Now the first of these two sentences misquotes our definition of an automaton so as to give a false appearance of truth to the implication of the second sentence. Our real definition is as follows: "An automaton is a machine, constructed, sometimes in the human form, whose parts, by force of interior springs, are made to operate apparently like a human system, with self-motion;" and in our next sentence we specify that it is moved by "forces applied." Here the "inherent instincts and proclivities" assumed by our critic to be omitted, are fully and prominently expressed by the phrase "interior springs." He then adds: "Autonomous or spontaneous would then seem to be the proper term by which to designate the moral character in man which lies back of its volitions, and is historically antecedent to them, and, as some believe, their determining cause."

Now to mean any thing to the purpose, this must signify that autonomous, and not automatic, is the term to apply to the quality or action of an automaton, physical or psychological! But automatic is the very adjective form of the word automaton. Webster says, "The term automatic is now applied to self-acting machinery, or such as has within itself the power of regulating its own movements, although the moving force is derived from without." In this statement all will admit that "the power of regulating its own movements" is mechanical and fixed, not free and alternative, and hence the automatic material agent and action. But the word autonomous is never applied to a material mechanism, whether an automaton or any other structure, but is always applied to a free living agent, or body of living agents, for the very purpose of specializing the freedom from all external force. It is a Greek word compounded of avros, self, and vouos, law; and was first used to designate the cities of Greece as free and independent of any foreign force. Webster defines it, "Independent in government; having the right of self-government." When, therefore, our critic tells us that autonomous and not automatic is the word to designate the quality of an automaton, or an agent as necessitated as an automaton, he precisely reverses the truth.

Our critic next applies his dissecting knife to our proposition that in order to responsibility "common sense demands . . . free self-control." On this he commits a whole series of very flagrant mistakes. 1. He assumes that we propound this as nearly an axiomatic postulate, needing no proof; whereas it is a proposition proposed to be proved; and the whole chapter is an attempt to prove it by presenting its various phases before the tribunal of

the common sense. Our critic pronounces it "not proven ;" and if so the chapter is a failure. 2. He faults our using the term common sense," treating the phrase, through an unwise page or two, as unmetaphysical, as "used to cover up vacuity of thought,' etc. We are, doubtless, much rebuked by all this for our incompetence in the use of due metaphysical language. And yet the phrase is the regular technic used by Reid as against Hume; and as a translation of the old communis sensus of the Latin it is legitimated by Sir William Hamilton as a valid metaphysical technic. It is used by Edwards, the great standard whom we were antagonizing, and the phrase in our same chapter, "universal common sense of mankind," (p. 381,) is Edwards' own phrase, intended by us as a quotation from him, and a few lines lower is marked with quotation points. At any rate, these last phrases ought to have shown our critic that we used the term as a proper authorized technic, not at all affected by its popular use, which is really based upon the original metaphysical term. The sensus communis is that universal sensus, common to all mankind, by which self-evidence is universally recognized. Our use of the word is further verified by the fact that in our volume (pp. 398-400) we bring the same proposition before the "intuitions," and endeavor to show both that the intuitions do affirm it, and that their affirmation is conclusive. And, finally and conclusively, the phrase is used by the very highest authority in the present debate, namely, by Dr. Curry himself, in the very first line of the volume containing this criticism, as a designation of the final court of appeal in metaphysical discussion. The very first line in his book is this: "The common sense of mankind has always and every-where recognized," etc. 3. Our author rejects the maxim that in order to moral responsibility "common sense demands free self-control." Now Calvinism bases its whole moral defense on this non-concession of that maxim. Grant that nonconcession and an act or state may be necessitated, eternally pre-decreed, and yet be responsible. God may decree the sin and damn the sinner. Now can our respected brother wonder or complain if thousands of us are compelled to feel that he writes, speaks, and thinks Calvinism? Yet on page 201 he tells us that since "the interior will is alone capable of acting in view of moral obligation, sin can be predicated of only the reason in its volitionary action-that is of the will." And (p. 195) of this "volitionary" reason he tells us that it "rises above the passions and acts by its own energy, and independently of all beyond itself; this is original volition." Now, putting these two state

ments together, the predicability of sin requires the volitionary action of the will; and that volitionary action, or original volition, "acts independently of all beyond itself." In other words, sin can be imputed to nothing but a volition independent of every thing but itself. And yet he denies that "in order to moral responsibility there must be free self-control." If his phrase "independently of all beyond itself" is equivalent to "free selfcontrol," then here is the most categorical contradiction. If not, then, clearly, the agent is at once independent of all control both outside and inside of itself! It is independent of every thing else, and yet has no "free self-control." And here is that quavering between Arminianism and its opposite, with which Dr. C. has for years confounded his friends.

