Thinking and DecidingCambridge University Press, 22 oct. 2006 Beginning with its first edition and through subsequent editions, Thinking and Deciding has established itself as the required text and important reference work for students and scholars of human cognition and rationality. In this fourth edition, first published in 2007, Jonathan Baron retains the comprehensive attention to the key questions addressed in the previous editions - how should we think? What, if anything, keeps us from thinking that way? How can we improve our thinking and decision making? - and his expanded treatment of topics such as risk, utilitarianism, Baye's theorem, and moral thinking. With the student in mind, the fourth edition emphasises the development of an understanding of the fundamental concepts in judgement and decision making. This book is essential reading for students and scholars in judgement and decision making and related fields, including psychology, economics, law, medicine, and business. |
Table des matières
5 | |
9780521862073c02_p3160 | 31 |
9780521862073c03_p6176 | 61 |
9780521862073c04_p7798 | 77 |
9780521862073pt02_p99102 | 99 |
9780521862073c05_p103136 | 103 |
9780521862073c06_p137160 | 137 |
9780521862073c07_p161182 | 161 |
9780521862073c12_p289310 | 289 |
9780521862073c13_p311340 | 311 |
9780521862073c14_p341362 | 341 |
9780521862073c15_p363388 | 363 |
9780521862073c16_p389416 | 389 |
9780521862073c17_p417440 | 417 |
9780521862073c18_p441470 | 441 |
9780521862073c19_p471496 | 471 |
9780521862073c08_p183198 | 183 |
9780521862073c09_p199228 | 199 |
9780521862073pt03_p229232 | 229 |
9780521862073c10_p233256 | 233 |
9780521862073c11_p257288 | 257 |
9780521862073c20_p497526 | 497 |
527 | |
9780521862073ain_p567576 | 567 |
577 | |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
actively open-minded Allais paradox answer argued argument assume attributes Baron Bayes's theorem behavior beliefs benefit better bias biases cancer cause Chapter choice choose concerned consider cooperation correlation cost decision analysis dimension disease effect emotions error evaluate evidence example expected utility expected value expected-utility theory experiment experimental favor formula function gamble given harm heuristic hypothesis idea inference intuitions involve irrational Journal judge Kahneman kind less logic means measure method moral normative model normative theory omission bias one’s option outcomes patients people’s possible prediction prefer prescriptive primacy effect principle prior probability probability judgments probability theory problem prospect theory Psychology question rational reason representativeness heuristic result risk risk aversion rule score situation Slovic social dilemmas standard gambles subjects were asked Suppose tend things tradeoff true Tversky utilitarianism utility theory vaccine winning