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CHAPTER XVI.

Affairs of the Marattas-Treaty of Poorundur-Capitulation at Wargâm-March of Col. Goddard-Takes Scindia's Camp-Exploits of Capt. Popham-Capture of GwaliorOf Bassein-Ascent of the Ghâts-Treaties with the Marattas.

HAVING brought the affairs of Bengal down thus far, we must now occupy ourselves for some time with those of the other two presidencies, commencing with that of Bombay, which had hitherto engaged little in the game of Indian politics.

This presidency was quite surrounded by the dominions of the Marattas. These comprised the original Maratta state, of which Sattâra and Poona were the capitals; Berar and Orissa, held by the family of Ragujee Bôsla; the possessions of Morari Râo in the South, and those of Holkar and Scindia in Malwa, and Gûzerât ruled by the Guicawar family.

On the death of the Peishwa, Balajee Râo1, leaving two sons, Madhoo Rao and Narrain Râo, both minors, the power of the state was for some years wielded by his brother Ragonath Râo, commonly called Ragoba, as regent. After some time Madhoo was enabled to take the reins of government into his own hands. But he died in 1772, and was succeeded by his brother Narrain. This prince, however, was shortly after murdered in consequence of a plot which Ragoba, though without intending such a consummation, had formed against him. Ragoba then was acknowledged as Peishwa; but it appeared soon after, that the widow of Narrain was with child. The ministers of the late Peishwa proclaimed the event, and carried her to the fort of Poorundur for safety. Ragoba, who was absent, endeavouring to obtain arrears of chout from Hyder Ally, and Mohammed Ally, returned with his army and defeated that of the ministers; but hearing that Holkar and Scindia had been gained by them, he took panic and fled to Gûzerât. The widow was delivered of a son, who was generally acknowledged as Peishwa (May 1774).

Ragoba now addressed himself to the English at Bombay, who readily listened to his overtures; for they were very anxious to obtain possession of the isle of Salsette, of Bassein, and some other places in their neighbourhood, which the Marattas had taken from the Portuguese. They had already offered the Maratta government, in exchange for them, Baroach (which they had lately seized) and some places on the coast, but to no purpose. While they were now in treaty with Ragoba, they learned from Goa, that the Portuguese were fitting out an expedition for their recovery. They therefore hesitated no longer, but, signifying both to Ragoba and to the government at Poona. that it was merely a matter of precaution, they landed troops in Salsette, and having reduced the fort of Tanna, became masters of the island. Ragoba, however, did not appear at all inclined to cede this place; but he and his allies from Gûzerât having sustained a defeat from the troops of the ministers, he was glad to get the aid of the English on any terms, and on the 6th March, 1775, a treaty was See p. 48.

concluded by which he yielded up Salsette and Bassein, with the Maratta share of the revenue of Surat, Baroach, and other places. He was also to bear the expenses of the troops sent to his aid, to pay other sums of money, &c. &c.

Matters being thus arranged, Ragoba, who was in the vicinity of Cambay, was joined on the 19th April by a force of 580 Europeans and 1560 native troops, with a train of artillery under Col. Keating. It then moved southwards; and on the 18th May it encountered the troops of the ministers, and, owing to a panic caused by a mistake made by an officer of the grenadiers, the British lost seven officers, eighty Europeans, and two hundred Sepoys, and want of cavalry prevented their deriving the due advantage from their victory. As Ragoba's own troops refused to cross the Nerbudda till their arrears of pay were discharged, and as the rains were at hand, the troops were put into quarters about fifty miles north of Baroach.

