expect that measures will be taken for regaining the territory extorted from him, and retaliating the injury with tenfold vengeance. Plans of mutual support will be concerted with the other Hindoo-Chinese nations equally exposed to such inroads, and probably with the Chinese themselves, so jealous of European influence, to ward off the common danger. The blood that has been shed, and the devastation that has been committed in this invasion, will be chronicled in their annals, and depicted in their popular poetry, till every imagination is filled with the most horrid pictures of foreign atrocity, and the people prepared to rise en masse whenever the monarch chooses to call them to avenge their national wrongs and national honour. With these seeds of national animosity now so deeply sown, (like the Gallophobia of the English,) we think the chances of hostilities with the Burmese are infinitely greater than they were before; so that instead of saying that the war is now brought to a close, we should rather say it is suspended, under a nominal treaty of peace, which will last just so long as may be requisite for preparing to renew the struggle. If a pretence for doing so could ever be wanting, it will soon be furnished by the concluding article in the treaty, "that the Siamese nation be included in the peace." For if we are to guarantee a continued peace between states which are known to wage almost incessant war, and to look upon each other as natural enemies, we may as well not lay down our arms, or withdraw our troops at all.

But taking for granted that the treaty has been ratified by the Burmese, and, what is much harder to credit, that it will be faithfully attended to, what are its advantages, to compensate for the already ruinous consequences of this war, the loss of human life, the waste of so many British troops, the absolute destruction of two fine armies at Rangoon and Arracan, the lamentable catastrophe at Barrackpore, and, lastly, the insurrection of the princes and people of Central India, which may all be traced to this prolific source of public calamity? We are to receive, it seems, a million of money, not a tithe, perhaps, of the actual pecuniary loss which has arisen out of it. We are to have, in addition, the pestilential marshes of Arracan, where we have already, in a single season, buried the best part of an army from disease alone. We are to have a political control over the provinces of Assam, Cachar, and Munnipore,-a sort of control which we might have easily acquired long ago, if we had not rather wished to avoid it; as, in the case of one or more of those kingdoms, it was tendered for our acceptance, but peremptorily rejected on principles of sound policy; because it has been strongly enjoined by the British Parliament to avoid all extension of territory, and because it is found, by long experience, that taking Native princes under our protection, whose alliance or friendship is not necessary to our safety, only serves to involve us in endless quarrels and perplexities on their account. For these reasons, when, on two successive occasions, the Rajah of Cachar, in 1809 and 1811, besought that his state might be taken under the protection of the Company, he was informed by the Government of that day, that, "consistently

with the principles that regulated the British Government, his overture could not be accepted." What have now become of those wise and salutary principles, when the duty of acting as guardian to this and other neighbouring states is stipulated for by Lord Amherst as a valuable acquisition, or as a compensation for our losses in the Burmese war?

Of the acquisition of Mergui and Tavoy, little need be said, as they are of little importance in a commercial point of view, and, politically, we should think of none at all. If these and Arracan, that is, the whole of our territorial acquisitions, ever pay their own expenses, we shall be exceedingly surprised; but time will show whether, after having got rid of Sumatra, with all its expensive array of fortresses, residences, stations, and harbours, which yielded the Company a loss of about 100,000l. sterling annually, it is not now triumphantly saddled with possessions still more costly, cumbersome, and useless; for, so far as we can judge from what is known of the country, our present acquisitions are the most worthless portions of the Burmese territory, either to us or to them. Besides their own antient territory, which is entirely untouched, they still preserve the kingdom of Pegue, their most valuable foreign conquest, containing the important harbour of Rangoon, the great emporium of their commerce with Bengal and other countries. The English papers have, therefore, led their readers into error, in making them believe that we have shut the Burmese out from the sea-coast, and gained possession of the whole sea-board from the bay of Bengal to the Malayan peninsula; for they still retain the sole command of the banks of the Irrawaddy, and the branches of that noble stream connect all the principal places in the empire with the ocean. The places they have given up will, in fact, render their territories more compact, and impose upon us a very heavy charge for their retention, without affording any additional means worth mention for assuming political control; since an attack by sea can be directed with greater efficiency from the Ganges than from Mergui or Tavoy; and if we should wish to assail the Burmese by land, it is well known there is no passage for an army into their territories from our new province of Arracan.

