it comes to pass that we can conceive in thought, faces and forms which we have never seen, is one which proves the acuteness of your mind. I shall therefore do what may extend this letter beyond the usual length; not, however, beyond the length which you will approve, for I believe that the greater the fulness with which I write to you, the more welcome shall my letter be. they are, as I think, true in themselves as objects of, the understanding, are nevertheless the causes of illusive exercises of the imagination, the misleading tendency of which reason itself can only with difficulty withstand; although it is not easy to preserve even the science of reasoning free from this evil, since in our logical divisions and conclusions we form to ourselves, so to speak, calculi or counters to facilitate the process of reasoning. 4. I perceive that all those images which you as well as many others call phantasie, may be 5. In this whole forest of images, I believe most conveniently and accurately divided into that you do not think that those of the first class three classes, according as they originate with belong to the mind previous to the time when the senses, or the imagination, or the faculty of they find access through the senses. On this reason. Examples of the first class are when we need not argue any further. As to the other the mind forms within itself and presents to two classes a question might reasonably be raised, me the image of your face, or of Carthage, or of were it not manifest that the mind is less liable our departed friend Verecundus, or of any other to illusions when it has not yet been subjected thing at present or formerly existing, which I to the deceptive influence of the senses, and of have myself seen and perceived. Under the things sensible; and yet who can doubt that second class come all things which we imagine these images are much more unreal than those to have been, or to be so and so: e.g. when, for with which the senses acquaint us? For the the sake of illustration in discourse, we ourselves things which we suppose, or believe, or picture suppose things which have no existence, but to ourselves, are in every point wholly unreal; which are not prejudicial to truth; or when we and the things which we perceive by sight and call up to our own minds a lively conception of the other senses, are, as you see, far more near the things described while we read history, or to the truth than these products of imagination. hear, or compose, or refuse to believe fabulous As to the third class, whatever extension of body narrations. Thus, according to my own fancy, in space I figure to myself in my mind by means and as it may occur to my own mind, I picture of an image of this class, although it seems as to myself the appearance of Æneas, or of Medea if a process of thought had produced this image with her team of winged dragons, or of Chremes, by scientific reasonings which did not admit of or Parmeno. To this class belong also those error, nevertheless I prove it to be deceptive, things which have been brought forward as true, these same reasonings serving in turn to detect either by wise men wrapping up some truth in its falsity. Thus it is wholly impossible for me the folds of such inventions, or by foolish men to believe [as, accepting your opinion, I must building up various kinds of superstition; e.g. believe] that the soul, while not yet using the the Phlegethon of Tartarus, and the five caves bodily senses, and not yet rudely assaulted of the nation of darkness,2 and the North Pole through these fallacious instruments by that supporting the heavens, and a thousand other which is mortal and fleeting, lay under such prodigies of poets and of heretics. Moreover, ignominious subjection to illusions. CHAP. III. Objection answered. we often say, when carrying on a discussion, "Suppose that three worlds, such as the one which we inhabit, were placed one above another;" or, "Suppose the earth to be enclosed 6. "Whence then comes our capacity of conwithin a four-sided figure," and so on for all ceiving in thought things which we have never such things we picture to ourselves, and imagine seen?" What, think you, can be the cause of according to the mood and direction of our this, but a certain faculty of diminution and adthoughts. As for the third class of images, it dition which is innate in the mind, and which it has to do chiefly with numbers and measure; cannot but carry with it whithersoever it turns which are found partly in the nature of things, (a faculty which may be observed especially in as when the figure of the entire world is discov-relation to numbers)? By the exercise of this ered, and an image consequent upon this dis- faculty, if the image of a crow, for example, covery is formed in the mind of one thinking which is very familiar to the eye, be set before upon it; and partly in sciences, as in geometri- the eye of the mind, as it were, it may be cal figures and musical harmonies, and in the brought, by the taking away of some features infinite variety of numerals: which, although and the addition of others, to almost any image 1 Dramatis persona in Terence. a Referring