thing that rarely ftrikes his fenfes will generally have but a tranfient influence upon his mind. A government continually at a distance and out of fight, can hardly be expected to intereft the fenfations of the people. The inference is, that the authority of the union, and the affections of the citizens towards it, will be ftrengthened rather than weakened by its extenfion to what are called matters of internal concern; and that it will have less occafion to recur to force in proportion to the familiarity and comprehenfiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through thofe channels and currents, in which the paffions of mankind naturally flow, the lefs will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of compulfion.

One thing at all events, must be evident, that a government like that propofed, would bid much fairer to avoid the neceffity of ufing force, than the fpecies of league contended for by moft of its opponents; the authority of which should only operate upon the states in their political or collective capacities. It has been fhewn, that in fuch a confederacy, there can be no fanction for the laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members, are the natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that as often as thefe happen they can only be redreffed, if at all, by war and violence.

The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of the feveral states, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magiftracy of each in the execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to deftroy, in the common apprehenfion, all diftinction between the fources from which they might proceed; and will give the federal government the fame advantage for fecuring a due obedience to its authority, which is enjoyed by the government of each ftate; in addition to the influence on public opinion, which will refult from the important confideration of its having power to call to its affistance

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and

and fupport the refources of the whole Union. It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurifdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the obfervance of which, all officers legislative, executive and judicial in each state, will be bound by the fanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts and magiftrates of the refpective members will be incorporated into the operations of the national government, as far as its juft and conftitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.* Any man, who will purfue by his own reflections the confequences of this fituation, will perceive that there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the union; if its powers are administered with a common fhare of prudence. If we will arbitrarily fuppofe the contrary, we may deduce any inferences we pleafe from the fuppofition; for it is certainly poffible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best government that ever was or ever can be inftituted, to provoke and precipitate the people into the wildeft exceffes. But though the adversaries of the propofed conftitution fhould prefume that the national rulers would be infenfible to the motives of public good, or to the obligations of duty; I would ftill afk them, how the interefts of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by fuch a conduct?

PUBLIUS.

The fophiftry which has been employed to show that this will tend to the deftruction of the ftate governments will, in its proper place, be fully detected.

NUMBER

TH

NUMBER XXVIII.

The fame Subject continued.

HAT there may happen cafes, in which the national government may be neceffitated to refort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the leffons taught by the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this fort will fometimes exist in all focieties, however conftituted; that feditions and infurrections are unhappily maladies as infeparable from the body politic, as tumours and eruptions from the natural body; that the idea of governing at all times by the fimple force of law (which we have been told is the only admiffible principle of republican government) has no place but in the reveries of those political doctors, whofe fagacity difdains the admonitions of experimental inftruction.

Should fuch emergencies at any time happen under the national government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mifchief. If it fhould be a flight commotion in a small part of a state, the militia of the refidue would be adequate to its fuppreffion and the natural prefumption is, that they would be ready to do their duty. An infurrection, whatever may be its immediate caufe, eventually endangers all government: Regard to the public peace, if not to the rights of the union, would engage the citizens, to whom the contagion had not communicated itself, to oppofe the infurgents: And if the general government should be found in practice conducive to the profperity and felicity of the people, it were irrational to believe that they would be difinclined to its fupport.

If on the contrary the infurrection should pervade a whole ftate, or a principal part of it, the employment of a different kind of force might become unavoidable.

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unavoidable. It appears that Maffachusetts found it neceffary to raise troops for fuppreffing the diforders within that ftate; that Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehenfion of commotions among a part of her citizens, has thought proper to have recourfe to the fame measure. Suppofe the ftate of New-York had been inclined to re-establish her loft jurifdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont; could fhe have hoped for fuccefs in fuch an enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone? Would the not have been compelled to raife and to maintain a more regular force for the execution of her defign? If it must then be admitted that the neceffity of recurring to a force different from the militia in cafes of this extraordinary nature, is applicable to the state governments themselves, why fhould the poffibility that the national government might be under a like neceffity in fimilar extremities, be made an objection to its exiftence? Is it not furprifing that men, who declare an attachment to the union in the abstract, fhould urge, as an objection to the propofed conftitution, what applies with ten-fold weight to the plan for which they contend; and what as far as it has any foundation in truth, is an inevitable confequence of civil fociety upon an enlarged fcale? who would not prefer that poffibility to the unceafing agitations and frequent revolutions which are the continual fcourges of petty republics?

Let us purfue this examination in another light. Suppofe, in lieu of one general fyftem, two or three, or even four confederacies were to be formed, would not the fame difficulty oppofe itself to the operations of either of thefe confederacies? Would not each of them be expofed to the fame cafualties; and, when thefe happened, be obliged to have recourfe to the fame expedients for upholding its authority, which are objected to a government for all the states? Would the militia in this fuppofition be more ready or more able to fupport the fœderal authority than in the cafe of a general union? All candid and intelligent men

muf

muft upon due confideration acknowledge that the principle of the objection is equally applicable to either of the two cafes; and that whether we have one government for all the states, or different governments for different parcels of them, or as many unconnected governments as there are states, there might fometimes be a neceffity to make ufe of a force conftituted differently from the militia to preferve the peace of the community, and to maintain the just authority of the laws against those violent invafions of them, which amount to infurrections and rebellions.

Independent of all other reasonings upon the fub, ject, it is a full anfwer to thofe who require a more peremptory provifion against military establishments in time of peace, to say that the whole power of the propofed government is to be in the hands of the reprefentatives of the people. This is the effential, and after all the only efficacious fecurity for the rights and privileges of the people which is attainable in civil fociety.*

If the reprefentatives of the people betray their conftituents, there is then no refource left but in the exertion of that original right of felf-defence, which is paramount to all pofitive forms of government; and which, against the ufurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of fuccefs, than against those of the rulers of an individual ftate. In a fingle ftate, if the perfons entrusted with fupreme power become ufurpers, the different parcels, fubdivifions or diftricts, of which it confifts, having no diftinct government in each, can take no regular measures for defence. The citizens must rush tumultuoufly to arms, without concert, without fyftem, without refource; except in their courage and despair. The ufurpers, cloathed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush the oppofition in embryo. The smaller the extent of territory, the more difficult will it be for the people to form a regular or fyftematic

*Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.

plan