SECTION XIV. LAWS ARE NOT MADE BY KINGS, NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE BUSIED IN GREATER MATTERS THAN DOING JUSTICE, BUT BECAUSE NATIONS WILL BE GOVERNED BY RULE, AND NOT ARBITRARILY. OUR author, pursuing the mistakes to which he seems perpetually condemned, says, that "when king's were either busied in war, or distracted with public care, so that every private man could not have access unto their persons, to learn their wills and pleasures, then of necessity were laws invented, that so every particular subject might find his prince's pleasure." I have often heard, that governments were established for the obtaining of justice; and if that be true, it is hard to imagine what business a supreme magistrate can have to divert him from accomplishing the principal end of his institution. And it is commonly said, that this distribution of justice to a people, is a work surpassing the strength of any one man. Jethro seems to have been a wise man, and it is probable he thought Moses* to be so also; but he found the work of judging the people to be too heavy for him, and therefore advised him to leave the judgment of causes to others, who * Exod. xviii. should be chosen for that purpose; which advice Moses accepted, and God approved. The governing power was as insupportable to him as the judicial. He desired rather to die than to bear so great a burthen; and God neither accusing him of sloth or impatience, gave him seventy assistants. But if we may believe our author, the powers judicial and legislative, that of judging, as well as that of governing, are not too much for any man, woman, or child, whatsoever and that he stands in no need, either of God's statutes to direct him, or man's counsel to assist him, unless it be when he is otherwise employed; and his will alone is sufficient for all. But what if he be not busied in greater matters, or distracted with public cares? Is every prince capable of this work? Though Moses had not found it too great for him, or it should be granted, that a man of excellent natural endowments, great wisdom, learning, experience, industry, and integrity, might perform it, is it certain, that all those who happen to be born in reigning families are so? If Moses had the law of God before his eyes, and could repair to God himself for the application or explanation of it; have all princes the same assistance? Do they all speak with God face to face, or can they do what he did, without the assistance he had? If all kings of mature years are of that perfection, are we assured, that none shall die before his heir arrives to the same? Or shall he have the same ripeness of judgment in his infancy? If a child comes to a crown, does that immediately infuse the most admirable endowments and graces? Have we any promise from heaven, that SECTION XIV. LAWS ARE NOT MADE BY KINGS, NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE BUSIED IN GREATER MATTERS THAN DOING JUSTICE, BUT BECAUSE NATIONS WILL BE GOVERNED BY RULE, AND NOT ARBITRARILY. OUR author, pursuing the mistakes to which he seems perpetually condemned, says, that "when kings were either busied in war, or distracted with public care, so that every private man could not have access unto their persons, to learn their wills and pleasures, then of necessity were laws invented, that so every particular subject might find his prince's pleasure." I have often heard, that governments were established for the obtaining of justice; and if that be true, it is hard to imagine what business a supreme magistrate can have to divert him from accomplishing the principal end of his institution. And it is commonly said, that this distribution of justice to a people, is a work surpassing the strength of any one man. Jethro seems to have been a wise man, and it is probable he thought Moses* to be so also; but he found the work of judging the people to be too heavy for him, and therefore advised him to leave the judgment of causes to others, who *Exod. xviii. should be chosen for that purpose; which advice Moses accepted, and God approved. The governing power was as insupportable to him as the judicial. He desired rather to die than to bear so great a burthen; and God neither accusing him of sloth or impatience, gave him seventy assistants. But if we may believe our author, the powers judicial and legislative, that of judging, as well as that of governing, are not too much for any man, woman, or child, whatsoever and that he stands in no need, either of God's statutes to direct him, or man's counsel to assist him, unless it be when he is otherwise employed; and his will alone is sufficient for all. But what if he be not busied in greater matters, or distracted with public cares? Is every prince capable of this work? Though Moses had not found it too great for him, or it should be granted, that a man of excellent natural endowments, great wisdom, learning, experience, industry, and integrity, might perform it, is it certain, that all those who happen to be born in reigning families are so? If Moses had the law of God before his eyes, and could repair to God himself for the application or explanation of it; have all princes the same assistance? Do they all speak with God face to face, or can they do what he did, without the assistance he had? If all kings of mature years are of that perfection, are we assured, that none shall die before his heir arrives to the same? Or shall he have the same ripeness of judgment in his infancy? If a child comes to a crown, does that immediately infuse the most admirable endowments and graces? Have we any promise from heaven, that women shall enjoy the same prerogatives in those countries where they are made capable of the succession? Or does that law which renders them capable, defend them, not only against the frailty of their own nature, but confer the most sublime virtues upon them? But who knows not, that no families do more frequently produce weak or ill men, than the greatest? and, which is worse, their greatness is a snare to them; so that they, who, in a low condition, might have passed unregarded, being advanced to the highest, have often appeared to be, or become, the worst of all beasts; and they who advance them are like to them: for if the power be in the multitude, as our author is forced to confess (other wise the Athenians and Romans could not have given all, as he says, nor a part, as I say, to Draco, Solon, or the decemviri) they must be beasts also, who should have given away their right and liberty, in hopes of receiving justice from such as probably will neither understand nor regard it; or protection from those who will not be able to help themselves; and expect such virtue, wisdom, and integrity, should be, and forever remain, in the family they set up, as was never known to continue in any. If the power be not conferred upon them, they have it not; and if they have it not, their want of leisure to do justice, cannot have been the cause for which laws are made; and they cannot be the signification of their will, but are that to which the prince owes obedience, as well as the meanest subject. This is that which Bracton calls, esse sub lege," and says, that "rer |