A. D. 1780.

Câzee and other fit persons to investigate and report on. Their opinion was, that neither party had established their claims; and they recommended that the estate should be divided, the widow, as was the law, to get a fourth, and the remainder to go to the brother of the deceased, namely, the father of the nephew. This was done, the widow giving every opposition in her power, and finally refusing to accept her share, or give up the title-deeds which she had secured. The nephew petitioned the council; and the Câzee and Muftees were directed to use measures to force her to compliance; and they set a guard over her, according to the rule of Mohammedan law.

The widow now was advised to bring an action in the Supreme Court against the nephew, the Câzee, and the Muftees; and she laid her damages at 600,000 rupees. The nephew was pronounced subject to the jurisdiction of the Court; for, as a renter, it was asserted he was a servant of the Company. The plea of the others, that they had acted in obedience of their lawful superiors, was answered by the legal maxim, Delegatus non potest delegare. They were arrested; judgment was given against them, damages 300,000 rupees with costs; they were brought to Calcutta (the Câzee, an old man, dying on the way) and thrown into prison, where they remained till released by Parliament, in 1781. The widow also obtained 15,000 rupees damages against Mr. Law and two other members of the council of Patna ; which money was paid by the Company.

In September, 1777, an attorney at Dacca proceeded to arrest the dewan of the foujdar, at the suit of a common pyke, who had been confined for a misdemeanour and had brought his action for false imprisonment. His bailiff, who produced no warrant, having been repelled, he himself, attended by a parcel of his followers, went to the house of the foujdar, broke open the gates, and forced his way in. A scuffle ensued, in which the attorney himself shot the foujdar with a pistol in the body. One of the judges wrote to the military officer at Dacca, highly commending the conduct of the attorney, and requiring him to give him assistance. The Provincial Council gave bail for the dewan.

At length the Supreme Court and the government came into direct collision. Cossinât Baboo, a wealthy native, brought an action against the rajah of Cossijura, and a capias was issued. The rajah, however, had absconded; a writ was then issued to sequester his property, and the sheriff's officer, attended by about sixty Sepoys and armed seamen, proceeded to execute it. They broke into the house, forced their way into the zenana, or woman's apartment, so sacred in the East, and arrested the rajah's dewan. The government, however, acting on the opinion of Sir John Day, their legal adviser, that zemindars were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, had given orders to Col. Achmuty to send soldiers and seize the whole party, which was done. Notice was then given by the government to all zemindars and landholders, directing them not in any way to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court over them. The Court, in return, prepared to issue attachments against the officer commanding the military party, Mr. Naylor, the Company's attorney, and others, and even the governor-general and Mr. Barwell. Cossinât Baboo, at the same time,

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brought an action of trespass against the governor and council. They refused to plead; the Court grew furious, and declared that they would proceed in the case as in any similar one. Men's minds were in expectation of something direful, when suddenly the storm dispelled: Cossinât Baboo, no one then could tell why, discontinued all legal proceedings against the rajah and all others.

A measure was effected very soon after, which may throw some light on that transaction. The courts of Dewannee Adawlut, it was said, had proved inconvenient and even dangerous, and the court of Suddur Dewannee Adawlut had never been brought into operation. Hastings then proposed to the council that the constitution of this court should be changed, and the chief justice be vested with its powers, to hold them during the pleasure of the governor and council. A large salary was of course to be annexed, and Hastings expressed his belief that this "would prove an instrument of conciliation between the council and the court;" that is, that the chief justice, when thus holding office and salary at their will, would never dare to oppose them. Francis and Wheeler of course disagreed with the governor-general, and their arguments were cogent and well-founded. But Hastings was a more practical statesman, and he knew the man he had to deal with; for Sir Elijah Impey saw at once the great advantages of the plan, and willingly consented to accept the office with a salary of 60,000 sicca rupees, and 7200 as rent for an office; thus, for paltry lucre, freely giving up all claim to respect, and all chance of his preceding conduct being judged charitably. He did not even long enjoy his new office for in May, 1782, an address to the Crown for his recal, on account of it, was voted by the House of Commons, and he was menaced with an impeachment 10.

Throughout the whole of this, contest with the judges the conduct of Hastings is entitled to praise. The last measure must make necessity its plea for justification.