The government of Bengal, to which the other presidencies were now subordinate, had highly disapproved of the treaty with Ragoba. Hastings proposed that it should be cancelled and the troops withdrawn, except under certain circumstances. But the majority ordered the withdrawal of the troops at once, provided it would be safe; and then having condemned the government of Bombay for taking part with one side, they took the other, voting that a negotiation should be opened with the ministers in order to obtain Salsette and Bassein. They resolved to send for this purpose an agent of their own. Hastings proposed Col. Dow, they named Col. Upton. The latter, of course, was appointed, and he set out for Poona on the 17th July. The government of Bombay sent Mr. Tayler, a member of council, to Calcutta, to try to obtain aid in men and money; and it was Hastings' opinion, that they should be supported, but the majority were inexorable.

Col. Upton did not reach Poona till the beginning of January, 1776. The ministers assumed a high tone with him; they asked why the government of Bengal, which so strongly condemned the war, should seek to avail themselves of the advantages of it. They finally declared that they knew of no alternative but war. On the receipt of this intelligence, the government of Bengal resolved (March 7) to make the most vigorous preparations for the conflict. But soon after (April 1) came a letter from Col. Upton, to say that the ministers had yielded, and that a treaty was in progress. The English renounced their claim on Bassein, of which they never, it appeared, had had possession, and were confirmed in that of Salsette, and the little islands about it. Altogether, the treaty named of Poorundur, was far less advantageous than that with Ragoba; and, strange enough, just as it was concluded, came the Directors' letter approving of that treaty.

Matters remained tolerably tranquil till 1778, when intelligence came of the arrival of a French ship in one of the Maratta ports, having on board where he was received with much favour. a French agent, who had proceeded to Poona, This proved to be an adventurer, already well known in India. He called himself the chevalier St. Lubin, and he had persuaded the minister of marine that he could effect much by means of the Marattas. While the government of Bengal was deliberating

MARCH OF COL. GODDARD.

A. D. 1779-80.

on the best course to pursue, a split in the ministry at Poona occurred, and one party, headed by Succaram Baboo, declared for Ragoba. The Presidency of Bombay was empowered to treat with them, and a new arrangement was made, by which Ragoba was to act as regent, in the name of the young Peishwa. But the party of Siccaram Baboo soon appeared so strong, that it seemed likely to be able to dispense with Ragoba and the English. Scindia, however, threw his weight into the opposite scale, and the party, headed by Nana Furnovees, became ascendant; and their rivals now called on the English.

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A division of the army which had been assembled, was immediately sent forward. It consisted of about 4500 men, under the command of Col. Egerton, an inefficient officer; and to make matters worse, Mr. Mostyn, late resident at Poona, and Mr. Carnac, a member of Council, were sent as field-deputies, who, with the commander, were to form a committee for controlling all matters. They set out about the beginning of December, advanced slowly through the Côncan, and on the 23rd they had ascended the Ghât, and reached Condola. They were now within about thirty-five miles of Poona, for which place they set out on the 4th January, 1779, with provisions for twenty-five days. Mr. Mostyn, from illness, returned to Bombay; and the same cause obliged Col. Egerton to resign the command to Col. Cockburn, though he still continued to act in committee. On the 9th (for they moved at a snail's pace) they were within sixteen miles of Poona, where they found an army prepared to oppose them. Ragoba had sought to impress them with the necessity of gaining some advantage, in order to induce his friends to declare for them; but now, on its being announced that there were only provisions for eighteen days remaining, and on Cockburn's asserting that he could not protect the baggage, without a body of horse, the committee resolved to retreat! On the night of the 11th, having thrown the heavy guns into a tank, and burnt the stores, the army commenced this disgraceful movement. They thought to have gone off unobserved; but before daybreak the enemy was upon them, and continued to harass them till four in the afternoon of the second day (13th), when they reached Wargâm. Here the commander-in-chief declared that it was impossible to bring back the army to Bombay. Capt. Hartley, who had commanded the rear, proposed a plan by which it might be effected, but in vain; it was resolved to negotiate. The surrender of Ragoba was made a preliminary; this they agreed to; but he had already secured himself with Scindia. In fine, a treaty was concluded, by which Salsette and the other places were to be restored, the march of the troops that were coming from Bengal to be stopped, Baroach to be given up to Scindia, and two gentlemen left as hostages. On these terms the army was allowed to depart. The Directors, when they heard of this disgraceful affair, dismissed, and most justly, Egerton and Cockburn from their service, and degraded Mr. Carnac.

