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I.

Dew? Out of whofe Womb came the Ice? SERM, and the hoary Froft of Heaven, who hath gender'd it? Can't thou lift up thy Voice to the Clouds, that abundance of Waters may cover thee? Can't thou fend Lightnings that they may go, and fay unto thee, Here we are? Who hath put Wisdom in the inward Parts? or who hath given Understanding to the Heart? In this fublime manner did God condefcend to talk with Job, and ascrib'd the Creation of all Things to himself by challenging him to find out another Author of Nature.

And, indeed, if we can't afcribe all these things to the Wisdom of God, to what can we afcribe them? Can we afcribe them, as the Epicureans of old foolishly did, to Chance, to that which has no real Existence in the World? for Chance is nothing but only the Ignorance of Certainty. When, therefore, we afcribe any thing to Chance, we don't mean by it that Chance is any thing real, much less that it is the Cause of any thing, however fome may be amus'd by the Sound of the Word, but 'tis an Expreffion we make use of to fhew our Ignorance of the true Caufe. Thus when any Event happens in Life, which we could not forefee, 'tis common enough to attribute it

to

SERM. to Chance, because we can't fee the Reason

I.

of it, i. e. the Train of Causes that have produc'd it; for in any other Sense 'tis impoffible there fhould be any fuch thing in Nature as Chance, there being a certain and neceffary Reason for every thing; and to a Being that fees all Things, and the Rea fons of them, 'tis all Certainty, there can be no fuch thing as Chance; but to a Being who can't fee all Things the Cafe is thus: As far as he can discover the Reasons of Things, fo far they are Certainties to fuch a one too; and as far as he cannot do this, fo far they stand to him upon the Foot of Chance. Whatshallwe fay then, that these wonderful Works of the Creation are, as the Epicureans fay, the Effects of certain Atoms, or fine Parts of Matter meeting together by Chance? Befides the Abfurdity of fuppofing those to meet that will be for ever falling at certain Distances from each other, or to fall not in perpendicular Lines, but a little declining, which they fuppofe for no Reason in the World but to fupport a tottering Hypothefis; yet as Chance has been prov'd to be nothing but the Ignorance of the Caufe, to fay that these Things met by Chance is no fatisfactory Account; for fuppofing this were true, yet we are not to reft here, but

muft

I.

n

muft go on to enquire for the Caufe, the SERM. Caufe even of that Chance, or rather of that which appears to us to be fo; and what can that be but God? But all this while the Atoms themselves are not accounted for, which yet must be done in order to make a confiftent Scheme; for whatever is must have a Cause, except the self-exiftent Being himself, the Suppofition of whofe Nature excludes all Cause.

But fuppofe, according to the vulgar Notion of it, that Chance were fomething real, a fort of a giddy Agent, that does things at Random, without any Thought or Defign; can we imagine that this beautiful Frame of the Universe can poffibly be the Effect of fuch a whimfical, uncertain Cause? Can we fuppofe that the conftant and invariable Laws of Nature are the Effect of Casualty, or that the Worlds were made by Accident? Can we fuppofe that Matter madly thrown together should form fo glorious a Body as the Sun is? or, could the lucky Hit be carried ftill further to Stars innumerable? How comes their Motion and Periods to be fo regular, fince Chance is by the Suppofition fo uncertain? Doubtlefs blind Fortune has not done all this, but the Hand of an all-wife God. What fortuitous Concourse

of

SERM. of Atoms could produce fuch a Creature as

I.

Man? or how came he to be endued with Reason? Is this by Virtue of a few Particles of Matter? Can any Thing give what it is not poffefs'd of? or, can Thought and Reason be fuppos'd to proceed from a dull inanimate Subftance? But why han't these Atoms, or this Chance, rais'd fome lofty Fabrick or convenient Houfes, as well as Men to inhabit them? Thefe Conjectures are too weak to impofe upon rational Crea tures, and are as fenfelefs as the Atoms themfelves. Who looks into the vegetative World, when all Nature is in its Bloom, when the flowery Meadows and Groves delight the Smell, and with pleafing Disorder and beautiful Irregularity falute the Eyes, and afcribes all this to Chance, and not rather to the highest Wisdom? In fhort, if the Har mony of the Univerfe was the Effect of Chance, then this plain Contradiction must neceffarily follow; That nothing can be imagin'd more certain and regular than Cafualty and Accident. So that if Chance means Regularity, Order, Uniformity, Contrivance, &c. then 'tis co-incident with the highest Wisdom, and becomes identified with it. Thus this ridiculous Error, like all others, when pursued far enough, runs up at last into Truth, and the Epicurean

Chance,

Chance, abating only the Contradiction of SER M the Word, is no lefs than the great God of I.

Heaven and Earth.

as I propos'd,

Which brings me,

Secondly, To make fome Reflections upon the Whole. And, firft, The Wisdom, which is every where display'd in the Works of the Creation, fhould lead us to praise and adore the great Creator. Man is the only Creature upon this Globe that is capable of difcerning the infinite Beauty and Contri vance of them; for, tho' other Creatures are naturally fenfible of the Ufe and Benefit of a great many of them, as, for Example, that the Grafs is good for Food, the Tree for Shelter, &c. yet Man alone is capable of feeing how wifely and beautifully they are order'd and contriv'd, because he alone is endued with Faculties capable of fuch Contemplation; he alone then is able to express a juft Senfe of it, to praise the Lord for his Goodness, and declare the Wonders that he doth for the Children of Men; and hence arifes his Obligation to do it.

But Man is more efpecially concern'd to do this, because he is placed at the Head of Things, at leaft in this Part of the Creation, where all Things were made for his Use and C Service,

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