Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy

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Princeton University Press, 1997 - 250 pages
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In exploring the special nature of alliances among democracies, Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that the West European and Canadian allies exerted greater influence on American foreign policy during the Cold War than most analysts assume. In so doing, he challenges traditional alliance theories that emphasize strategic interactions and power-based bargaining processes. For a better understanding of the transatlantic relationship, the author proposes that we instead turn to liberal theories of international affairs. Accordingly, liberal democracies are likely to form the "pacific federations" described by Immanuel Kant or "pluralistic security communities" as Karl W. Deutsch suggested.


Through detailed case studies, Risse-Kappen shows that the Europeans affected security decisions concerning vital U.S. interest during the 1950-1953 Korean war, the 1958-1963 test ban negotiations, and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis--all during a span of time in which the U.S. enjoyed undisputed economic and military supremacy in the alliance. He situates these case studies within a theoretical framework demonstrating that the European influence on decision-making processes in Washington worked through three mechanisms: norms prescribing timely consultations among the allies, use of domestic pressures for leverage in transatlantic interactions, and transnational and transgovernmental coalitions among societal and bureaucratic actors. The book's findings have important repercussions for the post-Cold War era in that they suggest the transatlantic security community is likely to survive the end of the Soviet threat.

 

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Table des matières

Conclusions
140
A Strike on Cuba which May Lose Berlin The Europeans and the 1962 Cuban Missle Crisis
146
Allied Consultation during the Crisis
148
Support for a Deal
152
Support
157
Berlin
159
The Jupiter Missiles
162
Conclusions
176

Pushing and Pulling the US toward a CeaseFire
66
Conclusions
75
Unworthy and Unreliable Allies Violation of Alliance Norms during the 1956 Suez Crisis
83
Diverging Interests and Preferences
84
Duplicity
87
Unworthy
91
US Coercion and the Restoration of the Transatlantic Relationship
96
Conclusions
99
A Game of Golf and a Little Talk Transnational Coalitions and the 19581963 Test Ban Negotiations
105
Transnational Coalitions among Scientists and Peace Activists
107
The British Impact on Eisenhowers Nuclear Testing Policies
112
British Efforts during the Kennedy Administration
126
Dealing with French and German Opposition
134
Blowing Up New York to Save Berlin? Norms Transnational Relations and NATOs Nuclear Decisions
183
The Debate about Flexible Response
184
The Neutron Bomb Controversy
187
INF the DualTrack Decision and the Zero Option
188
Conclusions
191
Conclusions the Transatlantic Community and the European Impact on American Foreign Policy
194
Collective Identity Norms and the Big Influence of the European Allies
195
The British and Germans versus the French
210
Suggestions for Further Research
215
The End of the Cold War and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship
218
BIBLIOGRAPHY
227
INDEX
243
Droits d'auteur

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Expressions et termes fréquents

Fréquemment cités

Page 32 - They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.
Page 35 - NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character; c) a member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible...
Page 35 - The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
Page 56 - Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.
Page 85 - My colleagues and I are convinced that we must be ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses. For our part we are prepared to do so. I have this morning instructed our Chiefs of Staff to prepare a military plan accordingly.
Page 30 - INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of'peaceful change
Page 19 - Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Marina vN Whitman, "Leadership without Hegemony,
Page 27 - If, as is inevitably the case under this constitution, the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war is to be declared, it is very natural that they will have great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war, such as doing the fighting themselves, supplying the costs of the war...
Page 86 - For many years now the United States has been walking a tightrope between the effort to maintain our old and valued relations with our British and French allies on the one hand, and on the other trying to assure ourselves of the friendship and understanding of the newly independent countries who have escaped from colonialism...
Page 22 - However, this correlation between benefits, policies and power is by no means inevitable. A weak nation may well possess an asset which is of such great value for its strong ally as to be irreplaceable.

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À propos de l'auteur (1997)

Thomas Risse-Kappen is Professor of International Relations at the University of Konstanz, Germany, and International Relations Chair at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. He is the editor of Bringing Transnational Relations Back In.

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