When the government of Bengal was informed by that of Bombay of the proposals made for the restoration of Ragoba, aware that war had now broken out between France and England, and that it was therefore of the utmost consequence to destroy the French influence at Poona, they autho

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rised them to join in the plan, and promised to assist them with men and money. With this view a detachment, commanded by Col. Leslie, was assembled at Calpee, in order to be sent to Bombay. On the 19th May it commenced its march; but Leslie, instead of advancing, as he was directed, with as much speed as possible, actually wasted four months in Bundelcund, trying to make up the quarrels in the family of the rajah, and negotiate useless treaties. In consequence of this "wild conduct," as Hastings terms it, the board unanimously agreed to recal him (October 9), and give the command to Lieut.-Col. Goddard, a man of a very different character2, who marched without delay for the Nerbudda, where he was to enter the dominions of Moodajee, the ruler of Berar. For Hastings had long been in treaty with this chief, with the design of aiding him to obtain the office of rajah of Sattâra, as being of the family of Sevajee.

On the 1st of December Goddard crossed the Nerbudda. He found that Moodajee was not inclined to contract any engagement, but that he would act in a friendly manner. He there received letters from Bombay urging him to advance without loss of time. He set out on the 16th of January (1779), and on the 22nd he was at Charwa, on the road to Bûrhanpûr. Here he received letters from the committee of the Bombay army dated the 11th, telling him not to advance, and one next day from Bombay, urging him to it. Though perplexed he went on, and on the 30th he reached Burhanpûr. On the 6th of February, having received certain intelligence of the disaster of the Bombay army, he marched for Surat. By the celerity of his movements he escaped a body of 20,000 horse sent from Poona to intercept him; and by the discipline which he maintained the people of the country were induced to stay in their houses and supply the army with all it required. He reached Surat on the 30th 3, whence he proceeded to Bombay; and though his troops were not to be placed under the orders of that presidency, but to be solely under the authority of the Supreme Council, he was requested to sit with the council, and recommended for the post of commander-in-chief.

Mr. Hornby the governor refused to ratify the convention of the 11th of January. In this he was perfectly justified, for the committee had clearly stated that they had not power to conclude a definitive treaty; but he was willing to ratify the treaty with Scindia. On both points the Supreme Council agreed with him. The good sense, moderation, and dignity shown by Hastings in his conduct toward the Bombay authorities who had committed such gross errors, do him great honour. No taunts, no insults, no reproaches escaped his lips or his pen.

Early in 1780, Goddard (now a general,) put his troops in motion, and on the 15th of February he took Ahmedabâd in Gûzerât by assault. Meantime Scindia and Holkar were advancing with 40,000 men towards Surat. By rapid marches Goddard arrived on the 8th of March in the vicinity of their camp and was preparing to attack 2 Leslie died a few days after. Hastings speaks of his "sordid disposition, and morose and disgusting manners." 3 This was the first British force that marched across India.

it in the night, when Scindia released the two English hostages, and sent a Vakeel with them to open a negotiation. But Goddard could place no reliance in him ; and after several fruitless attempts to bring him to action, he succeeded in entering his camp before dawn on the 3rd of April, and reached the very centre of it before he was perceived. Hardly any resistance was made, and the whole Maratta army fled, leaving the English in possession of both their camp and the country. As the rains commenced soon after, both sides retired; and Goddard sending back the Madras troops, put his own detachment into cantonments.