In

Before the arrangement with the chief justice was completed, Mr. Francis quitted India, where his presence had certainly produced little good. It seems to us almost certain, that in the arrangement made previous to the departure of Mr. Barwell, he had promised to give the governor no opposition on the subject of the Maratta war. fact, if he did not, Hastings must have conceded every thing and he nothing. Hastings asserted that he had, Francis denied it; and the result was, that one day, when the council had risen, Mr. Francis requested a private interview with the governor. They retired, and he then handed him a written challenge. Hastings accepted it; and two mornings after (July 17, 1780,) they met and exchanged shots. Francis was wounded in the side, but not dangerously. In the following month of December he sailed for England.

10 His successor was the learned, accomplished, and virtuous Sir William Jones. What a contrast!

CHAPTER XVI.

Affairs of the Marattas-Treaty of Poorundur-Capitulation at Wargâm-March of Col. Goddard-Takes Scindia's Camp-Exploits of Capt. Popham-Capture of GwaliorOf Bassein-Ascent of the Ghâts-Treaties with the Marattas.

HAVING brought the affairs of Bengal down thus far, we must now occupy ourselves for some time with those of the other two presidencies, commencing with that of Bombay, which had hitherto engaged little in the game of Indian politics.

This presidency was quite surrounded by the dominions of the Marattas. These comprised the original Maratta state, of which Sattâra and Poona were the capitals; Berar and Orissa, held by the family of Ragujee Bôsla; the possessions of Morari Râo in the South, and those of Holkar and Scindia in Malwa, and Gûzerât ruled by the Guicawar family.

On the death of the Peishwa, Balajee Râo1, leaving two sons, Madhoo Rao and Narrain Râo, both minors, the power of the state was for some years wielded by his brother Ragonath Râo, commonly called Ragoba, as regent. After some time Madhoo was enabled to take the reins of government into his own hands. But he died in 1772, and was succeeded by his brother Narrain. This prince, however, was shortly after murdered in consequence of a plot which Ragoba, though without intending such a consummation, had formed against him. Ragoba then was acknowledged as Peishwa but it appeared soon after, that the widow of Narrain was with child. The ministers of the late Peishwa proclaimed the event, and carried her to the fort of Poorundur for safety. Ragoba, who was absent, endeavouring to obtain arrears of chout from Hyder Ally, and Mohammed Ally, returned with his army and defeated that of the ministers; but hearing that Holkar and Scindia had been gained by them, he took panic and fled to Gûzerât. The widow was delivered of a son, who was generally acknowledged as Peishwa (May 1774).

;

Ragoba now addressed himself to the English at Bombay, who readily listened to his overtures; for they were very anxious to obtain possession of the isle of Salsette, of Bassein, and some other places in their neighbourhood, which the Marattas had taken from the Portuguese. They had already offered the Maratta government, in exchange for them, Baroach (which they had lately seized) and some places on the coast, but to no purpose. While they were now in treaty with Ragoba, they learned from Goa, that the Portuguese were fitting out an expedition for their recovery. They therefore hesitated no longer, but, signifying both to Ragoba and to the government at Poona. that it was merely a matter of precaution, they landed troops in Salsette, and having reduced the fort of Tanna, became masters of the island. Ragoba, however, did not appear at all inclined to cede this place; but he and his allies from Gûzerât having sustained a defeat from the troops of the ministers, he was glad to get the aid of the English on any terms, and on the 6th March, 1775, a treaty was

See p. 48.

concluded by which he yielded up Salsette and Bassein, with the Maratta share of the revenue of Surat, Baroach, and other places. He was also to bear the expenses of the troops sent to his aid, to pay other sums of money, &c. &c.

Matters being thus arranged, Ragoba, who was in the vicinity of Cambay, was joined on the 19th April by a force of 580 Europeans and 1560 native troops, with a train of artillery under Col. Keating. It then moved southwards; and on the 18th May it encountered the troops of the ministers, and, owing to a panic caused by a mistake made by an officer of the grenadiers, the British lost seven officers, eighty Europeans, and two hundred Sepoys, and want of cavalry prevented their deriving the due advantage from their victory. As Ragoba's own troops refused to cross the Nerbudda till their arrears of pay were discharged, and as the rains were at hand, the troops were put into quarters about fifty miles north of Baroach.

The government of Bengal, to which the other presidencies were now subordinate, had highly disapproved of the treaty with Ragoba. Hastings proposed that it should be cancelled and the troops withdrawn, except under certain circumstances. But the majority ordered the withdrawal of the troops at once, provided it would be safe; and then having condemned the government of Bombay for taking part with one side, they took the other, voting that a negotiation should be opened with the ministers in order to obtain Salsette and Bassein. They resolved to send for this purpose an agent of their own. Hastings proposed Col. Dow, they named Col. Upton. The latter, of course, was appointed, and he set out for Poona on the 17th July. The government of Bombay sent Mr. Tayler, a member of council, to Calcutta, to try to obtain aid in men and money; and it was Hastings' opinion, that they should be supported, but the majority were inexorable.

