INTRODUCTION.

The world has been much surprised at an article which appeared in Number XLVI. of the Edinburgh Review, on a work of La Place, Sur Les Probabilites, in which the doctrine of Hume, "that miracles cannot be proved by any testimony," is revived. It was not expected that, after the complete exposure of the weakness of Hume's arguments, his sophisms and self-contradictions, by Dr. Campbell and others, any person would again have asserted his doctrine. But this has been done in the broadest manner, in the above article, and a very high compliment paid to Hume, as having been the first who ever gave a fair view of that doctrine. It is true, their is a salvo added in favour of religion, but as it is certain that Hume intended his doctrine to militate against religion, and as not a word is said to shew how it does not apply to religion, there is reason to apprehend that this will be considered as a mere compliment to general opinion.— The whole reasoning of Hume, of the Reviewer, and of the author whom he reviews, bears as strongly against miracles in support of religion, as against those of any other kind, and however it may be meant, there is reason to believe that both the friends and enemies of religion will consider it as an attack against the argument in favour of Christianity, arising from miracles.

I cannot help observing here, the eagerness of the enemies of Christianity, in turning all sciences into weapons against religion. Natural philosophy, geography, geology, history, politics, chemistry, are all made vehicles for conveying infidel opinions. Geometry and algebra, one would have thought, could never have been so employed; yet such is the earnestness of infidels in promoting their cause, and such their dexterity, that even these sciences have been forced to contribute their aid; and so far do they carry it, that, in a pamphlet on Backgammon, or Whist, they will contrive to have something against religion.

Some persons may consider it as quite superfluous to publish any thing on this subject, after what has been written by others, and particularly after the able work of Dr. Campbell, which is so well known in this country. But when the enemies of revelation are found considering it as useful to their cause to publish anew their old and refuted arguments, it may also be useful to the cause of religion to meet them with new answers, suited to the present circumstances. New publications will always find some readers, who might be disposed to neglect old works, though of greater merit. This little tract is not to be considered as a full or elaborate discussion of the question, nor as intended to supercede the more extensive work of Dr. Campbell,-a work

which is earnestly recommended to every reader;-but merely to furnish, in a small compass, an antidote to the poison so widely diffused by the Edinburgh Review.*

It may be thought an arduous attempt to enter the lists with the first geometrician, whom France has produced in the present day, and with the Reviewer, who is also, perhaps, the first in his profession in this country. And, indeed, were it in any degree a question of geometry or calculation, I would leave it to others. But it is a question of pure reasoning; and it is well known that the most eminent geometricians, however gigantic their powers are in their own field, are often, when they leave that, less than other men. The most moderate talents on the side of truth, have often been found an overmatch for the greatest on the side of error; and I apprehend there will be very little difficulty in this case, in showing the inconclusiveness of the whole reasoning.— I shall, first, examine the reasoning of La Place, and then that of the Reviewer.

SECTION. I.

Examination of the Reasoning of La Place.

The following is the passage from La Place, on which the whole is built.

"Events may be so extraordinary, that they can hardly be established by any testimony. We would not give credit to a man who affirmed that he had seen an hundred dice thrown into the air, and all fall on the same faces. If we ourselves had been spectators of such an event, we would not believe our own eyes, till we had scrupulously examined all the circumstances, and assured ourselves that there was no trick nor deception. After such examination, we would not hesitate to admit it, notwithstanding its great improbability; and no one would have recourse to an inversion of the laws of vision, in order to account for it.

Dr. Campbell informs us, that it excited much surprise in his days, that Hume continued to publish one edition after another of his Essays, without taking the least notice of the answer, though he had, in a letter to the author, expressed himself in terms very different from those of contempt, concerning that work. It has excited no less surprise at present, that the Reviewer has republished Hume's doctrine, and maintained as profound a silence about any answer to it, as if none had ever been made. But there is no occasion for any surprise. They wish to produce a certain effect, and that effect is to be produced by promulgating their own doctrines, not by noticing the answers. They have, perhaps, taken the hint, from these persevering personages, the quack doctors, who continue year after year to advertise their nostrums, long after their pernicious effects have been detected. They persevere, because they hope that many will read and believe, and purchase and swallow, who never heard of the detection.

+ No man ever fell into grosser absurdities in general reasoning than Whis

ton.

This shows, that the probability of the continuance of the laws of nature, is superior, in our estimation, to every other evidence, and to that of historical facts the best established. One may therefore judge of the weight of testimouy necessary to prove a suspension of the laws of nature, and how fallacious it is, in such cases, to apply the common rules of evidence." Edinburgh Review, p. 327.

The first remark I shall make on this paragraph, is, the author's apparent hesitation and diffidence with regard to the doctrine he is advancing. He reminds us of a boy venturing on the ice, uncertain whether it will bear him or not. He first says, he would hardly believe extraordinary events: then he gives a particular instance, and says, we would not believe it. There is certainly a wide difference betwixt hardly believing, and not believing at all; and though the author seems to use the first as a stepping-stone to carry him on to the last, yet there is still so great a difference between them, that we may grant the first, and utterly deny the second.