Hastings had some time before formed an alliance with a Rajpût rajah named the Rana of Gôhud, whose territories lay between those of Scindia and the Jumna. In consequence of an invasion of the Marattas, the Rana called on the English for aid, and Capt. Popham, who was in command of a detachment intended to reinforce Goddard, was ordered to lead it to his assistance. Popham soon drove off the Marattas, and then entering their own territory, laid siege to the fort of Lahar. Having no heavy guns he was unable to effect a sufficient breach; but having made an imperfect one with his light guns he resolved to storm. The garrison made a most gallant resistance, and did not yield till nearly the whole of them were slain. The English loss was 125 men.

Popham soon after achieved a far more brilliant conquest. The fortress of Gwalior in Gôhud, now held by the Marattas, had always been regarded as impregnable. It lay on a lofty insulated rock, scarped nearly all round, and was garrisoned by 1000 men. Sir Eyre Coote had pronounced it absolute madness to attack it with so feeble a detachment as Popham's; yet this gallant officer resolved to make the attempt. Taking his position in a village at a little distance from the fort, he kept spies constantly employed in examining it. They at length reported that there was one place which seemed practicable. At that place the height of the scarp was sixteen feet; from thence to the wall the steep rock was forty yards, and the wall was thirty feet high. Popham resolved to attempt that place, and made all the requisite preparations; and at daybreak on the 3rd August, the storming party, led by Capt. Bruce, arrived at the foot of the rock. By means of wooden ladders they mounted to the top of the scarp; they then clambered up to the foot of the wall, and the spies having climbed up and fixed rope-ladders to it, the Sepoys ascended with great rapidity. They then pushed on for the main body of the place; the garrison fled after a brief resistance, and thus the formidable Gwalior was captured. Popham was raised to the rank of major for this splendid achiev ment, at the fame of which the Marattas quitted all the surrounding country.

In October, Gen. Goddard being reinforced from Madras, moved from Surat in order to attack Bassein. Owing to the state of the roads and the rivers he did not arrive before it till the 13th November. As the place was strong and the garrison numerous, he resolved to proceed with caution and regularity, and began to erect batteries. The approaches were duly made: on the 10th December a breach had been effected, and next day the enemy surrendered at discretion. While Goddard was thus engaged, a division of the Bombay army

under Col. Hartley remained in the Côncan to secure the collection of the revenues, and to cover the siege of Bassein. Hartley defeated a large Maratta force, and finally falling back to within nine miles of Bassein, repelled all the attacks of an army of 20,000 men that was coming to raise the siege.

The affairs of the Carnatic were at this time in a dreadful condition, and a union of all the great powers of the Deckan against the English was to be apprehended. This, with the want of funds, and the violent and unprincipled opposition which he experienced from Francis, made Hastings most anxious to conclude a peace with the Marattas. He thought to effect it through the mediation of the rajah of Bêrar; but that chief appeared now quite lukewarm in his friendship. As a means of forcing the Marattas to conclude a peace, he sent directions for Gen. Goddard to direct his march for Poona. The general, then leaving Bassein, and driving the Maratta army before him, reached the foot of the pass named the Bhore Ghât on the 8th February. Aware of the importance of dispatch, he sent forward that very night a party of grenadiers under Capt. Parker to force the pass. The enemy was driven from all his posts, and next day the whole army reached the summit. Negotiations were then entered into with Nana Furnovees, but no terms could be arranged; and as the enemy had determined to burn Poona if the English advanced to it, and no advantage seemed likely to be derived from remaining above the Ghâts, Gen. Goddard resolved to descend and make the war merely a defensive one. On the night of the 17th April the troops secretly descended the Ghât, and though harassed by the desultory attacks of the Marattas in the Concan, they reached their destination without any great loss of men or stores.

Meantime a force from Bengal under Col. Carnac of five battalions, including Popham's detachment, had entered Scindia's territories to make a diversion in favour of Goddard. On reaching Serônj, Carnac found himself surrounded by a powerful army, his supplies cut off, and the rajah, whom he had expected to join him, keeping aloof. Having continued for some weeks in that situation, vainly expecting to be joined by Col. Muir from Gôhud, he called a council of war. Capt. Bruce, who had commanded the storming party at Gwalior, recommended a night attack on Scindia's camp. The plan was adopted and executed the next night (Mar. 24) with the usual success, the enemy flying and leaving every thing behind. Soon after Col. Muir joined and took the chief command. The two armies lay near each other for some months, but no action took place; and in October a treaty was concluded, the English restoring to Scindia all their conquests beyond the Jumna, except what had been given to the Rana of Gôhud.

