Images de page
PDF
ePub

are inspired by the principle of the freedom of the sea as the common highway of nations, but the second part of the preamble seems to admit the possibility of belligerents infringing this principle, inasmuch as it states that its object is to ensure as far as possible to peaceful navigation the security to which it is entitled. This is not at all a satisfactory result, and, on the whole, the practice existing before the adoption of the Convention in question might have given rise to combined action by powerful neutral Powers against the infringement of the freedom of the high sea which the Convention seems now to authorise.

No. IX. is an amplification of the Vau adopted by the first Peace Conference "expressing the wish that the proposal to settle the question of the bombardment of forts, towns, and villages by naval forces may be referred to a subsequent Conference for consideration." The Convention forbids the bombardment by naval forces of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings, except in case the naval force has requisitioned the provisions necessary for their immediate wants and this requisition has not been complied with, a most dangerous licence not granted to commanders of land forces.1 Nor does the prohibition prevent the bombarding of military works or depots of arms or workshops or plant which can be utilised for the needs of a hostile fleet or army.

Lastly, No. XI. deals with postal correspondence, the exemption from capture of coasting vessels, and the position of crews of enemy merchant ships captured by a belligerent.

As regards postal correspondence a very important innovation was adopted. Under the Convention all correspondence, whether of neutrals or belligerents, official or private, which may be found on board a neutral or enemy ship is inviolable, and has to be forwarded by the captor with the least possible delay, except in the case of correspondence destined for or proceeding from a blockaded port.

As regards small coasting and fishing vessels and vessels entrusted with religious, scientific, and philanthropic missions, the existing practice is confirmed.

Under this Convention another radical change is made in the existing practice of regarding the officers and crews of captured enemy merchant ships without distinction of nationality as prisoners of war.

As regards those who are nationals of an enemy State, they are no longer, under the Convention, to be regarded as prisoners of war provided they undertake in writing not to enter during the continuance of the hostilities "any service relating to the operations of war."

This is far from an assimilation of practice in naval war to that in war on land. It was properly observed that the existing practice involved an unnecessary hardship for civilians who

1 Compare Article XXV. of the Regulations for Warfare on Land. The term used, "refuses to comply with the requisition," comprises the possibility of inability to do so. The qualification that the requisition shall be proportioned to the resources of the place leaves the decision as to this to the commander of the naval force!

had taken no part in hostilities, and that there was no good reason for distinguishing between them and those accompanying land forces in a non-combatant capacity and who were never made prisoners of war.1

This applies a fortiori to subjects of neutral Powers, as to whom, in fact, Article X. provides simply that, on capture, such of its crew as are nationals of a neutral State are not made prisoners of war. It further provides, however, that the same rule shall only apply in the case of captain and officers who are nationals of a neutral State, if they give a formal promise in writing not to serve on an enemy ship while the war lasts, which is an interference with innocent neutral persons, however much worse the existing practice may be, for which it is difficult to find justifying agreements.

(i) PROJECTILES FROM AIRCRAFT

Lastly, a Declaration was adopted "relating to the prohibition against discharging projectiles and explosives from balloons," the previous Declaration adopted at the Conference of 1899 having expired. No substantial change was made in readopting it, except that instead of its duration being limited to five years, the new Declaration was made operative till the close of the next Conference.

It was ratified by the United States, Belgium, Bolivia, China, Great Britain, Haiti, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Siam, and Switzerland.2

On the other hand, the Declaration was ignored without protest by belligerents in both the Turco-Italian and Balkan wars, in which air navigation was freely used for the dropping of shells; a precedent the full effects and horrors of which have now been seen when belligerents are equipped with air vessels which can even give each other battle and carry warfare into belligerent districts far removed from the areas of actual hostilities.3

1 In the present War of Nations potential combatants have been assimilated to combatants. This is one of the modifications in the law of war current experience is likely to have made for good.

2 As regards the Declaration of 1899, Great Britain was the only Power which did not ratify it.

3 The following memorial, signed by a large number of eminent Englishmen in the beginning of 1912, sets out the views of those who deplore the addition of aviation to the already numerous methods of adding devastation to the horrors of war:

"We, the undersigned, protest against the use of aerial vessels in War. We appeal to all Governments to foster by every means in their power an international understanding which shall preserve the world from what will add a new hideousness to the present hideousness of Warfare.

"Without universal agreement, no single Power can stay its hand (i.e. can retard its own action): ): every day of ingenuity and every pound of money spent diminishes the chance of such agreement.

"The occasion is unique. The civilised world is now alive to the ghastliness and economic waste of War; The Hague Conference is an established fact. For the first time, in the face of a new development of the arts of fighting, Nations possess both the conscience and the machinery necessary to check that development effectually.

"All Civilisation protests its desire for Peace and Goodwill; protests its wish to reduce the already grievous burden of armaments. Unless its protestations be those of a hopeless hypocrite, it cannot stand and watch the conquest of the air, that most glorious of men's mechanical achievements, callously turned to the usages of destruction; it cannot idly acquiesce in a new departure that must heavily increase this burden of armaments.