Col. Upton did not reach Poona till the beginning of January, 1776. The ministers assumed a high tone with him; they asked why the government of Bengal, which so strongly condemned the war, should seek to avail themselves of the advantages of it. They finally declared that they knew of no alternative but war. On the receipt of this intelligence, the government of Bengal resolved (March 7) to make the most vigorous preparations for the conflict. But soon after (April 1) came a letter from Col. Upton, to say that the ministers had yielded, and that a treaty was in progress. The English renounced their claim on Bassein, of which they never, appeared, had had possession, and were confirmed in that of Salsette, and the Altogether, the treaty little islands about it. named of Poorundur, was far less advantageous than that with Ragoba; and, strange enough, just as it was concluded, came the Directors' letter approving of that treaty.

Matters remained tolerably tranquil till 1778, when intelligence came of the arrival of a French ship in one of the Maratta ports, having on board a French agent, who had proceeded to Poona, where he was received with much favour. This proved to be an adventurer, already well known in India. He called himself the chevalier St. Lubin, and he had persuaded the minister of marine that he could effect much by means of the Marattas. While the government of Bengal was deliberating

A. D. 1779-80.

on the best course to pursue, a split in the ministry at Poona occurred, and one party, headed by Succaram Baboo, declared for Ragoba. The Presidency of Bombay was empowered to treat with them, and a new arrangement was made, by which Ragoba was to act as regent, in the name of the young Peishwa. But the party of Siccaram Baboo soon appeared so strong, that it seemed likely to be able to dispense with Ragoba and the English. Scindia, however, threw his weight into the opposite scale, and the party, headed by Nana Furnovees, became ascendant; and their rivals now called on the English.

A division of the army which had been assembled, was immediately sent forward. It consisted of about 4500 men, under the command of Col. Egerton, an inefficient officer; and to make matters worse, Mr. Mostyn, late resident at Poona, and Mr. Carnac, a member of Council, were sent as field-deputies, who, with the commander, were to form a committee for controlling all matters. They set out about the beginning of December, advanced slowly through the Côncan, and on the 23rd they had ascended the Ghrât, and reached Condola. They were now within about thirty-five miles of Poona, for which place they set out on the 4th January, 1779, with provisions for twenty-five days. Mr. Mostyn, from illness, returned to Bombay; and the same cause obliged Col. Egerton to resign the command to Col. Cockburn, though he still continued to act in committee. On the 9th (for they moved at a snail's pace) they were within sixteen miles of Poona, where they found an army prepared to oppose them. Ragoba had sought to impress them with the necessity of gaining some advantage, in order to induce his friends to declare for them; but now, on its being announced that there were only provisions for eighteen days remaining, and on Cockburn's asserting that he could not protect the baggage, without a body of horse, the committee resolved to retreat! On the night of the 11th, having thrown the heavy guns into a tank, and burnt the stores, the army commenced this disgraceful movement. They thought to have gone off unobserved; but before daybreak the enemy was upon them, and continued to harass them till four in the afternoon of the second day (13th), when they reached Wargâm. Here the commander-in-chief declared that it was impossible to bring back the army to Bombay. Capt. Hartley, who had commanded the rear, proposed a plan by which it might be effected, but in vain; it was resolved to negotiate. The surrender of Ragoba was made a preliminary; this they agreed to; but he had already secured himself with Scindia. In fine, a treaty was concluded, by which Salsette and the other places were to be restored, the march of the troops that were coming from Bengal to be stopped, Baroach to be given up to Scindia, and two gentlemen left as hostages. On these terms the army was allowed to depart. The Directors, when they heard of this disgraceful affair, dismissed, and most justly, Egerton and Cockburn from their service, and degraded Mr. Carnac.