On the 17th May, 1782, a treaty was also concluded with the Poona government. The English resigned Bassein and all their other conquests made since the treaty of Poorundur; the Marattas engaged on their side to make Hyder give up all his conquests in the Carnatic. No Europeans but the Portuguese were to have factories within the Maratta dominions. Scindia was to have Baroach, and Ragoba was to have 25,000 rupees a month from the Peishwa, if he would reside in Scindia's dominions.

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CHAPTER XVII.

Mohammed Ally's Agent in England-Powers given to Sir John Lindsay-Reduction of Tanjore-Mr. Paul Benfield

-Arrest and Death of Lord Pigot-Strange Conduct of Hastings-Capture of the French Possessions- Quarrel with the Nizâm-War with Hyder Ally-Destruction of Baillie's Detachment-Arrival of Coote-Defence of Wandewash-Victories of the English-Lord Macartney-Reduction of the Dutch Settlements-Destruction of Braithwaite's Detachment-Encounters of French and English Fleets-Storm and Famine at Madras-Death of HyderDeath of Coote-Attack on Cuddalore-Dismissal of Gen. Stuart-Operations on West Coast-Surrender of Bednore -Of Mangelore-Peace with Tippoo.

In the Carnatic, to which we now return, events of importance had been taking place, and war, with all its horrors, had been renewed.

A Scottish adventurer in India, named John Macpherson, having ingratiated himself with Mohammed Ally, was empowered by him to go to England and try to obtain from the crown the justice which he fancied was denied him by the Company. The Duke of Grafton was premier when Macpherson arrived in England; and in his interviews with this minister, he did not suffer truth to stand in his way when pleading the cause of his employer, whom he represented as a man of unsullied honour, an accomplished statesman and gentleman, one to whom Britain owed the rise of her power in India. He had even the courage to offer the duke what he calls "the credential presents " of Mohammed Ally; and on his refusal, he endeavoured to force them on his secretary, Mr. Bradshaw, but without effect. He then offered, in the name of the Nabob (who was a beggar), to invest seventy lacs of rupees in any funds the minister would name, or to lend that or even a larger sum to government at two per cent. He wrote pamphlets and articles in newspapers, and caused them to be written by others. He sought by all means to cause dissension between the ministry and the Company, and at length succeeded so far that the ministry resolved to support Mohammed Ally.

The mode of carrying their resolution into effect adopted by the ministry, was not a very creditable one. The Directors having applied to them for some ships of the line, they agreed to give them, provided their commander should have a large and conspicuous share in all treaties with native princes, as, by the peace of Paris, they said, the crown was bound to maintain the rights of certain Indian princes. The Directors refused; the ministry affected to acquiesce, but they secretly gave these powers to Sir John Lindsay, who was sent out in command. This officer arrived at Madras on the 26th July, 1770, and astonished the servants of the Company by announcing his powers, and calling on them to appear in his train when he went in state to deliver to the Nabob his Majesty's letter and presents. They declined, assigning very sufficient reasons. In the correspondence which ensued, Sir John exhibited abundance of the unreasoning insolence then almost characteristic of the British naval commanders. He attached him. self blindly to the cause of the Nabob, lent a credulous ear to all the representations of him, and

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the flock of European vultures which filled his court; and in his letters home to the ministers, represented him as the most excellent and the most ill-used of princes.

