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BATTLES OF ASSYE AND ARGÂM.
suffered dreadfully from the enemy's canister-right to keep out of shot from that place. But he, shot, and the Maratta cavalry then bore down on mistaking the orders, led directly on it, followed by them, but by their steadiness they repelled it; the 74th, which was to support the pickets. The and while the 29th dragoons made a charge, consequence was, that they suffered most severely the infantry advanced on the enemy's line, which by the cannonade from Assye, and were also they broke and routed. The remainder of the charged by the enemy's cavalry, to repel which column now came up and joined in the attack on the general was obliged to bring the British cathe enemy's second line, which after a stout resist- valry sooner into action than he had intended. It ance was driven back. The British cavalry then also suffered from the cannonade, and when the advanced and completed the rout of the enemy, time came for employing it in pursuit, it was unwho fled, leaving all their artillery. About 2000 able, to act. Another bad result was, that when men surrendered, with the camp and baggage. the cavalry was thus withdrawn from the rear, The slain on their side is said to have amounted many of the enemy who had, in Indian fashion, to 7000; the English had 172 killed, and 652 lain on the earth as if dead, rose and turned their wounded. guns on the backs of the British. The enemy finally went off, leaving 98 pieces of cannon in the hands of the victors, and 1200 men dead on the field. The loss of the British was very severe : out of a force of 4500 men, they had 428 killed, and 1138 wounded, a third of the entire number.
It was a disputed point among military men, whether Gen. Wellesley was justified in engaging with such a disparity of force; but all were unanimous in praise of his skill and conduct in the action. His personal courage also was conspicuous, and two horses were killed under him.
A. D. 1803.
The victory was due to the indomitable valour of the 76th, and the native troops which supported them. The conduct of the general is liable to the charge of temerity and want of judgment; but of his courage there could be no doubt. He headed every charge, he had two horses shot under him; and his son, who was his aid-de-camp, was himself wounded in the arm as he was remounting his gallant father.
The victory of Laswaree completed the overthrow of Sindia's power in the north. We will now trace the contemporary course of events in the Deckan.
After the reduction of Ahmednugur, Gen. Wellesley moved to Aurungabâd. The troops of the confederates were now at Jalnapûr, forty miles eastward of that city, and their design seemed to be to go on southwards, cross the Godâveri, and advance on Hyderabâd. To prevent them he proceeded to that river, and marched along it eastwards. The enemy then moved northwards from Jalnapûr till they were joined by sixteen of Sindia's disciplined battalions, commanded by two Frenchmen. Meanwhile Col. Stevenson with the Nizam's subsidiary force had taken Jalna; and as the two British forces were now near each other, the two commanders held a conference (Sept. 21), and arranged a plan for a combined attack on the enemy on the morning of the 24th at a place named Bokerdun, where they were said to be lying. The general was to attack their left, Col. Stevenson their right. The former marched so as to arrive on the 23rd within twelve or fourteen miles of the enemy; but on that day to his surprise, he found himself within six miles of them, for Bokerdun being the name of the district as well as of the town, it was the former his informants had meant. It was only the enemy's right that was at the town; their camp extended thence several miles to Assye. As Col. Stevenson would not be up till next day, and it was reported that the enemy was about to retire, and as if he himself were now to fall back he might be harassed by them, Gen. Wellesley resolved to give battle, though their army contained four times as much infantry as his own, had a numerous cavalry, abundance of artillery, and was strongly posted.
As the enemy's right, in front of which he found himself, consisted wholly of cavalry, he resolved to attack their left; and crossing a river which lay between them, he advanced to the attack with his infantry in two lines, supported by the cavalry in a third. The enemy having occupied the village of Assye with infantry and cannon, Gen. Wellesley directed the officer commanding the pickets on the
When Col. Stevenson came up, he was prevented from going in pursuit of the enemy by the necessity there was for the wounded men having the care of his surgeons. He then moved northwards into Candeish, where Bûrhampûr, the capital, opened its gates (Oct. 15), and the strong fortress of Asseerghur, named the Key of the Deckan, capitulated as soon as he had opened his batteries against it (20th). Meantime, Gen. Wellesley remained in the south, covering his operations, and protecting the territories of the Nizâm and the Peishwa by a series of rapid and harassing marches.