When the government of Bengal was informed by that of Bombay of the proposals made for the restoration of Ragoba, aware that war had now broken out between France and England, and that it was therefore of the utmost consequence to destroy the French influence at Poona, they autho

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rised them to join in the plan, and promised to assist them with men and money. With this view a detachment, commanded by Col. Leslie, was assembled at Calpee, in order to be sent to Bombay. On the 19th May it commenced its march; but Leslie, instead of advancing, as he was directed, with as much speed as possible, actually wasted four months in Bundelcund, trying to make up the quarrels in the family of the rajah, and negotiate useless treaties. In consequence of this "wild conduct," as Hastings terms it, the board unanimously agreed to recal him (October 9), and give the command to Lieut.-Col. Goddard, a man of a very different character 2, who marched without delay for the Nerbudda, where he was to enter the dominions of Moodajee, the ruler of Berar. For Hastings had long been in treaty with this chief, with the design of aiding him to obtain the office of rajah of Sattâra, as being of the family of Sevajee.

On the 1st of December Goddard crossed the Nerbudda. He found that Moodajee was not inclined to contract any engagement, but that he would act in a friendly manner. He there received letters from Bombay urging him to advance without loss of time. He set out on the 16th of January (1779), and on the 22nd he was at Charwa, on the road to Burhanpûr. Here he received letters from the committee of the Bombay army dated the 11th, telling him not to advance, and one next day from Bombay, urging him to it. Though perplexed he went on, and on the 30th he reached Bûrhanpûr. On the 6th of February, having received certain intelligence of the disaster of the Bombay army, he marched for Surat. By the celerity of his movements he escaped a body of 20,000 horse sent from Poona to intercept him; and by the discipline which he maintained the people of the country were induced to stay in their houses and supply the army with all it required. He reached Surat on the 30th 3, whence he proceeded to Bombay; and though his troops were not to be placed under the orders of that presidency, but to be solely under the authority of the Supreme Council, he was requested to sit with the council, and recommended for the post of commander-in-chief.

Mr. Hornby the governor refused to ratify the convention of the 11th of January. In this he was perfectly justified, for the committee had clearly stated that they had not power to conclude a definitive treaty; but he was willing to ratify the treaty with Scindia. On both points the Supreme Council agreed with him. The good sense, moderation, and dignity shown by Hastings in his conduct toward the Bombay authorities who had committed such gross errors, do him great honour. No taunts, no insults, no reproaches escaped his lips or his pen.

Early in 1780, Goddard (now a general,) put his troops in motion, and on the 15th of February he took Ahmedabâd in Gûzerât by assault. Meantime Scindia and Holkar were advancing with 40,000 men towards Surat. By rapid marches Goddard arrived on the 8th of March in the vicinity of their camp and was preparing to attack 2 Leslie died a few days after. Hastings speaks of his "sordid disposition, and morose and disgusting manners." 3 This was the first British force that marched across India.

it in the night, when Scindia released the two English hostages, and sent a Vakeel with them to open a negotiation. But Goddard could place no reliance in him ; and after several fruitless attempts to bring him to action, he succeeded in entering his camp before dawn on the 3rd of April, and reached the very centre of it before he was perceived. Hardly any resistance was made, and the whole Maratta army fled, leaving the English in possession of both their camp and the country. As the rains commenced soon after, both sides retired; and Goddard sending back the Madras troops, put his own detachment into cantonments.

Hastings had some time before formed an alliance with a Rajpût rajah named the Rana of Gôhud, whose territories lay between those of Scindia and the Jumna. In consequence of an invasion of the Marattas, the Rana called on the English for aid, and Capt. Popham, who was in command of a detachment intended to reinforce Goddard, was ordered to lead it to his assistance. Popham soon drove off the Marattas, and then entering their own territory, laid siege to the fort of Lahar. Having no heavy guns he was unable to effect a sufficient breach; but having made an imperfect one with his light guns he resolved to storm. The garrison made a most gallant resistance, and did not yield till nearly the whole of them were slain. The English loss was 125 men.

Popham soon after achieved a far more brilliant conquest. The fortress of Gwalior in Gôhud, now held by the Marattas, had always been regarded as impregnable. It lay on a lofty insulated rock, scarped nearly all round, and was garrisoned by 1000 men. Sir Eyre Coote had pronounced it absolute madness to attack it with so feeble a detachment as Popham's; yet this gallant officer resolved to make the attempt. Taking his position in a village at a little distance from the fort, he kept spies constantly employed in examining it. They at length reported that there was one place which seemed practicable. At that place the height of the scarp was sixteen feet; from thence to the wall the steep rock was forty yards, and the wall was thirty feet high. Popham resolved to attempt that place, and made all the requisite preparations; and at daybreak on the 3rd August, the storming party, led by Capt. Bruce, arrived at the foot of the rock. By means of wooden ladders they mounted to the top of the scarp; they then clambered up to the foot of the wall, and the spies having climbed up and fixed rope-ladders to it, the Sepoys ascended with great rapidity. They then pushed on for the main body of the place; the garrison fled after a brief resistance, and thus the formidable Gwalior was captured. Popham was raised to the rank of major for this splendid achiev ment, at the fame of which the Marattas quitted all the surrounding country.

