Pain,-Positive and lute, and into Negative or Relative. But, in the second place, there is, moreover, a subdivision of positive pain into that which accompanies a repression of the spontaneous energy of a power, and that which is conjoined with its effort, when stimulated to over-activity.1 Negative. Positive pain, sub divided. I proceed now to state certain corollaries, which flow immediately from the preceding doctrine. Corollaries from preceding doctrine. 1. The individual will be disposed to exercise his more vigorous powers. In the first place, as the powers which, in an individual, are either preponderantly strong by nature, or have become preponderantly strong by habit, have comparatively more perfect energies; so the pleasures which accompany these will be proportionally intense and enduring. But this being the case, the individual will be disposed principally, if not exclusively, to exercise these more vigorous powers, for their energies afford him the largest complement of purest pleasure. "Trahit sua quemque voluptas," each has his ruling passion. 2. Those faculties which most need cultivation, the least secure it. But, in the second place, as the exercise of a power is the only means by which it is invigorated, but as, at the same time, this exercise, until the development be accomplished, elicits imperfect, and, therefore, painful, or at least less pleasurable, energy, -it follows that those faculties which stand the cultivation, are precisely those which the least secure it; while, on the contrary, those which are already more fully developed, are precisely those which present the strongest inducements for their still higher invigoration. most in need of 1 [With the foregoing theory compare Hutcheson, System of Moral Philosophy, i. p. 21 et seq Lüders, Kritik d. Statistik, p. 457-9. Tiedemann, Psychologie, p. 151. edit. 1804.] [Bonnet, Essai Analytique sur l'Ame, caps. xvii. THE FEELINGS. LECTURE XLIII. HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THEORIES OF In my last Lecture, I gave an abstract statement of that Theory of Pleasure and Pain, which, I think, is compe Recapitulation. tent, and exclusively competent, to explain the whole multiform phænomena of our Feelings,-a theory, consequently, which those whole phænomena concur in establishing. It is, in truth, nothing but a generalization of what is essential in the concrete facts themselves. Before, however, proceeding to show, by its application to particular cases, that this theory affords us a simple principle, on which to account for the most complicated and perplexing phænomena of Feeling, I shall attempt to give you a General historical notices of Theories of the Pleasurable. slight survey of the most remarkable opinions. on this point. To do this, however imperfectly, is of the more importance, as there is no work in which any such historical deduction is attempted; but principally, because the various theories of philosophers on the doctrine of the pleasurable, are found, when viewed in connection, all to concur in manifesting the truth of that one which I have proposed to you,—a theory, in fact, which is the resumption and complement of them all. In attempting this survey, I by no means propose to furnish even an indication of all the opinions that have been held in regard to the pleasurable in general, nor even of all the doctrines on this subject that have been advanced by the authors to whom I specially refer. I can only afford to speak of the more remarkable theories, and, in these, only of the more essential particulars. But, in point of fact, though there is no end of what has been written upon pleasure and pain, considered in their moral relations and effects, the speculations in regard to their psychological causes and conditions are comparatively few. In general, I may also premise that there is apparent a remarkable gravitation in the various doctrines promulgated on this point, towards a common centre; and, however one-sided and insufficient the several opinions These theories fall into two grand classes, -the Platonic and Aristotelic. may appear, they are all substantially grounded upon truth, being usually right in what they affirm, and wrong only in what they deny; all are reflections, but only partial reflections, of the truth. These opinions, I may further remark, fall into two great classes; and at the head of each there is found one of the two great philosophers of antiquity,- Plato being the founder of the one general theory, Aristotle of the other. But though the distinction of these classes pervades the whole history of the doctrines, I do not deem it necessary to follow this classification in the following observations, but shall content myself with a chronological arrangement. Plato the first to at tempt the generalization of a law of Pleasure and Pain. Plato is the first philosopher who can be said to have attempted the generalization of a law which regulates the manifestation of pleasure and pain; and it is but scanty justice to acknowledge that no subsequent philosopher has handled the subject with greater ingenuity and acuteness. For though the theory of Aristotle be more fully developed, and, as I am convinced, upon the whole the most complete and accurate which we possess, it is but fair to add, that he borrowed a considerable portion of it from Plato, whose doctrine he corrected and enlarged. Plato's theory, -that a state of pleasure is always preceded by a state of pain. The opinion of Plato regarding the source of pleasure is contained in the Philebus, and in the ninth book of the Republic, with incidental allusions to his theory in other dialogues. Thus, in the opening of the Phado, we have the following statement of its distinguishing principle, that a state of