to Manichæan notions. such as never was seen by the eye. By this faculty also it comes to pass, that when men's minds habitually ponder such things, figures of LETTER VIII. (A.D. 389.) TO AUGUSTIN NEBRIDIUS SENDS GREETING. this kind force their way as it were unbidden into them. That resistance to the sway of the bodtheir thoughts. Therefore it is possible for the ily senses which it is our most sacred duty to mind, by taking away, as has been said, some practise, is wholly abandoned if we treat with things from objects which the senses have fondness and flattery the blows and wounds brought within its knowledge, and by adding which the senses inflict upon us. some things, to produce in the exercise of imagination that which, as a whole, was never within the observation of any of the senses; but the parts of it had all been within such observation, though found in a variety of different things: e.g., when we were boys, born and brought up in an inland district, we could already form some idea of the sea, after we had seen water even in a small cup; but the flavour of strawberries and of cherries could in no wise enter our conceptions before we tasted these fruits in Italy. Hence it is also, that those who have been born blind know not what to answer when they are asked about light and colours. For those who have never perceived coloured objects by the senses are not capable of having the images of agency or enchantments, do they accomplish such objects in the mind. 1. As I am in haste to come to the subject of my letter, I dispense with any preface or introduction. When at any time it pleases higher (by which I mean heavenly) powers to reveal anything to us by dreams in our sleep, how is this done, my dear Augustin, or what is the method which they use? What, I say, is their method, i.e. by what art or magic, by what this? Do they by their thoughts influence our 7. And let it not appear to you strange, that minds, so that we also have the same images though the mind is present in and intermingled presented in our thoughts? Do they bring bewith all those images which in the nature of fore us, and exhibit as actually done in their things are figured or can be pictured by us, own body or in their own imagination, the things these are not evolved by the mind from within which we dream? But if they actually do these itself before it has received them through the things in their own body, it follows that, in order senses from without. For we also find that, to our seeing what they thus do, we must be enalong with anger, joy, and other such emotions, dowed with other bodily eyes beholding what we produce changes in our bodily aspect and passes within while we sleep. If, however, they complexion, before our thinking faculty even are not assisted by their bodies in producing conceives that we have the power of produ- the effects in question, but frame such things in cing such images [or indications of our feeling]. their own imaginative faculty, and thus impress These follow upon the experience of the emo- our imaginations, thereby giving visible form to tion in those wonderful ways (especially deserv- what we dream; why is it, I ask, that I cannot ing your attentive consideration), which consist compel your imagination to reproduce those in the repeated action and reaction of hidden dreams which I have myself first formed by my numbers in the soul, without the intervention imagination? I have undoubtedly the faculty of any image of illusive material things. Whence of imagination, and it is capable of presenting I would have you understand - perceiving as to my own mind the picture of whatever I you do that so many movements of the mind go on wholly independently of the images in question - that of all the movements of the mind by which it may conceivably attain to the knowledge of bodies, every other is more likely than the process of creating forms of sensible things by unaided thought, because I do not think that it is capable of any such conceptions before it uses the body and the senses. Wherefore, my well beloved and most amiable brother, by the friendship which unites us, and by our faith in the divine law itself, I would warn you never to link yourself in friendship with those shadows of the realm of darkness, and to break off without delay whatever friendship may have been begun between you and 1 Numeri actitantur occulti 2 Pro ipsius divini juris fide. Thus please; and yet I do not thereby cause any Be not surprised at the want of elegance and subtlety with which these questions are here stated to you; consider the obscurity in which the subject is involved, and the inexperience of the writer; be it yours to do your utmost to supply his deficiencies. LETTER IX. (A.D. 389.) TO NEBRIDIUS AUGUSTIN SENDS GREETING. 1. Although you know my mind well, you are perhaps not aware how much I long to enjoy your society. This great blessing, however, God will some day bestow on me. I have read your letter, so genuine in its utterances, in which you complain of your being in solitude, and, as it were, forsaken by your friends, in whose society you found the sweetest charm of life. But what else can I suggest to you than that which I am persuaded is already your exercise? Commune with your own soul, and raise it up, as far as you are able, unto God. For in Him you hold us also by a firmer bond, not by means of bodily images, which we must meanwhile be content to use in remembering each other, but by means of that faculty of thought through which we realize the fact of our separation from each other. 