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Dr. Doddridge, in a better to John Wester, aft reading of severale distinguished writers ameny

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Itment sublime is to be found in his willings; &, notwinstanding the Sosuring of some passages, & the huronnes of eiers, in the strongest pathos, as well as some of tire uncermin thoughts. It lies a little out of my serve it at present, yet it is most time, that were w's the thoughts of his Living Temple to be taken from blair the Athibutes, what wonted remain would be very in considerable; but what remains of it. I love, unborrance & other, is weighty, variens, & in many parts of it, exum beautions".. Doddridge: Diary & Correspondence. édited by bump trays, vol. IV. p. 485..

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THE

WORK S

OF THE

REV. JOHN HOW E, M. A.

WITH

MEMOIRS OF HIS LIFE,

BY EDMUND CALAMY, D. D.

COMPLETE IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

NEW YORK:

PUBLISHED BY JOHN P. HAVEN,

No. 148 NASSAU STREET.

MDCCCXXXV.

DIVINITY SCHOOL

LIBRARY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CONTENTS.

thar. argument, whereof they are incapable.

Often disputes of its principles not necessary to

the practice of religion. Some consideration of

those supposed in the general notion of a temple,

pertinent (however) to this discourse. .

CHAP. II. I. The two more principal grounds

which a temple supposes. FIRST, The existence

of God. SECONDLY, His conversableness with

men: both argued from common consent. Doubt-

ful if the first were ever wholly denied in former

days. The second also implied, First, In the

known general practice of some or other religion.

Evidenced, Secondly, In that some, no strangers

to the world, have thought it the difference of

man. II. The immodesty and rashness of the

persons from whom any opposition can be ex-

pected. III. These two grounds, namely, the

existence of God, and his conversableness with

men, proposed to be more strictly considered

apart. And, FIRST, The existence of God,

where the notion of God is assigned. The parts

whereof are proposed to be evinced severally of

some existent being. First, Eternity. Secondly,

Self-origination. Thirdly, Independency. Fourth

ly, Necessity of existence. Fifthly, Self-activity.

(The impossibility that this world should be

this necessary self-active being. The incon-

sistency of necessary alterable matter, more

largely deduced in a marginal digression.)

Sixthly, Life. Seventhly, Vast and mighty power.

A corollary.

CHAP. III. Wisdom asserted to belong to this

Being. The production of this world by a

mighty agent destitute of wisdom impossible.

On consideration of, 1. What would be adverse

to this production. 2. What would be wanting;

some effects to which a designing cause will, on

all hands, be confessed necessary, having mani-

fest characters of skill and design upon them.

Absurd here to except the works of nature

wherein at least equal characters of wisdom and

design are to be seen, as in any the most confess-

ed pieces of art, instanced in the frame and mo

tion of heavenly bodies. A mean unphilosophical

temper, to be more taken with novelties, than

common things of greater importance. Further

instance, in the composition of the bodies of

animals. Two contrary causes of men's not

acknowledging the wisdom of their Maker

herein. Progress is made from the consideration

of the parts and frame, to the powers and func-

tions, of terrestrial creatures. Growth, nutrition,

propagation of kind. Spontaneous motion, sen-

sation. The pretence considered, that the bodies

of animals are machines. 1. How improbable it

is. 2. How little to the purpose. The powers of

the human soul. It appears, notwithstanding

them, it had a cause; by them, a wise and intelli-

gent cause. It is not matter. That not capable

of reason. They not here reflected on who think

reasonable souls made of refined matter, by the

Creator. Not being matter, nor arising from

thence, it must have a cause that is intelligent.

Goodness belonging to this Being.

CHAP. IV. Generally all supposable perfection

asserted of this Being; where, First, A being

absolutely perfect is endeavoured to be evinced

from the (already proved) necessary bei g; which

is shown to import, in the general, the utmost

fulness of being. Also divers things in particular

that tend to evince that general. As that it is at

the remotest distance from no being. Most pure-

ly actual. Most abstracted being. The produc-

tive and conserving cause of all things else. Un-

diminishable. Incapable of addition. Secondly,

Hence is more expressly deduced, The infinite-

ness of this being. An inquiry whether it be

possible the creature can be actually infinite?

Difficulties concerning the absolute fulness and

infiniteness of God considered. 2. The oneliness

of this being. The trinity not thereby excluded.

CHAP. V. Demands in reference to what hath been

hitherto discoursed, with some reasonings there-

upon 1. Is it possible that, upon supposition of

this being's existence, it may be, in any way

suitable to our present state, made known to us

that it doth exist? Proved, 1. That it may. 2.

That, since any other fit way that can be thought

on is as much liable to exception as that we have

already, this must be, therefore, sufficient. Strong

impressions. Glorious apparitions. Terrible

voices. Surprising transformations. If these are

necessary, is it needful they be universal? fre-

quent? If not, more rare things of this sort not

wanting. 2. Demand. Can subjects, remote from

their prince, sufficiently be assured of his exist-

ence 3. Demand. Can we be sure there are

men on earth? . .

CHAP. VI. What is intended by God's conversa-

bleness with men, considered only as fundamen-

tal and presupposed to a temple. An account of

the Epicurean deity. Its existence impossible

any way to be proved, if it did exist. Nor can

be affirmed to any good intent. That such a be-

ing is not God. That the absolute perfection

proved of God represents him a fit object of re-

ligion. From thence more particularly deduced

to this purpose, His omnisciency, omnipotency,

unlimited goodness, immensity. Curcellæus's

arguments against this last considered.

PART II. Containing Animadversions on Spinosa,

and a French Writer pretending to confute him.

With a Recapitulation of the Former Part, and

an Account of the Destitution and Restitution

of God's Temple among men.

CHAP. I. Wherein is shown, the destructiveness of

Spinosa's scheme and design to religion and the

temple of God. The repugnancy of his doctrine

to this assertion-That whatsoever exists neces-

sarily and of itself, is absolutely perfect; which

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