pleasure is always preceded by a state of pain. Phædo, in describing the conduct of Socrates in the prison and on the eve of death, narrates, that "sitting upright on the bed he (Socrates) drew up his leg, and stroking it with his hand, said at the same time, — What a wonderful thing is this, my friends, which men call the pleasant and agreeable! and how wonderful a relation does it bear by nature to that which seems to be its contrary, the painful! For they are unwilling to be present with us both together; and yet, if any person pursues and obtains the one, he is most always under a necessity of accepting also the other, as if both of them depended from a single summit. And it seems to me' (he continues), 'that if sop had perceived this, he would have written a fable upon it, and have told us that the Deity, being willing to reconcile the conflictive natures, but at the same time unable to accomplish this design, con 1 P. 60.-ED. joined their summits in an existence one and the same; and that hence it comes to pass that whoever partakes of the one, is soon after compelled to participate in the other. And this, as it appears, is the case with myself at present; for the pain which was before in my leg, through the stricture of the fetter, is now succeeded by a pleasant sensation."" The following extract from the Philebus' will, however, show more fully the purport and grounds of his opinion: Quotation from the Philebus. "Socrates. I say then, that whenever the harmony in the frame of any animal is broken, a breach is then made in its constitution, and, at the same time, rise is given to pains. "Protarchus. You say what is highly probable. "Soc. But when the harmony is restored, and the breach is healed, we should say that then pleasure is produced; if points of so great importance may be despatched at once in so few words. "Prot. In my opinion, O Socrates, you say what is very true; but let us try if we can show these truths in a light still clearer. "Soc. Are not such things as ordinarily happen, and are manifest to us all, the most easy to be understood? "Prot. What things do you mean? "Soc. Want of food makes a breach in the animal system, and, at the same time, gives the pain of hunger. "Prot. True. "Soc. And food, in filling up the breach again, gives a pleasure. "Prot. Right. "Soc. Want of drink also, interrupting the circulation of the blood and humors, brings on us corruption together with the pain of thirst; but the virtue of a liquid in moistening and replenishing the parts dried up, yields a pleasure. In like manner, unnatural suffocating heat, in dissolving the texture of the parts, gives a painful sensation; but a cooling again, a refreshment agreeable to nature, affects us with a sense of pleasure. "Prot. Most certainly. "Soc. And the concretion of the animal humors through cold, contrary to their nature, occasions pain; but a return to their pristine state of fluidity, and a restoring of the natural circulation, produce pleasure. See, then, whether you think this general account of the matter not amiss, concerning that sort of being which I said was composed of indefinite and definite, that, when by nature any beings of that sort become animated with soul, their passage into corruption, or a total dissolution, is accompanied with pain; 1 P. 81.-ED. and their entrance into existence, the assembling of all those particles which compose the nature of such a being, is attended with a sense of pleasure. "Prot. I admit your account of this whole matter; for, as it appears to me, it bears on it the stamp of truth." And, in a subsequent part of the dialogue, Socrates is made to approve of the doctrine of the Eleatic School, in regard to the unreality of pleasure, as a thing always in generation, that is, always in progress towards existence, but never absolutely existent. "Soc. But what think you now of this? Have we not heard it said concerning pleasure, that it is a thing always in generation, always produced anew, and which, having no stability of being, cannot properly be said to be at all? For some ingenious persons there are, who endeavor to show us that such is the nature of pleasure; and we are much obliged to them for this their account of it." 1 Then, after an expository discourse on the Eleatic doctrine, Socrates proceeds: 2-"Therefore, as I said in the beginning of this argumentation, we are much obliged to the persons who have given us this account of pleasure, — that the essence of it consists in being always generated anew, but that never has it any kind of being. For it is plain that these persons would laugh at a man who asserted, that pleasure and good were the same thing. "Prot. Certainly they would. "Soc. And these very persons would undoubtedly laugh at those men, wherever they met with them, who place their chief good and end in a becoming,- an approximation to existence? "Prot. How? what sort of men do you mean? "Soc. Such as, in freeing themselves from hunger or thirst, or any of the uneasinesses from which they are freed by generation, — by tending towards being, are so highly delighted with the action of removing those uneasinesses, as to declare they would not choose to live without suffering thirst and hunger, nor without feeling all those other sensations which may be said to follow from such kinds of uneasiness." Sum of Plato's doctrine of the Pleasurable. The sum of Plato's doctrine on this subject is this, that pleasure is nothing absolute, nothing positive, but a mere relation to, a mere negation of, pain. Pain is the root, the condition, the antecedent of pleasure, and the latter is only a restoration of the feeling subject, from a state contrary to nature to a state conformable with nature. Pleasure is the mere replenishing of a vacuum, |