2. In considering your letters, in answering all of which I have certainly had to answer questions of no small difficulty and importance, I was not a little stunned by the one in which you ask me by what means certain thoughts and dreams are put into our minds by higher powers or by superhuman agents. The question is a great one, and, as your own prudence must convince you, would require, in order to its being satisfactorily answered, not a mere letter, but a full oral discussion or a whole treatise. I shall try, however, knowing as I do your talents, to throw out a few germs of thought which may shed light on this question, in order that you may either complete the exhaustive treatment of the subject by your own efforts, or at least not despair of the possibility of this important matter being investigated with satisfactory results. 3. It is my opinion that every movement of the mind affects in some degree the body. We know that this is patent even to our senses, dull and sluggish though they are, when the movements of the mind are somewhat vehement, as when we are angry, or sad, or joyful. Whence we may conjecture that, in like manner, when thought is busy, although no bodily effect of the mental act is discernible by us, there may be some such effect discernible by beings of aërial or etherial essence whose perceptive faculty is in the highest degree acute, so much so, that, in comparison with it, our faculties are scarcely worthy to be called perceptive. Therefore these footprints of its motion, so to speak, which the mind impresses on the body, may perchance not only remain, but remain as it were with the 1 Dæmonibus. force of a habit; and it may be that, when these are secretly stirred and played upon, they bear thoughts and dreams into our minds, according to the pleasure of the person moving or touching them and this is done with marvellous facility. For if, as is manifest, the attainments of our earth-born and sluggish bodies in the department of exercise, e.g. in the playing of musical instruments, dancing on the tight-rope, etc., are almost incredible, it is by no means unreasonable to suppose that beings which act with the powers of an aërial or etherial body upon our bodies, and are by the constitution of their natures able to pass unhindered through these bodies, should be capable of much greater quickness in moving whatever they wish, while we, though not perceiving what they do, are nevertheless affected by the results of their activity. We have a somewhat parallel instance in the fact that we do not perceive how it is that superfluity of bile impels us to more frequent outbursts of passionate feeling; and yet it does produce this effect, while this superfluity of bile is itself an effect of our yielding to such passionate feelings. 4. If, however, you hesitate to accept this example as a parallel one, when it is thus cursorily stated by me, turn it over in your thoughts as fully as you can. The mind, if it be continually obstructed by some difficulty in the way of doing and accomplishing what it desires, is thereby made continually angry. For anger, so far as I can judge of its nature, seems to me to be a tumultuous eagerness to take out of the way those things which restrict our freedom of action. Hence it is that usually we vent our anger not only on men, but on such a thing, for example, as the pen with which we write, bruising or breaking it in our passion; and so does the gambler with his dice, the artist with his pencil, and every man with the instrument which he may be using, if he thinks that he is in some way thwarted by it. Now medical men themselves tell us that by these frequent fits of anger bile is increased. But, on the other hand, when the bile is increased, we are easily, and almost without any provocation whatever, made angry. Thus the effect which the mind has by its movement produced upon the body, is capable in its turn of moving the mind again. 5. These things might be treated at very great length, and our knowledge of the subject might be brought to greater certainty and fulness by a large induction from relevant facts. But take along with this letter the one which I sent you lately concerning images and memory,2 and study it somewhat more carefully; for it was manifest to me, from your reply, that it had not been fully 2 See Letter VII. understood. When, to the statements now before you, you add the portion of that letter in which I spoke of a certain natural faculty whereby the mind does in thought add to or take from any object as it pleases, you will see that it is possible for us both in dreams and in waking thoughts to conceive the images of bodily forms which we have never seen. LETTER X. (A.D. 389.) TO NEBRIDIUS AUGUSTIN SENDS GREETING. that either to those who are urged