we are capable of taking a more enlarged view of his creative and providential plan." (p. 273.) Instances might be readily found where the notable Prependary of St. Paul's makes havoc of perspicuity by the ruthless manner in which he employs the word "it" The style is in some respects good, and Dr. Row has, on the whole, succeeded in clothing an abstract subject with the charm of interest. But the diction is diffuse and, as we have seen, labored; the book is full of needless repetition, and its statements are at times inadequate and even inaccurate. That the proofreader is in part responsible for this, is undeniable. Dr. Row never could have asserted that the "internal ear' [sic] is of little importance in the case of man; but that a horse may be seen any time shaking it about.

It must also be a novelty to the medical profession to be told that • carbolic acid" [sic] is normally liberated from the lungs in the process of the aeration of the blood.

The author's defective analysis is again and again evinced by the unnecessarily large number of the recapitulary heads under which he is wont to sum up an extended discussion. Thus he makes separate coördinate points of will-power and the power of originating action; also of conscience and the moral sense. It is conspicuous too in his treatment of the topic of "correlations," and of his tiresome reiteration of the words in which he continually reduces into one indiscriminate jumble what he is so fond of referring to as "the adjustments, adaptations, and correlations with which the universe abounds." In his definition our author confines the application of the term "correlation" to two classes, but describes without naming them, viz.: correlations of forces, and correlations of adaptations. The second of these classes may be either inorganic or organic, as the writer implies, but does not say. The organic correlations he finds an example in the human body, and might have found one of the inorganic in the steam-engine. With Dr. Row a "correlation" is in either case a group of correlated, but independent forces, or adaptations, meeting for the production of a common resultant effect which otherwise would not have occurred. He never makes mention of the familiar use of the term in its etymological sense, or of the technical sense in which it is so freely employed by Darwin and the other naturalists, and of which we have a signal example in the so-called "homologies of the vertebrate skeleton." Dr. Row seems to use the term once in the sense of a "correlation" of organs and their environment; where he speaks of the "correlation" of "the sun, the ether, the eye, the brain, and the mind" (p. 295), in the production of vision.

The unsatisfactory nature of the logic of portions of this book has been adverted to. The logical worth of the general argument is unimpeachable. The deceptive character of some of his ratiocination is strikingly signalized in his discussion of Pessimism considered in regard of the question as to the proofs of the divine benevolence that are to be seen in the works of creation. The particularly reverend disputant alleges that he will not at first bring in the consideration of a future state. He then proceeds to construct an argument, and a good one, the whole validity of which depends upon a subsequent introduction of the assumed fact of a future state of adjudication and recompense. The proof that there is on the whole more happiness than misery in the world is strongly and ingeniously built up and persuasively stated. But it is when discussing the great problems of free-will, moral evil, eternal punishment, and what the Christadelphians style "the

intrinsic immortality of the soul," that the author of the Bampton Lectures on ""The Jesus of the Evangelists" and of the "Handbook of Christian Evidences" is most open to adverse criticism both as a logician and as a theologian.

The author first palpably begs the question by asserting point-blank that every determinism in form is nothing but another name for fatalism, being only a phase of the theory which reduces man to the condition of a machine or of an animal. Later on there is some pretence of reasoning out this proposition, but the process is only of the specious but frivolous sort which is based on the erroneous averments that have become so threadbare. Dr. Row is apparently a Pelagian, certainly a Restorationist, and possibly a Socinian. The unfathomable mystery of the origin of sin is dealt with in a manner as debonair and egotistical as it is superficial. It is manifest that the final theodicy has not yet been given to the world by Dr. Row. Our amiable, if oversanguine, author boldly takes the ground that "the existence" and "presence of moral evil" is one of the inevitable corollaries from the admitted existence of a moral system. This is, of course, the old, old delusion of the essential impreventibility of sin. The preacher of St. Paul's Cathedral also openly favors the scheme of posthumous probation. He urges impressively enough that God's work of repair traverses, not only innumerable peopled worlds, but innumerable progressive ages. The acme of absurdity is, however, reached when he surmises that some of the "many mansions" of the invisible universe may be "mansions of purification"! A friend near us suggests that in that great house not made with hands there must be "spiritual bath-rooms"! We part from our entertaining, but in some cardinal points, sadly untrustworthy mentor with a genuine respect for his moderation of temper, his talents, his exploits, and his good intentions; and with a clear recognition of the fact that his most serious departures from orthodoxy are no doubt due to the sinister fascination of the brilliant scholar, and audacious rhetorician and orator, who still preaches at St. Margaret's and Westminster Abbey. H. C. ALEXANDER.

STEARNS' EVIDENCE OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE.

