE FACULTIES IN GENERAL.

So far as we have proceeded, our determination of the contents of consciousness may be viewed as that universally admitted; for though I could quote to you certain counterRecapitulation. doctrines, these are not of such importance as to warrant me in perplexing the discussion by their refutation, which would indeed be nothing more than the exposition of very palpable mistakes. Let us, therefore, sum up the points we have established. We have shown, in general, that consciousness is the self-recognition that we know, or feel, or desire, etc. We have shown, in particular, 1°, That consciousness is an actual or living, and not a potential or dormant, knowledge; -2°, That it is an immediate and not a mediate knowledge; -3°, That it supposes a discrimination; -4°, That it involves a judgment; and, 5°, That it is possible only through memory.

We are now about to enter on a more disputed territory; and the first thesis I shall attempt to establish, involves several subordinate questions.

II. Special conditions of consciousness not generally admitted.

I state, then, as the first contested position which I am to maintain, that our consciousness is coëxtensive with our knowledge. But this assertion, that we have no knowledge of which we are not conscious, is tantamount to the other that consciousness is coëxtensive with our cognitive faculties, and this again is convertible with the assertion, that consciousness is not a special faculty, but that our special faculties, of knowledge are only modifications of consciousness. The question, therefore, may be thus stated, - Is consciousness the genus under which our several faculties of knowledge are contained as species, or, is consciousness itself a special faculty coördinate with, and not comprehending, these?

1. Our consciousness coëxtensive with our knowledge.