Sindia, who had now lost the whole of his possessions in the Deckan, became anxious to treat, and his envoys, though without proper credentials, appeared in the camp of Gen. Wellesley. Their master at first disavowed, then acknowledged them; and at length a cessation of arms was accorded him, provided he always kept at a distance of 40 miles from the British troops: but the general refused to extend it to the troops of the rajah of Berâr, whose interests he wished to separate from those of Sindia.
Col. Stevenson was now moving, by directions of Gen. Wellesley, to attack the strong hill-fort of Gawylghur, to the north of Elichpûr, in Berâr; and meantime that general advanced to support him, descending the Ghâts by Rajoora. The rajah of Berâr's army, commanded by his brother, was at a place named Parterly, not far from Elichpur, and the cavalry of Sindia, who had not yet ratified the armistice, lay within four miles of it. Col. Stevenson, on hearing of Gen. Wellesley's advance, prudently halted, and the armies joined (Nov. 29) within view of the enemy's camp, who retired at their approach. The general had no intention of pursuit, as the day was hot and the troops had made a long march; but on his going to put forward the pickets, he saw the enemy drawn up on the plains of Argâm, about six miles from where he had intended to encamp. His plan was formed at once he resolved to attack; and the British troops advanced in a single column, parallel to the enemy's lines, the cavalry leading. The line of
the enemy extended five miles; the village of Ar- | claims on the British and their allies, and agreed gâm, with its gardens and enclosures in its rear, to exclude Frenchmen and others from his serand a plain, intersected with water-courses, in its vice. front. Sindia's cavalry was on the right, a body of the irregular horse, named Pindarries, on the left.
The British infantry were formed in line for the attack, supported by the cavalry in a second line. When the cannonading began, three regiments of native infantry, who had behaved admirably at Assye, took panic, and were flying, but Gen. Wellesley, who was luckily at hand, stopped and rallied them, and then the whole line advanced in good order. The 76th and 78th regiments cut to pieces a body of Persians, to whom they were opposed on the right, and the charge of Sindia's cavalry on the left being repelled with great slaughter, the whole line broke and fled, leaving thirty-eight guns, and all their ammunition. The lateness of the day saved them, for it was the opinion of Gen. Wellesley, that if there had been an hour more of daylight, not a man would have escaped. As it was, their loss was very great; that of the British was only 346 killed and wounded:
The British army now marched to Elichpûr, where they formed a hospital (Dec. 6), and next day they moved for Gawylghur. This stood on a lofty mountain, on a range between the sources of the Taptee and Poona rivers. It consisted of an inner fort on the steep southern extremity, an outer one to the north, and beyond this a strong wall at the village of Labada. To each of these there was a gate opening to the country: but the two first were so difficult of approach, that it was deemed most advisable to make the attack at the wall, though it imposed the hardship of a toilsome march of thirty miles through the mountains. This task was committed to Col. Stevenson, who overcame the enormous difficulty of dragging artillery through these nearly pathless mountains; and on the night of the 12th he erected his batteries. Gen. Wellesley did the same on the south, to occupy the attention of the enemy. On the night of the 14th, the storming party from the north advanced under the command of Col. Kenny, while two attacks from the south were made by part of the troops of Gen. Wellesley. After a short time the fort was carried, with the loss of 126 men killed and wounded.
The rajah of Berar had been already negotiating for peace, and the fall of Gawylghur made him redouble his efforts, and, on the 17th, a treaty was concluded. By this treaty the rajah resigned to the English and their allies, the province of Cuttack, which had been reduced by a force under Col. Harcourt; he relinquished all claims on the possessions of the Nizâm; he bound himself not to employ any Europeans or Americans without the consent of the Company; and agreed to separate himself from the confederacy formed against them by Sindia and other Maratta chiefs.