In October, Gen. Goddard being reinforced from Madras, moved from Surat in order to attack Bassein. Owing to the state of the roads and the rivers he did not arrive before it till the 13th November. As the place was strong and the garrison numerous, he resolved to proceed with caution and regularity, and began to erect batteries. The approaches were duly made: on the 10th December a breach had been effected, and next day the enemy surrendered at discretion. While Goddard was thus engaged, a division of the Bombay army

under Col. Hartley remained in the Côncan to secure the collection of the revenues, and to cover the siege of Bassein. Hartley defeated a large Maratta force, and finally falling back to within nine miles of Bassein, repelled all the attacks of an army of 20,000 men that was coming to raise the siege.

The affairs of the Carnatic were at this time in a dreadful condition, and a union of all the great powers of the Deckan against the English was to be apprehended. This, with the want of funds, and the violent and unprincipled opposition which he experienced from Francis, made Hastings most anxious to conclude a peace with the Marattas. He thought to effect it through the mediation of the rajah of Bêrar; but that chief appeared now quite lukewarm in his friendship. As a means of forcing the Marattas to conclude a peace, he sent directions for Gen. Goddard to direct his march for Poona. The general, then leaving Bassein, and driving the Maratta army before him, reached the foot of the pass named the Bhore Ghât on the 8th February. Aware of the importance of dispatch, he sent forward that very night a party of grenadiers under Capt. Parker to force the pass. The enemy was driven from all his posts, and next day the whole army reached the summit. Negotiations were then entered into with Nana Furnovees, but no terms could be arranged; and as the enemy had determined to burn Poona if the English advanced to it, and no advantage seemed likely to be derived from remaining above the Ghâts, Gen. Goddard resolved to descend and make the war merely a defensive one. On the night of the 17th April the troops secretly descended the Ghât, and though harassed by the desultory attacks of the Marattas in the Concan, they reached their destination without any great loss of men or stores.

Meantime a force from Bengal under Col. Carnac of five battalions, including Popham's detachment, had entered Scindia's territories to make a diversion in favour of Goddard. On reaching Serônj, Carnac found himself surrounded by a powerful army, his supplies cut off, and the rajah, whom he had expected to join him, keeping aloof. Having continued for some weeks in that situation, vainly expecting to be joined by Col. Muir from Gôhud, he called a council of war. Capt. Bruce, who had commanded the storming party at Gwalior, recommended a night attack on Scindia's camp. The plan was adopted and executed the next night (Mar. 24) with the usual success, the enemy flying and leaving every thing behind. Soon after Col. Muir joined and took the chief command. The two armies lay near each other for some months, but no action took place; and in October a treaty was concluded, the English restoring to Scindia all their conquests beyond the Jumna, except what had been given to the Rana of Gôhud.

On the 17th May, 1782, a treaty was also concluded with the Poona government. The English resigned Bassein and all their other conquests made since the treaty of Poorundur; the Marattas engaged on their side to make Hyder give up all his conquests in the Carnatic. No Europeans but the Portuguese were to have factories within the Maratta dominions. Scindia was to have Baroach, and Ragoba was to have 25,000 rupees a month from the Peishwa, if he would reside in Scindia's dominions.

A. D. 1772-1775.

CHAPTER XVII.

Mohammed Ally's Agent in England-Powers given to Sir John Lindsay-Reduction of Tanjore-Mr. Paul Benfield -Arrest and Death of Lord Pigot-Strange Conduct of Hastings-Capture of the French Possessions- Quarrel with the Nizâm-War with Hyder Ally-Destruction of Baillie's Detachment-Arrival of Coote-Defence of Wandewash-Victories of the English-Lord Macartney-Reduction of the Dutch Settlements-Destruction of Braithwaite's Detachment-Encounters of French and English Fleets-Storm and Famine at Madras-Death of HyderDeath of Coote-Attack on Cuddalore--Dismissal of Gen. Stuart-Operations on West Coast-Surrender of Bednore -Of Mangelore-Peace with Tippoo.

In the Carnatic, to which we now return, events of importance had been taking place, and war, with all its horrors, had been renewed.

