Twofold, subjective and objective. In a subjective relation, the new is pleasurable, inasmuch as this supposes that the mind is determined to a mode of action, either from inactivity or from another state of energy. In the former case, energy (the condition of pleasure), is caused; in the latter, a change of energy is afforded, which is also pleasurable; for powers energize less vigorously in proportion to the continuance of the same exertion, consequently, a new activity being determined, this replaces a strained or expiring exercise, that is, it replaces a painful, indifferent, or unpleasurable feeling, by one of comparatively vivid enjoyment. Hence all that the poets, from Homer downward, have said of the satiety consequent on our enjoyments, and of the charms of variety and change; but if I began to give quotations on these heads there would be no end. In an objective relation, a novel object is pleasing, because it affords a gratification to our desire of knowledge; for to learn, as Aristotle has observed,' is to man naturally pleasing. But the old is already known,-it has been learned -has been referred to its place, and, therefore, no longer occupies the cognitive faculties; whereas, the new, as new, is still unknown, and rouses to energy the powers by which it is to be brought within the system of our knowledge. II. Contrast. Subordinate applications of this principle. II. The second general principle is Contrast. Contrast operates in two ways; for it has the effect both of enhancing the real or absolute intensity of a feeling, and of enhancing the apparent, or relative. As an instance of the former, the unkindness of a person from whom we expect kindness, rouses to a far higher pitch the emotions consequent on injury. As an instance of the latter, the pleasure of eating appears proportionally great, when it is immediately connected and contrasted with the removal of the pangs of hunger. It is on this principle, that the recollection of our past suffering is agreeable,-"hæc olim meminisse juvabit." To the same purport Seneca, the trage 1. Recollection of past suffering. Southern. Whereas the remembrance of a former happiness only augments the feeling of a present misery. 2. Consciousness of Our own felicity as contrasted with the wretchedness of oth "Could I forget What I have been, I might the better bear What I am destin'd to. I'm not the first That have been wretched: but to think how much I have been happier." 1 It is, likewise, on this principle, that whatever recalls us to a vivid consciousness of our own felicity, by contrasting it with the wretchedness of others, is, though not unaccompanied with sympathetic pain, still predominantly pleasurable. Hence, in part, but in part only, the enjoyment we feel from all representations of ideal suffering. Hence, also, in part, even the pleasure we have in witnessing real suffering: ers. Lucretius quoted. "Suave, mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis, E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem: Per campos instructa, tua sine parte pericli." 2 But on this, and other subjects, I can only touch. III. The third general principle on which our powers are roused to a perfect and pleasurable, or to an imperfect and painful energy, is the relation of Harmony, or Discord, in which one coëxistent activity III. Harmony and Discord. stands to another. Illustrated. It is sufficient merely to indicate this principle, for its influence is manifest. At different times, we exist in different complex states of feeling, and these states are made up of a number of constituent thoughts and affections. At one time, say during a sacred solemnity, we are in a very different frame of mind from what we are at another, - say during the representation of a comedy. Now, then, in such a state of mind, if anything occurs to waken to activity a power previously unoccupied, or to occupy a power previously in energy in a different manner, this new mode of activity is either of the same general character and tendency with the other constituent elements of the complex state, or it is not. In the former case, the new energy chimes in with the old; each operates without impediment from the 1 Southern, Innocent Adultery, act ii. 2 Lucretius, ii. 2.- ED. -- other, and the general harmony of feeling is not violated: in the latter case, the new energy jars with the old, and each severally counteracts and impedes the other. Thus, in. the sacred solemnity, and when our minds are brought to a state of serious contemplation, everything that operates in unison with that state, say a pious discourse, or a strain of solemn music, will have a greater effect, because all the powers which are thus determined to exertion, go to constitute one total complement of harmonious energy. But suppose that, instead of the pious discourse or the strain of solemn music, we are treated to a merry tune or a witty address; these, though at another season they might afford us considerable pleasure, would, under the circumstances, cause only pain; because the energies they elicited, would be impeded by those others with which the mind was already engrossed, while those others would, in like manner, be impeded by them. But, as we have seen, pleasure is the concomitant of unimpeded