In the treaty concluded with Hyder Ally there was, as we have seen, a stipulation of defensive alliance, and at this time, being hard pressed by the Marattas, he called on the English for aid, to which he had a manifest right. At the same time the Marattas, by threats of invading the Carnatic, tried to draw the English to their side. The Nabob, supported by Lindsay, was urgent with the presidency to join the Marattas; but they decided on neutrality, inclining rather to the side of Hyder. Meantime the ministry, somewhat alarmed at the accounts of the dissensions at Madras, adopted the sage expedient of recalling the person, but leaving the authority. The result was what any person of sense might have anticipated. Lindsay's successor, Sir Robert Harland, proved to be violent and intemperate, even beyond his predecessor. He zealously seconded the Nabob in his efforts to make the presidency accept the alliance of the Marattas, who were now masters of all Mysore except the fortresses; but they still remained firm, and at length, in 1772, the Marattas were induced to conclude a peace with Hyder on receiving from him both money and territory to a large amount.

Mohammed Ally, amidst all his difficulties, had never his eyes off the fertile little realm of Tanjore, on which in reality he had no just claim whatever. In 1771, he induced the presidency to aid him in overrunning that kingdom. Toward the end of September, Gen. Smith reduced the strong fortress of Vellum; he then marched against the city of Tanjore. By the end of October his batteries had effected a breach, and he was preparing to storm, when he learned that Omdut-ulOmrah, the Nabob's son, by whom he was accompanied, had concluded a peace with the rajah, and thus deprived the troops of the plunder they had expected.

The rajah had, of course, been obliged to promise to pay large sums of money. In 1773 his debt was brought down to ten lacs of rupees. He either actually had applied to the Marattas and Hyder for protection, or, as it is asserted, the artifices of the Nabob had made the Presidency believe he had done so, conduct which they themselves declared was not to be at all wondered at, as they could not support him against the Nabob. Still they resolved to take the present opportunity of destroying him, lest, as they could not give him "a firm promise of support in his just rights," he might on some future occasion join the French, or some native power. Actuated by these motives, they made all the requisite arrangements with the Nabob, and early in August, 1773, the British forces appeared before the city of Tanjore. On the 16th September the place was taken, by the stratagem of making the assault in the heat of the day, when the greater part of the garrison had retired for shelter or refreshment. The rajah and his family being made prisoners were delivered up to the Nabob, who was also put into possession of the whole of that prince's dominions.

Owing to various causes it was not till April, 1775, that the Court of Directors were able to come to a decision on the subject. They then condemned the whole transaction as unjust and dan

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gerous, removed Mr. Wynch, the President, from his office, and reprimanded the other members of the Council. Lord Pigot, who, by a vote of the proprietors, was appointed governor, was directed to restore the rajah of Tanjore, and to carry out all needful reforms in the affairs of the Company.

Pigot, like Clive, on his arrival at Madras, in the end of 1775, found, as he says, that "a general reform was necessary, to preserve the Company from ruin ;" and he knew, of course, that his attempt to effect it would raise him a host of enemies. The first thing to be done was to restore the rajah; to prevent this the Nabob made every conceivable effort, using every argument that could be devised, but all in vain. In April, 1776, the governor went in person to Tanjore, and put the rajah in possession of his former dominions. The Company's troops were to protect the country, for which the rajah was to pay four lacs of pagodas a year.

One of the reasons assigned by the Nabob, why he should not be deprived of Tanjore, was, that in that case he should not be able to pay the many Englishmen to whom he was indebted. While Lord Pigot was at Tanjore, he received a letter from a Mr. Paul Benfield, informing him that he had assignments on the revenues of Tanjore for 405,000 pagodas lent to the Nabob, and on the present crop, for 180,000 lent to individuals, in all equal to the no small sum of 234,000l. To any one curious to know who this man of wealth was, it may be replied, that he was a junior servant of the Company, with a salary of a few hundred pounds a year, and that he kept the finest horses and carriages in Madras.