Sindia also was now really anxious for peace, and on the 30th, a similar treaty was concluded with him. He surrendered Baroach and Ahmednugur and their territories, and all the country north of those of the rajahs of Jypûr and Jodhpûr, and the rana of Gohud; in which however his family, and ministers and officers, were to retain their jagheers under the British government. He gave up all
The Peishwa having had claims on Bundelcund, the British, as his allies, had entered that country and reduced it. The treaty of Bassein was now modified: the cessions he had made in the Deckan and Guzerat were returned to him, and Bundelcund was taken in exchange.
Early in the following year (1804), Capt. Malcolm was sent to Sindia's camp, and concluded with him (Feb. 27) a treaty of alliance, Sindia agreeing to receive a subsidiary force. Treaties of alliance had also been formed with the rana of Gohud and some of the Rajpoot princes.
War with Holkar-Col. Monson's Retreat-Siege of DelhiBattle of Deeg-Rout of Holkar-Capture of Deeg-Siege of Bhurtpore-Conduct of Sindia-Resignation of the Marquis of Wellesley.
HOLKAR alone now remained to give trouble to the British government. He had been preparing to take share in the late war, and a body of his troops, led by his friend and confederate Ameer Khân, was actually on its march to join Sindia, when tidings of the battle of Assye caused it to halt. He, however, plundered the territories of some of the British allies, and when warned of the consequences of such conduct, and counselled to send vakeels to the British camp, his demands were so unreasonable and so insolent, that orders were sent (Apr. 16.) to Gens. Lake and Wellesley to commence operations against him.
Gen. Wellesley, who had expected, and was therefore prepared for this event, sent orders to Col. Murray, who commanded in Gûzerât, to advance toward Sindia's capital, Ûjein, in order to co-operate with Gen. Lake, who was now moving in quest of Holkar. This chief having been on a real or pretended pilgrimage to Ajmeer, was now plundering the lands of Jyenuger or Jypoor, to protect the capital of which, a detachment was sent forward under the command of Col. Monson. At its approach, Holkar moved southwards, and the British followed, Monson's detachment being in advance. As the only place which Holkar now possessed north of the Chumbul was the fort of Tonk, fifty miles south of Jypoor, a detachment was sent to attack it; and by blowing open the gates in the usual way it was carried (May 15). Holkar being now at too great a distance for pursuit, the general, as the hot winds were prevailing and the cattle even perishing, resolved to lead all the troops but Monson's detachment back into the British territory. There seems to have been no great wisdom in this determination; for the hardships endured and the loss of men caused by the power of the fiery wind, were such, that it would have been just as well to advance as to retreat.
Holkar had been followed by two corps of native cavalry commanded by Col. Gardiner of the rajah of Jypoor's, and Lieut. Lucan of the king's service, and Col. Monson, on being joined by Col. Don from Tonk, moved for Kotah, (150 miles S. E.
MONSON'S RETREAT-SIEGE OF delhi.
