the party in oppofition: And if the majority should be really difpofed to exceed the proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it. Independent of parties in the national legiflature itself, as often as the period of difcuffion arrived, the ftate legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant, but fufpicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens, against incroachments from the federal government, will conftantly have their attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to found the alarm to the people, and not only to be the vOICE, but, if neceffary the ARM Of their difcontent.

Schemes to fubvert the liberties of a great community require time to mature them for execution. An army fo large as feriously to menace thofe liberties, could only be formed by progreflive augmentations; which would fuppofe not merely a temporary combi nation between the legislature and executive, but a continued confpiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that fuch combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be perfevered in, and tranfmitted along, through all the fucceffive variations in the representative body, which biennial elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it prefumable, that every man, the instant he took his feat in the national fenate, or house of representatives, would commence a traitor to his conftituents, and to his country? Can it be fuppofed, that there would not be found one man difcerning enough to detect fo atrocious a confpiracy, or bold or honeft enough to apprife his conftituents of their danger? If fuch prefumptions can fairly be made, there ought to be at once an end of all delegated authority. The people should refolve to recall all the powers they have heretofore parted with out of their own hands; and to divide themselves into as many ftates as there are counties

counties in order that they may be able to manage their own concerns in perfon.

If fuch fuppofitions could even be reasonably made, ftill the concealment of the defign, for any duration, would be impracticable. It would be announced by the very circumstance of augmenting the army to 10 great an extent in time of profound peace. What colorable reafon could be affigned in a country fo fituated, for fuch vaft augmentations of the military force? It is impoffible that the people could be long deceived; and the destruction of the project and of the projectors would quickly follow the difcovery.

It has been faid that the provifion, which limits the appropriation of money for the fupport of an army to the period of two years, would be unavailing; because the executive, when once poffeffed of a force large enough to awe the people into fubmiflion, would find refources in that very force fufficient to enable him to difpenfe with fupplies from the votes of the legislature. But the queftion again recurs: Upon what pretence could he be put in poffeffion of a force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we fuppofe it to have been created in confequence of fome domeftic infurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a cafe not within the principle of the objection; for this is levelled against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few perfons will be fo vifionary as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion, or resist an invafion; and if the defence of the community, under fuch circunftances, fhould make it neceffary to have an army, fo numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those calamities for which there is neither preventative nor cure.. It cannot be provided against by any poffible form of government: It might even refult from a fimple league offenfive and defenfive; if it fhould ever be neceffary for the confederates or allies to form an army for common defence.

But

But it is an evil infinitely lefs likely to attend us in an united than in an difunited state; nay it may be fafely afferted that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter fituation. It is not easy to conceive a poffibility, that dangers fo formidable can affail the whole union, as to demand a force confider. able enough to place our liberties in the leaft jeopardy; especially if we take into view the aid to be derived from the militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of difunion (as has been fully fhewn in another place) the contrary of this fuppofition would become not only probable, but almost unavoidable. PUBLIUS.

NUMBER XXVII.

The Subject continued with the fame View.

It

T has been urged in different fhapes that a conftitution of the kind proposed by the convention, cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This however like most other things that have been alledged on that fide, refts on mere general affertion; unfupported by any precife or intelligible defignation of the reafons upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a pre-fuppofition that the people will be difinclined to the exercise of federal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waving any exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or inexplicitnefs of the diftinction between internal and external, let us inquire what ground there is to presuppose that difinclination in the people. Unless we prefume, at the fame time, that the powers of the general government will be worse adminiftred than thofe of

the

the state governments, there feems to be no room for the prefumption of ill-will, difaffection or oppofition in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule, that their confidence in and obedience to a government, will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. It must be admitted that there are exceptions to this rule; but thefe exceptions depend fo entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be confidered as having any relation to the intrinfic merits or demerits of a conftitution. Thefe can only be judged of by general principles and maxims.

:

Various reafons have been fuggested in the courfe of these papers, to induce a probability that the general government will be better administered than the particular governments; the principal of which are that the extenfion of the spheres of election will present a greater option, or latitude of choice to the people, that through the medium of the ftate legiflatures, who are felect bodies of men, and who are to appoint the members of the national fenate-there is reafon to expect that this branch will generally be -composed with peculiar care and judgment: That these circumftances promise greater knowledge and more comprehenfive information in the national councils And that on account of the extent of the country from which those, to whofe direction they will be committed, will be drawn, they will be lefs apt to be tainted by the fpirit of faction, and more out of the reach of thofe occafional ill humours or temporary prejudices and propenfities, which in fmaller focieties frequently contaminate the public deliberations, beget injustice and oppreffion of a part of the community, and engender schemes, which though they gratify a momentary inclination or defire, terminate in general diftrefs, diffatisfaction and difguft. Several additional reasons of confiderable force, to fortify that probability, will occur when we come to furvey with a more critic eye, the interior ftructure of the edifice which

P

which we are invited to erect. It will be fufficient here to remark, that until fatisfactory reasons can be affigned to justify an opinion, that the fœderal government is likely to be administered in fuch a manner as to render it odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no reasonable foundation for the fuppofition, that the laws of the union will meet with any greater obftruction from them, or will ftand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of the particular members.

The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to fedition-the dread of punishment a proportionately ftrong difcouragement to it-will not the government of the union, which, if poffeffed of a due degree of power, can call to its aid the collective refources of the whole confederacy, be more likely to reprefs the former sentiment, and to inspire the latter, than that of a fingle ftate, which can only command the resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a state may eafily fuppose itself able to contend with the friends to the government in that state, but it can hardly be fo infatuated as to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the union. If this reflection be juft, there is lefs danger of refiftance from irregular combinations of individuals, to the authority of the confederacy, than to that of a fingle member.

I will in this place hazard an obfervation which will not be the lefs just because to fome it may appear new; which is, that the more the operations of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of government; the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their political life; the more it is familiarised to their fight and to their feelings; the further it enters into those objects which touch the most fenfible cords, and put in motion the most active springs of the human heart; the greater will be the probability that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. Man is very much a creature of habit.

A