In order to sift his reasoning more thoroughly, it will be necessary to draw it out in a somewhat more logical form. I shall endeavor do it all justice, under the conviction that this paper can be of no service, unless the argument is met both fairly and fully.--There are three premises, and a conclusion, as follows.

First, We would not believe a man who said that he had seen a hundred dice fall on the same faces.

Secondly, We would believe our own eyes, if we actually saw such an event.

Thirdly, The reason why we would believe our own eyes, is our belief of the immutability of the laws of vision.

Therefore, our belief of the continuance of the laws of nature, is greater than our belief of any testimony.

Now, I shall endeavour to show that both the first and third of these premises are false, and therefore the conclusion must be false also.

The whole rests on the first assertion, that we would not give credit to a man who related that he saw such a wonderful event. The truth of that proposition is therefore to be examined most particularly. But before proceeding to the examination of it, I must take the liberty of introducing a little change into the statement. The author merely says, we would not give credit to a man, that is, literally, to one man; but, in using this language, he either did not intend to go so far as Hume and the Reviewer, or if he did intend to go as far, it must have been an oversight; for his argument required that he should have said, we would not

believe any number of men, however great that number may be, and with whatever circumstances their testimony may be attended. His conclusion is universal, against our belief of any testimony; but that conclusion will not follow, though we had good ground not to believe one man. I suppose, therefore, he means to say, We would not believe any number of men, however intelligent, however disinterested, however circumstanced, who should tell us that they had seen an hundred dice fall on the same faces. Unless he says this, he says nothing to the purpose.

If La Place intended to go the same length with Hume and the Reviewer, there must also be an oversight in the instance he has given in illustration of his doctrine. He meant to shew that no testimony can prove a suspension of the laws of nature. Now, the falling of a hundred dice on the same faces, is no suspension of any law of nature. It is perfectly possible, in consistency with the laws of nature, and even in some degree probable. The author could easily have pointed out by numbers, the degree of its probability. I shall therefore, without taking advantage of this, strengthen his argument, by supposing a case which would really be a suspension of the laws of nature, such as the sun standing still, a dead person rising to life, a stone thrown into the air and not falling, or a piece of iron swimming in the water. La Place is to be understood, then, as saying, that we would not give credit to any number of witnesses, in any circumstances, who should assert that they saw an hundred dice thrown into the air, and all fall on the same faces, or a stone thrown up and remain suspended.

On this I would make two observations; 1, That it is a mere assertion without proof; and, 2, That it is altogether unfounded.

First, It is mere assertion without proof. The author has not so much as attempted any proof. In all sound reasoning, the premises from which any conclusion is drawn, ought either to be self-evident, or be proved by others which are so. But here is a proposition which lies at the foundation of the whole fabric, which is neither a self-evident axiom, nor supported by the shadow of proof.

Secondly, It is an assertion altogether unfounded.-In order to see this more clearly, we must examine it a little more particularly. It is an assertion respecting a matter of fact, "We would not believe." But who are they who are included in this word we? Does it include only La Place, the Reviewer, and two or three more; or does it include mankind at large? If the famer, it may be granted without any detriment to the cause; for as some men's enmity to the truth has been so great as to cause them

to believe a lie, so others, from the same cause, may work themselves up to disbelieve the truth, even when most clearly proved. If the latter, it is asserting a fact which he could not be sure of, unless he had examined all the people in the world, and found them unanimous, or at least, all of them who had any claims to be considered as possessed of any measure of understanding. It is a question concerning a fact in human nature, which is to be settled only by a very extensive induction of particulars, by a careful and extensive examination of existing individuals, and by a thorough knowledge of the history of mankind in times past. When La Place says, that we would not believe extraordinary or miraculous occurrences on any testimony whatever, he is contradicted by the whole history of mankind; for it is the unquestionable fact, that mankind have, in all ages, believed most extraordinary occurrences on what they considered as good testimony. Indeed, it never entered the head of one of the human race from the beginning of the world, to imagine that they ought not to believe extraordinary facts, when well attested, until about sixty years ago, this idea was started by Hume; and even since that time, the great body of mankind think themselves warranted to believe in good testimony just as they did before, notwithstanding all the new light which that author has thrown upon the subject. So far as regards the past time, then, the assertion of La Place, that mankind will not, upon any evidence, believe extraordinary facts, appears completely contrary to truth.

With regard to the present time, whether or not mankind would believe any number of witnesses in any circumstances, who should assert, that they had seen a stone remain suspended in the air, or a dead man rise to life, the fact can only be ascertained by a reference to mankind at large. It is a point on which every man must judge for himself, and, if we can by any means come to know what is the mind of mankind at large, we must abide by their decision. For, let it be observed, the question is not, what mankind ought to believe, but what they do, or will believe in a given case. It is a reference to the actual state of human nature, and to the existing constitution of the human mind, on the question, what mankind do believe, or will believe in any particular case. Now, there is not the shadow of a doubt, as was already stated, that in times past not only the vulgar, but the most enlightened of the human race, have believed miraculous facts when well attested. There is as little doubt, that the great body of mankind, learned as well as unlearned, still do the same, without being the least moved by the subtile arguments of Hume and his few followers. Thus far, belief in testimony appears to VOL. III.

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