A Scottish adventurer in India, named John Macpherson, having ingratiated himself with Mohammed Ally, was empowered by him to go to England and try to obtain from the crown the justice which he fancied was denied him by the Company. The Duke of Grafton was premier when Macpherson arrived in England; and in his interviews with this minister, he did not suffer truth to stand in his way when pleading the cause of his employer, whom he represented as a man of unsullied honour, an accomplished statesman and gentleman, one to whom Britain owed the rise of her power in India. He had even the courage to offer the duke what he calls "the credential presents " of Mohammed Ally; and on his refusal, he endeavoured to force them on his secretary, Mr. Bradshaw, but without effect. He then offered, in the name of the Nabob (who was a beggar), to invest seventy lacs of rupees in any funds the minister would name, or to lend that or even a larger sum to government at two per cent. He wrote pamphlets and articles in newspapers, and caused them to be written by others. He sought by all means to cause dissension between the ministry and the Company, and at length succeeded so far that the ministry resolved to support Mohammed Ally.

The mode of carrying their resolution into effect adopted by the ministry, was not a very creditable one. The Directors having applied to them for some ships of the line, they agreed to give them, provided their commander should have a large and conspicuous share in all treaties with native princes, as, by the peace of Paris, they said, the crown was bound to maintain the rights of certain Indian princes. The Directors refused; the ministry affected to acquiesce, but they secretly gave these powers to Sir John Lindsay, who was sent out in command. This officer arrived at Madras on the 26th July, 1770, and astonished the servants of the Company by announcing his powers, and calling on them to appear in his train when he went in state to deliver to the Nabob his Majesty's letter and presents. They declined, assigning very sufficient reasons. In the correspondence which ensued, Sir John exhibited abundance of the unreasoning insolence then almost characteristic of the British naval commanders. He attached himself blindly to the cause of the Nabob, lent a credulous ear to all the representations of him, and

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the flock of European vultures which filled his court; and in his letters home to the ministers, represented him as the most excellent and the most ill-used of princes.

In the treaty concluded with Hyder Ally there was, as we have seen, a stipulation of defensive alliance, and at this time, being hard pressed by the Marattas, he called on the English for aid, to which he had a manifest right. At the same time the Marattas, by threats of invading the Carnatic, tried to draw the English to their side. The Nabob, supported by Lindsay, was urgent with the presidency to join the Marattas; but they decided on neutrality, inclining rather to the side of Hyder. Meantime the ministry, somewhat alarmed at the accounts of the dissensions at Madras, adopted the sage expedient of recalling the person, but leaving the authority. The result was what any person of sense might have anticipated. Lindsay's successor, Sir Robert Harland, proved to be violent and intemperate, even beyond his predecessor. He zealously seconded the Nabob in his efforts to make the presidency accept the alliance of the Marattas, who were now masters of all Mysore except the fortresses; but they still remained firm, and at length, in 1772, the Marattas were induced to conclude a peace with Hyder on receiving from him both money and territory to a large amount.

Mohammed Ally, amidst all his difficulties, had never his eyes off the fertile little realm of Tanjore, on which in reality he had no just claim whatever. In 1771, he induced the presidency to aid him in overrunning that kingdom. Toward the end of September, Gen. Smith reduced the strong fortress of Vellum; he then marched against the city of Tanjore. By the end of October his batteries had effected a breach, and he was preparing to storm, when he learned that Omdut-ulOmrah, the Nabob's son, by whom he was accompanied, had concluded a peace with the rajah, and thus deprived the troops of the plunder they had expected.

The rajah had, of course, been obliged to promise to pay large sums of money. In 1773 his debt was brought down to ten lacs of rupees. He either actually had applied to the Marattas and Hyder for protection, or, as it is asserted, the artifices of the Nabob had made the Presidency believe he had done so, conduct which they themselves declared was not to be at all wondered at, as they could not support him against the Nabob. Still they resolved to take the present opportunity of destroying him, lest, as they could not give him "a firm promise of support in his just rights," he might on some future occasion join the French, or some native power. Actuated by these motives, they made all the requisite arrangements with the Nabob, and early in August, 1773, the British forces appeared before the city of Tanjore. On the 16th September the place was taken, by the stratagem of making the assault in the heat of the day, when the greater part of the garrison had retired for shelter or refreshment. The rajah and his family being made prisoners were delivered up to the Nabob, who was also put into possession of the whole of that prince's dominions.

Owing to various causes it was not till April, 1775, that the Court of Directors were able to come to a decision on the subject. They then condemned the whole transaction as unjust and dan

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