THE EVIDENCE OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE: By Lewis French Stearns, Professor of Christian Theology in Bangor Theological Seminary: Pp. 473. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

1890.

This handsome treatise consists of a series of lectures given by Professor Stearns, of Bangor, Me., on the Ely foundation in Union Seminary, New York city. With a great theme, an able thinker, a ripe scholar, and a fine writer, we are prepared to find these lectures of much interest and great practical value. After reading them, we are better able to understand why Union Seminary called Professor Stearns to succeed Dr. Shedd, in its chair of Theology, and why Bangor Seminary should rejoice that Dr Stearns did not accept the call. A more stimulating book we have not read for some time. If enthusiasm for his theme sometimes leads him to what we must consider one-sided views, yet the warm glow of that enthusiasm, coming from a heart burning with devotion to the glorified Redeemer, at once stimulates the mind and refreshes the heart. The course consists of ten compact and scholarly lectures. The following résumé of them may give our readers some idea of what they contain, though it can do them but scanty justice.

In the first lecture our author sets forth what may be termed the status of the Evidences at the present day, and defines carefully his theme-The Evidence of Christian Experience.

The refutation of the deism of the last century, at the hands of Butler, Paley and others, is well described, though it is perhaps going too far to allow that the methods of Butler are not effective for the apologetic needs of the present day. With fine skill, our author shows how subtle pantheism has taken the place of deism and how scientific progress has led to agnosticism and materialism. Following a hint given by Ebrard, in his Apologetics, he says that the present situation calls for a system of Apologetics which shall be "a positive system of proofs adapted to all times and circumstances, by which we may not only meet attacks, but forestall them and carry them into the enemy's country." (P. 19.) He thinks, too, that progress has been made in this direction in recent years. He is convinced that a truer perception of what Christianity is has been attained, and a more profound view of its defences has now been reached. We rejoice with him that such is the case. 'Christianity," he says, "is the whole redemptive activity of God in Christ. It is God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself." (P. 20.) It will be observed that this definition describes only what may be called the subjective or dynamic aspect of Christianity. This, of course, is every word of it true; yet, unless the objective or formal gospel scheme be at the same time clearly pre-supposed, the definition is at least one-sided.

That our author makes this pre-supposition is evident, as he approaches his theme, when he draws the distinction between: (1). The saving grace connected historically with a series of redemptive facts culminating in the advent of Christ, and: (2). The divine truth represented by the doctrines of revelation. (Pp. 23-24.) He also makes the somewhat popular modern distinction, signalized by Professor Mead, in his Supernatural Revelation, between the facts and doctrines of revelation and the record of them. The redemptive revelation is one thing, but its record in the Bible is another thing. In a qualified sense, there may be ground for this distinction, but great care must be taken not to push it too far. The Bible is not a merely human record of a divine redemptive revelation. The record is divine as well as the revelation. For while many things contained in the Bible were not at first divine revelations to those who wrote them, yet, as this so-called record of a divine revelation comes to us, stamped as divine and infallible by the fact of inspiration, may it not, by men of the present day, be regarded in all its parts as a divine revelation? Thus even the history and poetry of the Bible are different from all other history and poetry; and the divine revelation and its divine record are for us of the present age practically identical.

Our author rightly looks upon Christianity not merely as a redemptive revelation completed nearly two thousand years ago, but also as a system of redemptive agencies brought into the world to stay, so that Christianity is a living reality in all He deserves much credit for giving this point prominence.

the ages.

Then in defining his subject our author classifies the evidences from the standpoint above indicated in a threefold way, as historical, rational and redemptive. Christianity is historically true, it is philosophically sound, and it is a working power in the world to-day. The last is the sphere in which the evidence of Christian experience lies. By this evidence Dr. Stearns does not mean the general ar

gument from the effects of Christianity, nor that from its present influence upon men, nor even that drawn from the outwardly changed lives of its professors, but rather that which is " derived from the manifestation to the believer himself, in his own inward spiritual life, of the presence and power of God and the Christian realities," P. 28. There is a definiteness and clearness in the manner in which our author marks out his subject worthy of all praise.

The second and third lectures deal with the theistic and anthropological presuppositions upon which the evidence of Christian experience, and in fact the whole fabric of Christianity, rest. Both of these lectures are exceedingly able, and on the whole satisfactory. That on the theistic discussion is specially fine, revealing at every turn at once the philosopher and the theologian, but there are some things in the anthropological exposition which in our judgment might have been stated with a little more care. See page 75.

