Game TheoryCambridge University Press, 21 mars 2013 Covering both noncooperative and cooperative games, this comprehensive introduction to game theory also includes some advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. Mathematically oriented, the book presents every theorem alongside a proof. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a broad range of disciplines. With numerous exercises the book is a thorough and extensive guide to game theory from undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences to being an authoritative reference for researchers. |
Table des matières
The game of chess | 1 |
Extensiveform games | 39 |
strategic form | 82 |
Mixed strategies | 144 |
Behavior strategies and Kuhns Theorem | 219 |
Correlated equilibria | 300 |
Games with incomplete information and common priors | 319 |
the general model | 386 |
Coalitional games with transferable utility | 659 |
The core | 686 |
The Shapley value | 748 |
The bargaining set | 782 |
The nucleolus | 801 |
Social choice | 853 |
Stable matching | 884 |
Appendices | 916 |
Auctions | 461 |
Repeated games | 519 |
Repeated games with vector payoffs | 569 |
Bargaining games | 622 |
| 958 | |
| 968 | |
Expressions et termes fréquents
affine alternatives ascribes probability Aumann model average payoff bargaining game behavior strategy belief hierarchy belief space belief subspace buyer chance move choose coalitional game coalitional structure contains convex set core deduce defined Definition Denote dominated strategies efficiency Equation equilibrium payoff example Exercise exists expected payoff extensive-form game Figure find finite flow game tree game with incomplete II’s imputation incomplete information infinite information set knows lottery mixed strategy model of incomplete monotonic Nash equilibrium nonempty nucleolus ofplayer outcome pair partition payoff function Player 11 player i G N Player I’s preference relation private value probability distribution profit proof Prove pure strategies repeated game satisfies satisfying sealed-bid second-price auction set of players Shapley value simplex solution concept stable matching strategic-form game strategy of Player strategy vector strict preference subgame perfect equilibrium symmetric symmetric equilibrium Theorem two-player zero-sum game utility function vertex vertices winning