"There are many who believe that aerial warfare, by reason of its sheer horror, must prove a blessing in disguise, frightening men from War. To those we say: Civilisation does not sanction the ravages of a new and arrestable form of disease, in order that men through horror may be the more eager to join hands in stamping out all forms of sickness. And further: You underrate the fortitude and adaptability of human nature, which has long proved that it can endure all forms of terror.

"There are some who insist that the art of flying will never reach full development without the stimulus of War. To such we suggest that the story of mankind does not leave us without hope that where there is demand, even when only for the purposes of peaceful life, there will also be supply. If the art of flying be delayed a few years by the resolve of men to use that art for mutual help and not for mutual destruction, the world will be no loser. "There are many who argue that because men fight on earth and water they may just as well fight in the air. To these we answer: There has never yet been a moment when it was practically possible to ban the War machines of earth or water. There is a moment when it is practically possible to ban those of the air. That moment is now-before the use of these machines is proved; before great vested interests have formed.

"Governments are Trustees not only of the present but of the future of mankind. Fortune has placed this moment in the hands of the Governments of to-day. We pray of them to use it wisely."

V. RESTRICTION OF ARMAMENTS

At the conclusion of the present war, it is not improbable that one of the guarantees against the renewal of a catastrophe like that which is devastating the civilised world will take the form of a proportionate restriction of the power to break the peace. This may involve the question of the restriction of armaments.

"The maintenance of universal peace and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations, represent, in the present condition of affairs all over the world, the ideal towards which the efforts of all Governments should be directed," were the opening words of the Note which the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Mouravieff, on August 12, 1898, handed to the diplomatic representatives of the different Powers.

The answers to his suggestion of holding an International Conference of the Powers to deal with the question of " excessive armaments" were unanimously favourable.

A further Note, dated January 11, 1899, submitting the programme proposed, gave more precision to this item, which thereupon took the following form: "An understanding not to increase for a fixed period the present effectives of the armed military and naval forces, and at the same time not to increase the budgets pertaining thereto; and a preliminary examination of the means by which even a reduction might be effected in future in the forces and budgets above mentioned."

At the Conference the Russian Government, further developing the proposal, submitted the following details:

"1. Establishment of an international understanding for a term of five years, stipulating non-increase of the present figures of the peace effective of the troops kept up for home use.

"2. Fixation, in case of this understanding being arrived at, and, if possible, of the figures of the peace effective of all the Powers, excepting colonial troops.

"3. Maintenance for a like term of five years of the amount of the military budgets at present in force."

When the subject came on for discussion in the Commission appointed to deal with it, the German military delegate stated his view that "the question of effectives could not be discussed by itself, as there were many others to which it was in some

measure subordinated, such, for instance, as the length of service, the number of cadres, whether existing in peace or made ready for war, the amount of training received by reserves, the situation of the country itself, its railway system, and the number and position of its fortresses. In a modern army all these questions went together, and national defence included them all." In Germany, moreover, the military system "did not provide for fixed numbers annually, but increased the numbers each year." 1 After many expressions of regret at finding no method of giving effect to the proposal, the Commission recorded its opinion that "a further examination of the question by the Powers would prove a great benefit to humanity."

The growth of armaments, after the Conference, continued at a still greater speed than ever, and, if their limitation was desirable in 1899, it was far more so in 1907.

And yet, with the broadening of the policy of promoting international friendships and the removing of causes of international distrust, the strengthening of armaments ought proportionately to have lost its chief stimulus.

An agreement of the kind entered into between Chile and Argentina in 19022 is more feasible as among States whose navies are small and of comparatively recent origin, than as among States whose navies are composed of vessels of many and widely different ages. The breaking-up or sale of obsolete warships is a diminution of the paper effective of a navy, and their purchase by another State a paper increase of theirs. Even comparatively slight differences in the ages of ships may obviously make great differences in their fighting value.

On the other hand, as regards military power, with general conscription a national army corresponds numerically to the numerical proportion of males in the national population. It is difficult to say what could be the basis of the proportion to be established between countries of widely different areas and populations. Nor does any scheme seem to have been devised for the establishment of a proportion between the levies of men and the mechanical apparatus of war.

The feeling of the different military Powers of Europe in 1907 was strongly against dividing on the subject, and by arrangement with the British delegates, in a speech by Sir Edward Fry, the principal British delegate, the subject was given a full-dress burial. In the course of his speech, Sir Edward Fry intimated that His Majesty's Government, in view of the growing expenditure in armaments, were ready to communicate annually to the Powers, who might be prepared to do likewise, their proposed programme of naval construction and the estimates therefor with the object of facilitating an exchange of views between different Governments in relation to the reductions which could by common agreement be effected. His Majesty's Government

1 See Problems, p. 124, notes.

2 See Problems, pp. 128 et seq.

« PrécédentContinuer »