to accept such duties through desire for worldly honour, or to those who, although occupying a private station, covet a busy life, so great a boon is given as that amid bustle and agitating meetings, and journeyings hither and thither, they should acquire that familiarity with death which we seek for both of these classes had it in their power to seek edification in retirement. Or if this be not true, I am, I shall not say the most foolish of all men, but at least the most indolent, since I find it impossible, without the aid of such an interval of relief from care and toil, to taste and relish that only real good. Believe me, there is need of much withdrawal of oneself from the tumult of the things which are passing away, in order that there may be formed in man, not through insensibility, not through presumption, not through vainglory, not through superstitious blindness, the ability to say, "I fear nought." By this means also is attained that enduring joy with which no pleasurable excitement found elsewhere is in any degree to be compared. 1. No question of yours ever kept me so disturbed while reflecting upon it, as the remark which I read in your last letter, in which you chide me for being indifferent as to making arrangements by which it may be possible for us to live together. A grave charge, and one which, were it not unfounded, would be most perilous. But since satisfactory reasons seem to prove that we can live as we would wish to do better here than at Carthage, or even in the country, I am wholly at a loss, my dear Nebridius, what to do with you. Shall such a conveyance as may best suit your state of health be sent from us to you? Our friend Lucinianus informs me that you can be carried without injury in a palanquin. But I consider, on the other hand, how your mother, who could not bear your absence from her when you were in health, will be much less able to bear it when you are ill. Shall I myself then come to you? This I cannot do, for there are some here who cannot accompany me, and whom to you - for I would not say it to every one I would think it a crime for me to leave. For you already can pass your time agreeably when left to the resources of our own mind; but in their case the object of present efforts is that they may attain to this. Shall I go and come frequently, and so be now with you, now with them? But this is neither to live together, nor to live as we would wish to do. For the journey is not a short one, but so great at least that the attempt to perform it frequently would prevent our gaining the wished-for leisure. To this is added the bodily weakness through which, as you know, I cannot accomplish what I wish, unless I cease wholly to wish what is beyond my strength. 3. But if such a life does not fall to the lot of man, how is it that calmness of spirit is our occasional experience? Wherefore is this experience more frequent, in proportion to the devotion with which any one in his inmost soul worships God? Why does this tranquillity for the most part abide with one in the business of life, when he goes forth to its duties from that sanctuary? Why are there times in which, speaking, we do not fear death, and, silent, even desire it? I say 2. To occupy one's thoughts throughout life with journeyings which you cannot perform tranquilly and easily, is not the part of a man whose thoughts are engaged with that last journey which is called death, and which alone, as you understand, really deserves serious consideration. God has indeed granted to some few men whom He has ordained to bear rule over churches, the capacity of not only awaiting calmly, but even desiring eagerly, that last journey, while at the same time they can meet without disquietude the toils of those other journeyings; but I do not believe to you whose visits to the upper world I know well, Will you, who have often felt how sweetly the soul lives when it dies to all mere bodily affections, deny that it is possible for the whole life of man to become at length so exempt from fear, that he may be justly called wise? Or will you venture to affirm that this state of mind on which reason leans has ever been your lot, except when you were shut up to commune with your own heart? Since these things are so, you see that it remains only for you to share with me the labour of devising how we may arrange to live together. You know much better than I do what is to be done in regard to your mother, whom your brother Victor, of course, does not leave alone. I will write no more, lest I turn your mind away from considering this proposal. LETTER XI. TO NEBRIDIUS AUGUSTIN SENDS GREETING. brought before me by you with something even 1. When the question, which has long been 1 Text, "deificari” for “ædificari” (?). and on a subject so vast, that it is impossible either to give a sufficiently clear statement, or to support it by satisfactory proofs. I venture, however, since I am writing to you, to indicate rather than explain what my sentiments are, in order that you, from your talents and our intimacy, through which you thoroughly know me, may for yourself fill up the outline. of friendly chiding, as to the way in which we and