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The fourth lecture deals with the genesis of the evidence. It begins "when a man comes fairly under the redeeming activity of God in Christ." The initiative is known as coming from God” (italics his), in what is described as the "divine call." P. 112. This call has "an external and internal aspect." Of the external the outward word and the witnessing church are the means. The internal aspect of the divine call consists in “an immediate and personal communication of God to the soul as the God of redemption," and this in a "crisis of the inner life." P. 119. This brings the man to the threshold of the Christian experience in question, but the actual experience is only attained by the free act of the human will accepting the gospel, which act, however, is only possible by divine grace. P. 126. This act of the soul has two factors-repentance and faith. Repentance is choice and faith is volition, and they are inseparable. Faith is the first executive act of the will issuing from the choice implied in repentance, and it consists in receiving and resting upon Christ alone for salvation. Further, repentance differs from penitence. The former is a matter of the will, the latter belongs to the sensibility. Faith, too, is not mere mental assent, nor is it simply a belief in the unseen, nor again is it a conviction of the reality of axiomatic truth; rather is it an act of trust by which we yield to God's will, and accept Christ as he is offered to us in the gospel." This faith, further, "is instrumental and appropriates God's grace." "It is receptive rather than productive." It results in the "conscious experience of the revelation of a new life to the soul." This new experience testifies to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and this Spirit bears witness to the fact of union with Christ, of God's fatherly relation, of the forgiveness of sins, of the communion of saints, and of final blessedness. P. 127-130.

There is much fine analysis in this lecture of which the above summary gives no proper idea, and in it there is much which is to our liking. Did space permit, we would like to make some remarks on the philosophy of the will implied, and on the theology of repentance and faith involved, in our author's analysis. Omitting such remarks, there is a statement made on page 114 which in itself puzzles us, and which does not seem to be made plain by the context. In speaking of the relation between the general religious experience of all men, including heathen who have never heard of Christ, and the peculiar experience of the Christian, he says: "It seems to me not unreasonable to suppose not only that in some instances the germ of divine life may exist in heathen hearts (that, I hope, is often the case),

but also that it may arrive at a certain degree of maturity in this life, though, of course, it could never be what it might have been under consciously recognized Christian influences." .. .. "Nor should we expect to see such a person" (a heathen who had never heard of Christ) "make any high attainments in the religious life as judged by the Christian standard. In a word, his experience would not be, in any adequate sense of the term, a Christian experience." Here we are puzzled and prompted to ask several questions. Is this "germ of divine life" such as shall result in salvation? If not sufficiently mature in this life to secure salvation, shall it go on unto maturity and bring salvation in some stage beyond death? Is this germ ever implanted in any adult soul who has never heard of Christ? Does not the teaching of Scripture seem to be that in the case of adults a knowledge of the objective gospel is necessary to those subjective experiences that are really Christian, wherein the germ of divine life results in salvation? On such very delicate ground our author, it seems to us, would have been wise to have written more cautiously.

In the fifth lecture, the growth of the evidence is described. Here the advancing growth of sanctification is considered, and the way in which this growth furnishes an increasing knowledge of the reality of the divine causes at work is ably sketched. Then the trinitarian nature of this experience as it relates to the Father, to the Christ, and to the Holy Spirit is outlined. All along the progress of sanctification there comes increasing inward assurance of the truth of Christianity. The force of the evidence runs side by side with this growth.

In the sixth lecture, this evidence is verified in a discussion which, though marked by ability, seems at times to be somewhat forced and unreal. The author here raises the question, "Is the evidence of Christian experience capable of scientific or philosophical verification?" This question is answered in the affirmative, and he then goes on to show that, by a definitely scientific method, our probable knowledge of the truth of Christianity, based on the outward evidences, is transformed into real knowledge by the experiment of accepting the gospel offer. Until this Christian experience begins, a man can have only a probable knowledge of Christianity, but after he has responded by faith to the divine call, this probable knowledge is changed into real or certain knowledge which supplies the highest kind of evidence in favor of Christianity.

This is a brief statement of what is wrought out at length in this lecture. It is a rather technical sketch of the argument from the experience of the power of the gospel in a man's soul. For the man who is its subject, it is overpowering, but for others without this experience, it can have no greater force than any other good evidence based on testimony.

The seventh lecture, in order further to confirm the scientific nature of this evidence, considers certain philosophical objections. Eight objections are taken up and disposed of in a most effective manner. The objection raised by the positivist, agnostic and materialist against the possibility of this experience is most thoroughly refuted. The objection that the Bible determines Christian experience, and so that experience cannot be taken to prove the truth of the Bible, seems to give our author most difficulty from his point of view.

The eighth lecture deals with a number of theological objections, some from the opponents of evangelical truth, and some from its friends. Here the systems of