energy. IV. Association. Its nature. IV. The fourth and last general principle by which the activity of our powers is determined to pleasurable or painful activity, is Association. With the nature and influence of association you are familiar, and are aware that, a determinate object being present in consciousness with its proper thought, feeling, or desire, it is not present, isolated and alone, but may draw after it the representation of other objects, with their respective feelings and desires. And influence. Now it is evident, in the first place, that one object, considered simply and in itself, will be more pleasing than another, in proportion as it, of its proper nature, determines the exertion of a greater amount of free energy. But, in the second place, the amount of free energy which an object may itself elicit, is small, when compared to the amount that may be elicited by its train of associated representations. Thus, it is evident, that the object which in itself would otherwise be pleasing, may, through the accident of association, be the occasion of pain; and, on the contrary, that an object naturally indifferent or even painful may, by the same contingency, be productive of pleasure. This principle of Association accounts for a great many of the Association supposes as its condition pains and pleasures not founded on itself. phænomena of our intellectual pleasures and pains; but it is far from accounting for everything. In fact, it supposes, as its condition, that there are pains and pleasures not founded on Association. Association is a principle of pleasure and pain, only as it is a principle of energy of one character or another; and the attempts that have been made to resolve all The attempt to resolve all our pleasures and pains into Association, vicious in a twofold way. Hutcheson more properly appreciated the influence of Association. our mental pleasures and pains into Association, are guilty of a twofold vice. For, in the first place, they convert a partial into an exclusive law; and, in the second, they elevate a subordinate into a supreme principle. The influence of Association, by which Mr. Alison and Lord Jeffrey, among others, have attempted to explain the whole phænomena of our intellectual pleasures, was more properly, I think, appreciated by Hutcheson, a philosopher whose works are deserving of more attention than has latterly been paid to them. "We shall see hereafter," he says, and Aristotle said the same thing, "that associations of ideas make objects pleasant and delightful, which are not naturally apt to give any such pleasures; and the same way, the casual conjunction of ideas may give a disgust where there is nothing disagreeable in the form itself. And this is the occasion of many fantastic aversions to figures of some animals, and to some other forms. Thus swine, serpents of all kinds, and some insects really beautiful enough, are beheld with aversion, by many people who have got some accidental ideas associated with them. And for distastes of this kind no other account can be given."3 1 See his Essays on Taste, 6th edit. Edinburgh, 1825. - ED. 3 Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, treatise i. sect. vi., 4th edition, p. 2 See Encyclopædia Britannica, art. Beauty, 73.- ED. 7th edit. p. 487.- ED. LECTURE XLV. THE FEELINGS. THEIR CLASSES. HAVING thus terminated the consideration of the Feelings con The Feelings,-considered as Effects. sidered as Causes,- causes of Pleasure and Pain, I proceed to consider them as Effects, as products of the action of our different powers. Now, it is evident, that, since all Feeling is the state in which we are conscious of some of the energies or processes of life, as these As many different feelings as there are distinct modes of mental activity. Two grand classes of Feelings. energies or processes differ, so will the correlative feelings. In a word, there will be as many different Feelings as there are distinct modes of mental activity. In the Lecture in which I commenced the discussion of the Feelings, I stated to you various distributions of these states by different philosophers. To these I do not think it necessary again to recur, and shall simply state to you the grounds of the division I shall adopt. As the Feelings, then, are not primitive and independent states, but merely states which accompany the exertion of our faculties, or the excitation of our capacities, they must, as I have said, take their differences from the differences of the powers which they attend. Now, though all consciousness and all feeling be only mental, and, consequently, to say that any feeling is corporeal, would, in one point of view, be inaccurate, still it is manifest that there is a considerable number of mental functions, cognitive as well as appetent, clearly marked out as in proximate relation to the body; and to these functions we give the name of Sensitive, Sensible, Sensuous, or Sensual. Now, the feelings which accompany the exertion of these Sensitive or Corporeal Powers, whether cognitive or appetent, will constitute a distinct class, and to these we may, with great propriety, give the name of Sensations; whereas, on the Feelings which accompany the energies of all our higher powers of I. Sensations. 1 See above, lect. xli. p. 570. - ED. |