On the return of the governor to Madras, Mr. Benfield was called on to produce his vouchers, but he had none to produce. As to the debts of individuals, which had now dwindled down to 30,000 pagodas, he expected his bare word to be taken; and as to that of the Nabob, he referred to the books of the Cutcherry (which, however, were never produced), and he said the Nabob would acknowledge them. A majority of the Council, headed by Mr. Stratton, decided that they could not sanction any of his claims. Five days after, however, Mr. Benfield, having in the interval employed perhaps some arguments of known potency, this very same majority resolved against Lord Pigot, that the growing crops in Tanjore belonged to the Nabob, and that Benfield's claims against him were public, not merely private, and were therefore to be maintained. The next question was about a resident at Tanjore; Lord Pigot proposed Mr. Russell, a friend of his own; the majority supported Col. Stuart, who was to command the troops in Tanjore.

Lord Pigot was now in the same condition as Warren Hastings, opposed by a violent, and apparently unprincipled majority; but he did not act with the same prudence as Hastings. Assuming that the President was an integrant part of the Council, and that no act was valid without his sanction, he resolved not to concur in measures he

4 The Mr. Pigot of the preceding pages. He had gone out as a writer to Madras, in 1736, and returned to England in 1763, with a fortune of 400,000l., almost wholly gained by private trade. He was first created a baronet, and then an Irish peer.

did not approve. He therefore refused to sign the instructions to Col. Stuart, and a letter to the commandant at Tanjore. The majority hesitated, and the Council was adjourned for two days. When they again met (August 22), they resolved that the concurrence of the President was not necessary, and they wrote a letter to the secretary, directing him to sign those papers in the name of the Council. The letter was written, and two of them had signed it, when Lord Pigot snatched the paper, and produced a written charge against these two members for the act they were committing. As this charge precluded them from voting, the governor had now a majority by his casting vote, and it was voted to suspend them. When the Council met next day, the members of the late majority instead of attending, sent a protest declaring themselves the government, and claiming obedience from all persons in authority. By a vote of the Council they were then all suspended, and Sir Robert Fletcher 5, the commander-in-chief, was ordered into arrest, in order to be tried by courtmartial. The opposite party then resolved on the bold measure of arresting the governor himself. As Fletcher was ill, and so could not have the gratification of executing the mandate, it was given to Col. Stuart. This officer next day breakfasted and dined with Lord Pigot; he was also engaged to sup with him; and as they were going home together in his lordship's carriage it was stopped by the troops, whom the colonel had appointed for the service, and the arrest was made. It does not appear that the governor was treated with any harshness during the eight months that he was kept in custody, till released by death, brought on by wounded feelings, preying on a frame debilitated by age and the climate.

As in all such cases, there were faults on both sides, but those of lord Pigot were venial in comparison. His last measures were all irregular and imprudent no doubt, but they did not justify in any degree the violence of his opponents. There is no proof of his having, as they asserted, urged the appointment of Mr. Russell with the design of drawing money from the rajah ; and his brother Adm. Pigot asserted in parliament that he was offered 600,000l. to delay his restoration. On the other side were the supporters of Benfield and the Nabob; and it was quite natural for them to desire to have a resident at Tanjore who would not oppose their views. It is remarkable, however, that their courage failed them; and they did not venture to carry out their resolution that the growing crops belonged to the nabob. They were left with the rajah, and Benfield's claim remained unsatisfied.

It is remarkable also that Mr. Hastings, contrary

5 This exciter of mutiny (see p. 93), who, if he had had his deserts would have been shot, was actually some time before, by the influence of himself and friends in the Court of Proprietors, appointed to the chief command in Madras, with a seat in Council. True to his character, he soon quarrelled with the governor, and being ordered to Trichinopoly, he demanded a passage to England to attend his duty in Parliament, in which he, degraded as he had been, had a seat! He was told that he might perhaps have it, when he had set an example of military obedience. He then did obey, and soon the Council, out of respect to the House of Commons, permitted his departure. He had since returned, and acted as might have been expected.

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