Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Theory and Deliberative Democracy
Deliberation and Decision explores ways of bridging the gap between two rival approaches to theorizing about democratic institutions: constitutional economics on the one hand and deliberative democracy on the other. The two approaches offer very different accounts of the functioning and legitimacy of democratic institutions. Although both highlight the importance of democratic consent, their accounts of such consent could hardly be more different. Constitutional economics models individuals as self-interested rational utility maximizers and uses economic efficiency criteria such as incentive compatibility for evaluating institutions. Deliberative democracy models individuals as communicating subjects capable of engaging in democratic discourse. The two approaches are disjointed not only in terms of their assumptions and methodology but also in terms of the communication - or lack thereof - between their respective communities of researchers. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the recent debate between the two approaches and makes new and original contributions to that debate.
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What Do We Learn by Asking Whether Homo
Constitutionalism and its Alternatives
Democracy Discourse and Constitutional
Deliberation as a Discursive Feature
Constitutional Economics in Constitutional
A Dilemma for Deliberative Democrats
in Complex Social Decisions
7What is Meant by Consent?
The Consequences of Popular Participation
Is There a Need for a Positive Constitutional
Constitutional Culture and Comparative
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Aaken accept action aggregation agreement alternative analysis approach argue argument assessment assumption bargaining over beliefs behavior Bovens and Rabinowicz Brennan Buchanan Cambridge Cambridge University Cambridge University Press citizens collective decision common concept concerned Condorcet Condorcet's Jury Theorem consensus consent theory constitutional assembly constitutional choice constitutional economics constitutional economists Constitutional Political Economy constraints context decision-making deliberative democracy deliberative theory democratic Discourse Ethics Discourse Theory discursive dilemma discussion Dryzek Elster empirical epistemic perspective example Habermas heuristic homo oeconomicus hypotheses ideal interests issues Jury Theorem justificatory legitimacy legitimate majority voting meta-level moral normative notion outcomes paper participation payoff perspective Pettit Philip Pettit Philosophy positive possible propositions question rational Rational Ignorance Rawls relevant right reasons rules sets of judgments single-peakedness situation Social Choice social choice theory social order society structure substantive level Suchanek theoretical truth-tracking Tschentscher unidimensional alignment Vanberg Voigt voters welfare economics