It has been supposed by some, that the new subsidiary states with which we have belted our frontier, will afford a protection to our territories against the attacks of the Burmese, or such insults as led to the present war. But the truth is, it has been already proved that not one of these states is able to protect itself; and, in proportion to their number and weakness, the chances of quarrel are multiplied. Instead of their protecting us, therefore, (an idea which is ludicrous,) the very reverse will happen: we shall always be called upon to protect them from their formidable neighbours, or from each other.

In every way, therefore, the chances of war, and of future loss and trouble, are vastly increased by this treaty. Yet, under all the circumstances, it will be very acceptable to the Indian authorities; as

1 Oriental Herald, Vol. V. page 369.

they must be glad to escape from that miserable war on any honourable terms whatever. One feature of it well deserving of praise, is the making Rangoon a free port. The beneficial effects of this stipulation, more especially on the Burmese empire itself, as well as on trade generally, may probably, in the long run, more than compensate mankind for all the destructive effects of the war. But it is not to be forgotten, that a very active and beneficial commercial intercourse was carried on with Rangoon long previous to this contest; and no obstacle existed to the extension of this trade, which required to be removed at such an expense of blood and treasure. If, however, the present treaty improve this commerce, it is the Burmese who will chiefly benefit by it. A very great accession of foreign trade must be expected to flow towards a port declared free to one of the greatest trading nations in the world; and the influx of wealth, of civilization, and the arts, which will accompany it, must soon render the Burmese far more formidable than ever; since it is confessed that this hardy race require nothing but arms, discipline, and the materiel of war, to make them the finest soldiers in Asia.

What, then, has been gained by this war, in return for our immense sacrifices? Security we have gained none, as we were never in danger from that quarter. Strength we have gained none, by an addition to our already too extensive territory of other possessions, which will not pay their own expenses, and which afford no means of controlling the Burmese that we did not before possess. Again, the loss of such territory can hardly weaken our antagonist, whose frontier is still secured against us by the impenetrable barrier of mountains which divides him from our new province of Arracan,-a barrier so strong, that it is declared our army cannot pass it even in the midst of peace.

With all this, the treaty, if ratified and observed, will be received by all parties, both at home and abroad, with much thankfulness, as a pure God-send. It will relieve the Bengal Government from the pressure of two formidable wars at once; so that the resources of the state may be directed wholly against Bhurtpore, and the other for tresses now confederated against us. If this point be carried, the most pressing danger will be passed; and when Lord Amherst has effected a safe retreat from his present perilous position, it will be left to his successors-we trust to wiser men-to rectify, and, if possible, get rid of the various complicated relations into which he has drawn us on our eastern frontier. When his Lordship is enjoying his otium cum dignitate in England, others will have to deal with the natural fruits of the dragon's teeth he has now so thickly sown. After having planted the spirit of revenge in the hearts of a brave and barbarous people, he leaves us in return the security afforded by a piece of paper called a "treaty of peace"!

In confirmation of our opinions on this subject, we recommend to the attention of our readers the following remarks from one of the most intelligent English journals now published, and one which, as to correct and enlarged views of Indian politics, has no rival in this country. We mean the Globe' of the 15th ult., which observes:

It appears that Pegue remains in the hands of the Burmese, but the whole of the other maritime provinces are ceded to the Company; while Princes named by our Indian Government are to be placed in Assam, Cachar, Zeatung, and Munnipore. These last Princes, we suppose, as is usual in such cases, will be guaranteed in their possessions by the Indian Government, and supported by subsidiary forces.

If extension of territory were in itself desirable, this treaty would be gratifying. With the exception of the mouths of the Irrawaddy, the command of the sea-coast is obtained as far as the Malay Peninsula, while the territories of the subordinate Princes will extend to the frontiers of Tibet. It is yet to be seen, however, whether this extension of territory is worth the expense at which it has been purchased. We have not a better or more defensible frontier than before, and the ceded country includes the pestilential province of Arracan, which has already been the grave of so many troops. The Burmese, too, unless they are much more reasonable and docile than the powers of Hindoostan, will not be taught prudence by one disastrous war. The Eastern Princes with whom we have had any thing to do, have never found themselves easy till they have been placed in a state of complete subjection. This is a result, the conveniences or inconveniences of which should be always looked to before a war with one of them is commenced.