He next imputes to us "a damaging want of distinction" because in our chapter we did not adopt his "two things" which he calls TWO WILLS; namely, "an external will or "a surface will," and also "an internal will." This theory of two wills in the human soul he professedly adopts from Coleridge, and we venture to believe that nobody but the great opium-eater and Dr. C. ever held it. Of these two wills, the former or external will "consists in an action of the mind," "is commonly called choosing," and is "only choice-making;" while the latter is the will-power. On this we have to remark that this junction of said two wills is a false coordination. It is like saying that as we have the power of sight and the action of sight we have two sights, an external or surface sight and an internal or potential sight. This co-ordination of sight is purely verbal, arising from the fact that our language has unfortunately designated the faculty and the act of the faculty by the same vocable. So we might extend the term head to include the stomach, and thereby be enabled to say that we had two heads, a cephalic head and a gastric head. have in our legs the power to "walk," and we perform a “walk,” and so we have two walks. But the most extraordinary part of this criticism is that the writer really imagines that by our own word Will we really mean not the will-power, but the will-ing act. Most assuredly in so misconstruing our language he must of all our readers stand alone-" wrapt in the solitude of his own originality." On the very first page of our volume we declare, "The Will is the volitional power." We divide the trinality of the soul into intellect, sentiency, and will; one will and not two; three generic powers and not four. On page 26 we specially note the clumsy ambiguity of the application of the term Will to the action of the Will. To expose this ambiguity we frame

We

this sentence: "The will will will a will;" and in this sentence the first will and the last will are our critic's two wills. We framed the sentence in order to banish the latter use of the word from the language, and to secure our unequivocality we spell the noun Will throughout our volume with an initial capital. And now we confess that we shrink into utter discouragement and despair at being at last told by an eminent metaphysician in this year, 1880, that by Will we do not mean Will but the "action" of the Will.*

Our learned critic next takes issue with a statement imputed by him to us, and thus printed by him, as ours, in quotation marks: "The common sense of mankind recognizes morality in VOLITION alone." And on this he comments thus: "Volition is not the will itself, but an act of the will; and 'morality '—that is, moral properties can properly be predicated, according to this theory, not of persons, nor of their characters, but only of their volitions. In himself Judas was no worse than his Master, only his volitions were worse; and when both were asleep, because their volitions had ceased, there was no more 'morality' about the one than the other."

Now it is with deep regret we say that the words above adduced by Dr. Curry, and marked as ours, are a false quotation; being falsified by omission of words essential to the real meaning. And, what is worse, the validity of his criticism is attained by the cutting out of words which, if retained, would have neutralized it. His criticism is valid only by scissors. Our words were, (the omitted words being italicized:) "The common sense of mankind recognizes morality primarily in volition [not capitalized in the original] alone, and not in mere perception, because it recog nizes in volition alone non-necessitation." By his striking out primarily we are made to say what we neither say nor believe, namely: that morality is recognized in volition alone, unqualifiedly; whereas we imply a qualification by the primarily which we soon expand and explain secondarily on a following page, which we shall soon quote. The words and not in perception alone are carved out, so as to shut off the fact that morality is by us ascribed to

*We are not sure that we rightly understand Dr. C. in attributing to him belief in a will-faculty. His fullest exposition of Will that we find is on pp. 193, 194, arriving at this conclusion: "To the soul thus revealed by its own exercises, in the dialect of philosophy, is given the name of WILL." But we suppose that this means "the soul," as endowed with the power of volition, the will-faculty. So that the will is the ego in volitionating. This is the only sense in which we use be word Will. See our "Will,” p. 22.

the volitions alone, not in distinction from the "person" or "character," but in distinction from the other faculties. And the detruncation of the last member of the sentence shuts off the fact that the direct object of the sentence is not to show where the morality lies, but to show that it is the non-necessitation of the volition which renders it the subject of morality rather than the other faculties. And so, by use of scissors, we are monstrously made to teach that a man's bad volitions do not demoralize or inculpate his character! The inferences next drawn in his comment which follows from such an assumption are carefully moderate. Such an assumption would teach that Judas was as good as Jesus not only "when asleep," but when awake. The crucifiers on Calvary, in the very act, would be as good as He the Crucified; for neither their bad volitions nor his good ones would render them any worse or him any better. Is it possible for any man to believe that we teach such a monstrosity? Universally when men speak of a guilty act, an immoral volition, they mean that the free-agent himself is guilty and his character immoral.

But after this primarily in our chapter there follows (p. 387) a secondarily, in which it is subsidiarily shown that morality inheres not in "volitions alone," but to other psychological parts. The volitions may so modify "the intellections, emotions, and desires," as that they become responsible, for good or evil, and so the man "would be volitionally and morally responsible." The responsibility is expressly predicated of the man, since the volitions are truly the man himself in action. We add: "Even his automatic faculties would thence derive a sort of secondary responsible character." And we further add (as if to preclude all excuse for overlooking our words) in italics: “It is thus that a man's sensibilities, intellections, emotions, and beliefs become secondarily and consequentially responsible." When thus we see how it is, by cutting out and cutting off our words and sentences in this short chapter, that our critic makes a case against us, our readers may conclude that he handles a very dexterous, if not very scrupulous, pair of scissors.

But Dr. Curry's maintenance of the most explicit basal justification of necessitarian fatalism occurs on p. 223: "Moral worth is itself the ground of merit, regardless of the genesis of that characteristic of the soul." This maxim is, indeed, attributed by him to "many persons generally supposed to possess that characteristic of rationality," common sense. But he states it as a counter-position to ours, and as agreeable to what he calls his "very dull sense." The maxim means, if it means any thing to