nothing done by the Holy Spirit which is might live together, was seriously disturbing my not also done by the Father and by the Son; and mind, and I had resolved to write to you, and nothing done by the Son which is not also done to beg an answer from you bearing exclusively by the Father and by the Holy Spirit. From on this subject, and to employ my pen on no which it seems to follow as a consequence, that other theme pertaining to our studies, in order the whole Trinity assumed human nature; for if that the discussion of this matter between us the Son did so, but the Father and the Spirit did might be brought to an end, the very short and not, there is something in which they act sepaindisputable conclusion stated in your letter lately rately. Why, then, in our mysteries and sacred received at once delivered me from all further symbols, is the Incarnation ascribed only to the solicitude; your statement being to the effect Son? This is a very great question, so difficult, that on this matter there ought to be no further deliberation, because as soon as it is in my power to come to you, or in your power to come to me, we shall feel alike constrained to improve the opportunity. My mind being thus, as I have said, at rest, I looked over all your letters, that I might see what yet remained unanswered. In these I have found so many questions, that even if they were easily solved, they would by their 3. There is no nature, Nebridius — and, indeed, mere number more than exhaust the time and there is no substance—which does not contain talents of any man. But they are so difficult, in itself and exhibit these three things: first, that that if the answering of even one of them were it is; next, that it is this or that; and third, that laid upon me, I would not hesitate to confess as far as possible it remains as it is. The first of myself heavily burdened. The design of this these three presents the original cause of nature introductory statement is to make you desist for from which all things exist; the second presents a little from asking new questions until I am free the form 2 according to which all things are fashfrom debt, and that you confine yourself in your ioned and formed in a particular way; the third answer to the statement of your opinion of my presents a certain permanence, so to speak, in replies. At the same time, I know that it is to which all things are. Now, if it be possible that my own loss that I postpone for even a little a thing can be, and yet not be this or that, and while the participation of your divine thoughts.not remain in its own generic form; or that a 2. Hear, therefore, the view which I hold concerning the mystery of the Incarnation which the religion wherein we have been instructed commends to our faith and knowledge as having been accomplished in order to our salvation; which question I have chosen to discuss in preference to all the rest, although it is not the most easily answered. For those questions which are proposed by you concerning this world do not appear to me to have a sufficiently direct reference to the obtaining of a happy life; and whatever pleasure they yield when investigated, there is reason to fear lest they take up time which ought to be devoted to better things. With regard, then, to the subject which I have at this time undertaken, first of all I am surprised that you were perplexed by the question why not the Father, but the Son, is said to have become incarnate, and yet were not also perplexed by the same question in regard to the Holy Spirit. For the union of Persons in the Trinity is in the Catholic faith set forth and believed, and by a few holy and blessed ones understood, to be so inseparable, that whatever is done by the Trinity must be regarded as being done by the Father, and by the Son, and by the Holy Spirit together; and that nothing is done by the Father which is not also done by the Son and by the Holy Spirit ; thing can be this or that, and yet not be, and not remain in its own generic form, so far as it is possible for it to do so; or that a thing can remain in its own generic form according to the force belonging to it, and yet not be, and not be this or that, then it is also possible that in that Trinity one Person can do something in which the others have no part. But if you see that whatever is must forthwith be this or that, and must remain so far as possible in its own generic form, you see also that these Three do nothing in which all have not a part. I see that as yet I have only treated a portion of this question, which makes its solution difficult. But I wished to open up briefly to you-if, indeed, I have succeeded in this-how great in the system of Catholic truth is the doctrine of the inseparability of the Persons of the Trinity, and how difficult to be understood. 4. Hear now how that which disquiets your mind may disquiet it no more. The mode of existence (Species- the second of the three above named) which is properly ascribed to the Son, has to do with training, and with a certain art, if I may use that word in regard to such things, and with the exercise of intellect, by Aliquid præter invicem faciunt. 2 Species. |