The extension of the number of Princes dependent upon the British power, is of still more questionable utility than the increase of our own territory. The management of these Princes, for whose safety we hold ourselves responsible, while we have very imperfect means of checking their mal-administration, is one of the greatest practical difficulties of our Indian policy. The British Government is often obliged to act as the upholder of oppressors, who are encouraged, by the knowledge that they are supported by an irresistible force, to indulge, without restraint, a spirit of tyranny and rapacity. Residents are appointed to watch them; but it becomes a matter of almost equal difficulty to watch the Residents themselves, whose situation gives them greater facilities for abuse of power than can be safely intrusted to any men. The subjects of these dependent Princes must be considered to be in a transition state, (and a very inconvenient one,) which prepares them for, and reconciles them to, the complete domination of the British.

Some facility may be given, by the pacification with the Burmese, for the extension of commerce with Ava; but the condition of the people does not lead us to hope that it will be very valuable or important.

A letter published in the Calcutta John Bull,' of the 20th of November, mentions, that the bank of Bengal had then suspended payment a second time, in consequence, it would appear, of its great exertions to relieve the necessities of the Government! After this, we need not be surprised to learn that the Public Treasury has become insolvent, and that Lord Amherst and his Council is in the list of bankrupts ! or that they are fain to accept, from the Golden Foot, a promise of one crore of rupees, instead of their former demand of two in cash. The bank appears to have got over this difficulty, and quickly resumed payments.

Since making up the foregoing pages, we have received a file of the Bengal Hurkaru' for a part of November and December last, which, however, presents nothing very remarkable, except a series of letters by Dr, Tytler, entitled the Arracan Papers,' describing the dreadful

sufferings of the British troops and sepoys in that land of Goshen, which Lord Amherst boasts of gaining for the Company,-the whole forming a pestilential marsh, pregnant with diseases more hideously loathsome and deadly than all the plagues of Egypt.

CENTRAL INDIA.

A paragraph in the Bombay Gazette' of the 21st of December, announces that a report had been received there, which, if it prove well founded, will make the political situation of India much more alarming than ever. All persons of reflection have for years past regarded the celebrated Runjeet Sing as the most dangerous enemy we had to fear, eminently skilled as he is both in the arts of war and peace; alike prudent and successful in the cabinet and in the field; with a disciplined army at his command, always ready to take advantage of any favourable conjuncture, and with sufficient judgment to discover and seize the favourable moment when it should arrive; surrounded and supported by his brave and independent Siekhs, who have never yet bent to the Company's yoke, nor permitted a British Resident to insinuate himself into their public councils; who, together with courage, military discipline, political independence, and jealousy of our power, command the path into our Eastern dominions which has given India an easy prey to every invader from the north. When such a mass of political power is placed in the prudent and skilful hands of such a leader as Runjeet Sing, it cannot but be formidable to so loose and unsettled a fabric as our Indian empire; so that even in time of peace the slightest movements of this chieftain were regarded with jealousy. When the Burmese war commenced, the first question with reflecting politicians was, "Will Runjeet take advantage of it?" Again, would not the report of the Barrackpoor mutiny suggest to him that this was the time to strike a blow? And when Bhurtpore raised the standard of revolt, summoning every spark of independence that yet remained in Hindoostan to make one effort more to redeem India from a foreign yoke-the great question still was and is," Will Runjeet, like the antient Roman, come forward in this crisis and throw his sword into the scale?" As the famed Cunctator, who kept hovering like a cloud upon the mountains, and at last poured down his legions in destructive torrents upon the longvictorious Hannibal, Runjeet Sing, whose designs have so long been dark and doubtful, is supposed to be at last taking a decided part; as appears by the following extract from the Bombay Courier':

Bombay, Dec. 21.-A report is in circulation that Runjeet Sing has made some hostile preparations against Scinde; and such is the general consterna tion in that country, that the merchants have directed their agents to postpone their orders for merchandise till further advice. Another has been received, but to which little probability can be attached, that he is moving with 70,000 men towards Bhurtpore, to assist the rebel party.

We shall offer no comment on the authenticity of this intelligence; but we have for some time past remarked, that the Bombay papers give a much more impartial account of the political state of India than