A. D. 1804.
of Ajmeer,) where he arrived early in June. Being joined by some of the rajah's troops, he advanced still southwards to the strong pass of Mokundra on the frontiers of Malwa, and thence to Hinglaisghur, a fort belonging to Holkar ninety miles north of Ujein, and which was taken without difficulty (July 2). He thence moved further south, in the hope of being able to communicate with Col. Murray. But that officer after advancing some way, had, it seems, lost courage and fallen back; and Holkar, who had been keeping the Chumbul between himself and Monson, now taking heart, crossed that river, and approached his camp. Monson had been joined by Lieut. Lucan and his irregular cavalry, and by a corps of Sindia's cavalry under his cousin Bappoojee Sindia, and by the treacherous advice it is said of this last, he resolved to retire to the Mokundra pass. He set out on the morning of the 8th, leaving the cavalry on the ground, with directions to follow in half an hour's time. They had marched twelve miles when Bappoojee arrived with tidings that Lucan's corps had been cut to pieces by Holkar. The march was immediately resumed, and next day they reached Mokundra. Here they were attacked on the 11th by Holkar's cavalry in three divisions, but they repelled them with severe loss. Monson now fearing that the enemy might get into his rear, leaving his camp standing to deceive them, retired in all haste to Kôtah, where on their arrival the rajah refused to receive them, or to supply them with provisions. As the rains had begun, the country was all inundated, and on their march for Tonk the guns became so embedded in the mud, that they were obliged to spike them and leave them. On the 29th they reached Tonk. Col. Monson, as he had been directed by Gen. Lake not to retreat, remained here, and he received (Aug. 14) some reinforcements and a supply of grain from Agra. At length, not considering the place tenable, he left it (22nd) and advanced to the banks of the Banas, which river not proving then fordable, he was obliged to make a halt; and this gave the enemy time to bring up all their forces. On the 24th, the river was passed in the face of the enemy, but the baggage had to be abandoned, and on the next night they reached the fort of Khooshulghur, to which a party with the treasure under Capt. Nicholl had been sent forward from the Banas. Here Monson discovered that some of his troops (which were all native) were in correspondence with the enemy, and in spite of his precautions nearly two companies deserted. The march was resumed next day, the troops moved in an oblong square; the enemy's attacks were all repelled with great spirit, and at sunset on the 28th they reached the Biana pass. It was intended to halt there for the night; but Holkar having brought his guns to bear on them, they found it necessary to proceed. All order now was lost; the different battalions made for Agra as best they could, and on the 31st the last of them reached that city.
Monson's retreat was a most unfortunate event, and was the cause of much loss of men and money in the course of the war; for it led the people of India to think that Holkar was able to resist the English, gave confidence to that prince, and encouraged the Jât rajah of Bhurtpore to join him, and was near causing Sindia and the rajah of Berâr to
resume their arms. Monson was greatly to blame. He had been directed to remain at the passes of Boondee and Lakery to the south of Tonk, and he advanced to the Mokundra pass and even fifty miles beyond it, and in the whole of his proceedings he showed a great want of judgment and decision. Murray also was culpable in falling back for so trifling a cause, and the commanderin-chief had perhaps no right to retire when he did, and leave so small a detachment as Monson's at such a distance; he also greatly, and on very insufficient proofs, underrated the power and resources of Holkar: and by his orders not to retreat, he was in a great measure the cause of the retreat proving so disastrous.
Holkar now advanced with the whole of his army to Muttra, thirty miles north of Agra, and Gen. Lake leaving Cawnpore (Sept. 3), marched to Agra, on reaching which (22nd) he assembled the whole of his force at Secundra, six miles off, and thence (Oct. 1) began his march for Muttra. Holkar, leaving his cavalry to engage his attention, sent off the whole of his infantry and guns to Delhi, and on their arrival (8th), they commenced a cannonade on that city. Delhi had never been considered defensible. It was ten miles in circumference, surrounded by an ill-constructed wall, in most places without a parapet. The whole of the troops that could be brought together to defend it did not exceed 800 men, all natives, and some of them merely irregulars, several of whom had deserted at the approach of the enemy; and they had only eleven guns, while those of the enemy were 130, and their troops counted 20,000 men. So little hope had Gen. Lake that it would be possible to defend the town, that he wrote to the resident, Col. Ochterlony, directing him to abandon it, and draw the troops into the citadel, for the defence of the emperor. But Lieut.col. Burn, who commanded the troops, resolved to hold the town.
The cannonade of the besiegers was kept up day and night. On the evening of the 10th, a party of the garrison made a sortie, and seized and spiked some of the guns. At daybreak on the 14th, the guns of the enemy opened in every direction, and a large body of their infantry advanced with ladders to the Lahore gate; but they were driven back with great gallantry, and were obliged to leave their ladders behind. Toward evening they made a show of drawing some guns to another of the gates, but during the night they raised the siege and retired. The siege had lasted nine days, and, as Wilson justly observes, "The defence of Delhi only wants an Orme to form a worthy pendent to that of Arcot by Clive."
Holkar now moved northwards, and crossed the Jumna with his cavalry at the ford of Pâniput. Gen. Lake advanced to Delhi (18th), where he made a needless stay till the end of the month. He then crossed the Jumna himself with the cavalry, to act against that of Holkar. Their first service was to relieve the gallant Col. Burn, who on his return to his command at Saharunpore, had been surrounded in a small gurree, or mud
5"It is somewhat extraordinary," said Lake of Monson, "that a man, brave as a lion, should have no judgment or reflection." He did not perceive that he was unconsciously drawing nearly his own character.
fort, at Sâmlee, by the troops of Holkar. These fled at the appearance of the English, by whom they were rapidly pursued.
A few days after, Gen. Fraser left Delhi with the infantry and artillery, in pursuit of those of Holkar, which had not crossed the Jumna. He found them (Nov. 12) encamped, with their right covered by a fortified village, and their left by the fortress of Deeg. Early next morning, the British troops, led by Gen. Fraser in person, having made a detour to avoid a morass which lay before it, attacked and carried the village, and then charging down the hill, the first range of the enemy's guns. The firing from the second range, as they advanced, was tremendous, and their gallant leader lost a leg by a cannon-shot. The command now devolved on Col. Monson, and the second range was carried. The troops advanced, carrying battery after battery, for a space of two miles, till they came under the guns of the fort. They then returned and attacked a body of the enemy's troops, which some battalions had been left to keep in check, and drove them into the morass, where many of them perished. It was the opinion of Gen. Lake that this was the hardest-fought action that occurred during the war. It was a contest less with men than with guns. Eighty-seven guns were captured. The loss of the English in killed and wounded was upwards of 600 men, among whom their leader was included, whose wound had proved mortal.
Meanwhile Gen. Lake was pursuing Holkar so closely, as not to allow him a moment's time for plundering the country. Each day lessened the distance between them, and at length, (16th) the British having marched 58 miles in the last twenty-❘ four hours, fell suddenly by night on Holkar's camp, near Furrukabâd. The surprise was complete; the men were mostly sleeping, and the horses at picket, when a discharge of grape from the horse-artillery announced their arrival. Holkar, who would not at first believe that they could possibly be so near, mounted and fled with precipitation. His loss was about 3000 men slain, but the number of desertions which followed, reduced his cavalry-force to one half. He fled across the Jumna, still pursued by Gen. Lake. Holkar joined the remains of his infantry at Deeg, and the British general that of Col. Monson at Muttra (28th), after having, in the course of a month, marched about 500 miles after the flying foe.
The rajah of Bhurtpore, to whom Deeg belonged, had been one of the first of the tributaries of the Marattas to join the British in the late war. He had sent his troops to their aid, and he had been taken into a defensive alliance. But it had been discovered that he was in secret communication with Holkar; he had supplied his army at Deeg with provisions and protected its baggage, and his troops had openly taken part in the battle. It was therefore resolved to chastise him, and as soon as a battering-train had arrived from Agra (Dec. 13), Gen. Lake laid siege to Deeg. This town was surrounded by a strong mud-wall, with a deep ditch. The citadel, strongly built and fortified, stood in its centre. When a breach had been effected (23rd), a storming party marched to it in three divisions, at midnight. They speedily made themselves masters of the town, and the next night the garrison evacuated the citadel. A large quantity of
guns, stores, and ammunition, became the prize of the captors. The year 1804 closed with this
During the time of Monson's retreat, Col. Murray had advanced into Holkar's dominions, and taken Indore, his capital (Aug. 24). He thence moved northwards, reducing various forts, till he reached the Mokundra pass (Nov. 30), whence he advanced to Shahabâd, forty miles west of Nauvor (Dec. 25).
In the Deckan Gen. Wellesley, his presence being required in Bengal, had left the chief command with Col. Wallace, and this officer, during the month of October, by reducing the forts of Chandore and Galna, deprived Holkar of all his territory south of the Taptee.
On the 1st January, 1805, Gen. Lake being joined by the 75th regiment moved from Muttra, to which he had returned from Deeg, and on the third day he came before the rajah's capital, Bhurtpore. Having driven in Holkar's battalions, which were lying under its walls, he erected batteries against the town, and when a breach was reported practicable (9th), he gave orders for the assault to be made in the evening. But various causes of delay occurred, and when the storming party came to the ditch, they found the water breast-high Most of the men stopped here, and those that went over were driven back with great loss. Among the slain was the commander, Col. Maitland. A breach having been effected to the right of the former one, a second storm was attempted (21st); but the ditch, which had been reported to be narrow, and not very deep, was found to have been made to form a sheet of water in front of the breach. A portable bridge which had been brought, proving too short, it was attempted to lengthen it by a scaling-ladder; but both fell into the water, and could not be disengaged. An officer and some of the men then swam over, and ascended the breach, but were forced to retire with speed. The whole of the storming party was now drawn off, having had no less than eighteen officers and 500 men killed and wounded, by the grapeshot and musketry of the garrison.
Supplies having come from Agra, and the army having been reinforced by Col. Murray's troops, now under Gen. Jones, and a breach effected in another place, it was resolved to try a third assault (Feb. 20). At break of day the garrison made a sortie, and were near carrying the trenches in which the storming party was stationed. The men thus somewhat fatigued and dispirited were then formed into three columns, of which one, led by Col. Don, was to advance to the breach, while another, under Capt. Grant, was to carry the enemy's trenches and guns outside of the town, and a third, under Col. Taylor, was to attack one of the gates. The second was quite successful, and was near getting into the town with the fugitives; the third, having lost its scaling-ladders, was forced to retire. When. Col. Don ordered his column to advance, the men of the king's 75th and 76th, which formed the head of it, refused to move. The 12th and 15th native infantry then took their place, and gallantly followed Col. Don, and the former regiment succeeded in planting its colours on the bastion; but the colonel seeing how little hope there was of success, recalled the whole party. The loss of the British, in killed and
A. D. 1805.
SIEGE OF BHURTPORE-CONDUCT OF SINDIA.
wounded on this fatal day, was 894 men. Next morning Gen. Lake appeared on parade, and severely reprimanded the Europeans, who had refused to obey orders. They all then offered to volunteer for another assault, which was made that day under Col. Monson. All that valour could achieve was performed; but there was in reality no breach, the fire of the garrison was murderous, and they flung down on the assailants as they clambered up the face of the bastion, large logs of wood, flaming cotton steeped in oil, and pots filled with gunpowder and other combustibles. Col. Monson at length ordered a retreat, when nearly 1000 men had been killed or wounded.
In these four assaults the British had had upwards of 3000 men killed and wounded, their guns were almost all become unserviceable, their ammunition was nearly expended, and their provisions exhausted, and the men were quite worn out with fatigue. It therefore became necessary to withdraw from before Bhurtpore, the only fortress in India that has successfully resisted the British arms. Gen. Lake assigned various causes for his want of success, such as the strength of the place, the number of its defenders, and, above all, the incapacity of his engineers. But surely the blame ought to rest with the man, who undertook the siege under such disadvantages, and who so wantonly squandered the lives of his men. The truth is, that like too many other British commanders, he relied on the valour of his men for covering his own want of skill and knowledge.
The rajah was, no doubt, elated with the success of his defence; but, on the other hand, he saw that Holkar could not hold out against the power of the British, and he resolved to endeavour to secure himself in time. His vakeels, therefore, soon appeared in the British camp (March 10), where they were favourably received, and negotiations were commenced. While they were going on, the British cavalry was employed in pursuit of Holkar's; and as the rajah appeared to be trying to gain time, the army was moved (April 8), and took up nearly its former ground, before Bhurtpore. This made him somewhat uneasy, and at length (17th) a treaty was signed, in which he agreed to pay twenty lacs of rupees for the expenses of the war, and give one of his sons as a hostage.
During the whole course of this war the conduct of Sindia had been very suspicious. He had entertained a vakeel of Holkar's in his camp; he required the British to put him in possession of Gohud and Gwalior; he demanded to be supplied with money, to enable him to march from Bûrhampur, where he then was, to Ujein; and he even had the audacity to expect, that in the event of his joining a British force, he should have the command of the whole. While these points were in discussion between him and Mr. Webbe, the resident, his camp was entered by his father-in-law, Shirzee Râo, the most unprincipled man even among the Marattas, and a thorough hater of the English; and he soon gained unlimited power over the feeble mind of his son-in-law.
Sindia soon after put his troops in motion, entered the territories of the Nabob of Bhopâl, and marched along the north banks of the Nerbudda for Sâgur, a city belonging to the Peishwa, in Bundelcund, on whom he pretended to have some un
settled claims. He invested that fort; but on the remonstrance of Mr. Jenkins, who, Mr. Webbe being dead, was acting as resident, he commenced his march for Ujein. He, however, made such delays, and such positive information was obtained of his being secretly engaged in a plan for a confederacy against the English, that the resident quitted his camp, and marched to a distance of fourteen miles from it. At Sindia's earnest entreaty, however, he returned, and during his absence Sindia's whole body of Pindarries fell on his camp, and plundered it of every thing of value, killing and wounding about fifty men of his escort. Sindia expressed great sorrow, but pretended that he had no power over the Pindarries. The resident still continued to accompany his march.
Sindia at length (March 22) nearly cast off the mask, by announcing to the resident that it was his intention to march to Bhurtpore, in order to mediate between the contending parties. Lord Wellesley, when informed of this design, resolved to be prepared for war, and in case of its accruing to reduce the power of Sindia, to what he terms "the lowest scale." With this view he directed Col. Close, to whom he gave the same extensive powers as had been held by Gen. Wellesley in the Deckan, to make preparations for reducing the southern part of Sindia's dominions; and he instructed the commander-in-chief (now Lord Lake) to oppose his march to Bhurtpore, and at the same time to provide for the safety of the resident.
Sindia had advanced (29th) as far as Subdulghur on the Chumbul. Two days after he was joined by Ambajee Inglia, and some days later (Apr. 7), Ameer Khân left Bhurtpore with the avowed purpose of joining him also. On that same day, Shirzee Râo marched toward Bhurtpore with a large body of horse and Pindarries, thinking that the rajah was still at war. From Weir, a place within fifteen miles of it, he wrote to Lord Lake, to say, that he had been sent by Sindia to negotiate; in reply, he was desired not to advance on any account. He did however advance to within a short distance of that town; but on the rajah's refusal of a personal interview, he returned to Weir, where he was joined by Holkar with about 3000 or 4000 horse, and they proceeded together to the camp of Sindia, who received Holkar in a most cordial manner, and excused himself for it to the resident by his extreme desire of promoting peace. Holkar had been but a few days there, when, with Sindia's connivance, he seized and tortured Ambajee, till he made him pay him a large sum of money.
Lord Lake at length (21st) was enabled to leave Bhurtpore, and march in the direction of Sindia's camp. On the tidings of his approach, the confederates, in alarm, broke up, and marched for Sheopore, a town about half-way to Kôtah. Owing to the fatigue, the heat, and the want of water, a great number of their men perished before they reached it. Sindia, still afraid of war, kept the resident with him. From Sheopore they marched (May 10) for Kôtah, and they moved thence in the beginning of June toward Ajmeer. As Sindia still refused to let Mr. Jenkins depart, instructions were forwarded to Lord Lake to be prepared for war as soon as the season would permit.
There can be little doubt, that if military operations had been resumed, the object of Lord Wel