Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear ThreatsThe contributors to this book - including policymakers, diplomats, scientists, regionalists and academic specialists - have joined in an effort to survey nuclear arms control successes, ongoing initiatives, and future prospects for reducing and countering nuclear proliferation. |
Avis des internautes - Rédiger un commentaire
Aucun commentaire n'a été trouvé aux emplacements habituels.
Table des matières
| 3 | |
| 18 | |
| 39 | |
| 60 | |
| 67 | |
| 80 | |
Nonproliferation | 88 |
Nuclear Leakage from the PostSoviet States | 107 |
Russian Nuclear Disarmament and Restrictions in | 197 |
French Nuclear Disarmament and Restrictions in the 199os | 206 |
British Nuclear Disarmament and Restrictions in the 199os | 214 |
Ben Sanders | 237 |
A Limited NuclearWeaponsFreeZone for Northeast Asia? | 245 |
Achieving | 258 |
Prevent Deter Defend | 269 |
Weapons of Mass Destruction and National Security in | 276 |
Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Reversal in South Asia | 120 |
Nuclear Proliferation Issues and Prospects in the Middle East | 136 |
A Look at | 148 |
US Nuclear Disarmament and Restrictions in the 199os | 175 |
Future Implications | 189 |
Consequences of the Spread of Weapons of Precise | 283 |
Military Responses to Proliferation Threats | 294 |
Index | 307 |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats Barry R. Schneider,William L. Dowdy Aucun aperçu disponible - 1998 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
acquire nuclear weapons agreement allies Argentina Argentina and Brazil Asia attack ballistic missiles Belarus bilateral biological weapons China Chinese civilian cold war conventional cooperation countries CTBT decision defense diplomatic disincentives dismantlement economic efforts eliminate Energy facilities fissile material foreign fuel Gulf IAEA IAEA safeguards important India and Pakistan inspection Iran Iraq Iraq's Iraqi Israel Israeli issues Kazakstan mass destruction ment Middle East military monitoring national security negotiations NGOs non-nuclear nonproliferation regime Nonproliferation Treaty North Korea nuclear arsenal nuclear capability nuclear deterrent nuclear disarmament nuclear forces nuclear material nuclear nonproliferation nuclear policy nuclear power nuclear programs nuclear proliferation Nuclear Suppliers Group nuclear warheads nuclear weapons capability nuclear weapons program nuclear-weapon-free zones Pakistan peace plutonium political President reactor regional Russia South Africa Soviet Union START II storage strategic threat tion Ukraine Ukraine's nuclear Ukrainian Ukrainian officials United UNSCOM weapons of mass
Fréquemment cités
Page 191 - Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Page 21 - Agreement is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.
Page 175 - The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of the National Science Foundation. TABLE 8.1 Prospects are grim for the highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) "These countries have reached the "decision point" under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative: Status as of January 2003.
Page 107 - Potter is a professor and director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS).
Page 278 - I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of America, find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass destruction") and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.
Page 120 - The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. REFERENCES 1. LG Naul and ST Sincleair. Radiology goes filmless. What does this mean for primary care physicians?
Page 109 - Fuel Storage Area 3-30," sawed through a padlock on the back door, and pried open the door with a metal fire pole he found next to the building. Once inside, he located the containers of fresh submarine fuel, broke off parts of three assemblies from a VM-4-AM reactor core, stuffed the material containing 4.5 kg of uranium (enriched to approximately 20 percent U-235) into a bag, and retraced his steps. The theft was soon discovered because the perpetrators carelessly left the back of the storage building...
Page 16 - Iraq's should stand a monument to the fallibility of on-site inspections and national intelligence when faced by a determined opponent. The Iraqi military buildup, as well as the multiple failures of its timely detection, is an experience rich in lessons that, if correctly understood, may help in detecting other covert weapons programs and, equally important, US understanding of the limits of its ability to guarantee timely detection. During the inspections in Iraq after the Gulf War, an immense...
Informations bibliographiques
| Titre | Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats |
| Rédacteurs | Barry R. Schneider, William L. Dowdy |
| Édition | illustrée |
| Éditeur | Psychology Press, 1998 |
| ISBN | 0714648566, 9780714648569 |
| Longueur | 309 pages |
| Exporter la citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |