Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy

Couverture
Oxford University Press, 1982 - 432 pages
1 Commentaire
When Strategies of Containment was first published, the Soviet Union was still a superpower, Ronald Reagan was president of the United States, and the Berlin Wall was still standing. This updated edition of Gaddis' classic carries the history of containment through the end of the Cold War. Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt's postwar plans, Gaddis provides a thorough critical analysis of George F. Kennan's original strategy of containment, NSC-68, The Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look," the Kennedy-Johnson "flexible response" strategy, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of detente, and now a comprehensive assessment of how Reagan-- and Gorbachev-- completed the process of containment, thereby bringing the Cold War to an end.
He concludes, provocatively, that Reagan more effectively than any other Cold War president drew upon the strengths of both approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. A must-read for anyone interested in Cold War history, grand strategy, and the origins of the post-Cold War world."
 

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LibraryThing Review

Avis d'utilisateur  - chellinsky - LibraryThing

This exceedingly dense book recounts the Cold War policies of the United States from Truman through Reagan. This is one of the better history book I have read as it refuses to repeat the same themes ... Consulter l'avis complet

Pages sélectionnées

Table des matières

Prologue Containment Before Kennan
3
George F Kennan and the Strategy of Containment
25
Implementing Containment
54
NSC68 and the Korean War
89
Eisenhower Dulles and the New Look
127
Implementing the New Look
164
Kennedy Johnson and Flexible Response
198
Implementing Flexible Response Vietnam as a Test Case
237
Nixon Kissinger and Détente
274
Implementing Détente
309
Epilogue Containment after Kissinger
345
Droits d'auteur

Expressions et termes fréquents

Fréquemment cités

Page 298 - Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot — and will not — conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions, and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world.
Page 119 - Staff, this strategy would involve us in the' wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy.
Page 254 - In the empty immensity of earth, sky, and water, there she was, incomprehensible, firing into a continent. Pop, would go one of the six-inch guns; a small flame would dart and vanish, a little white smoke would disappear, a tiny projectile would give a feeble screech — and nothing happened.
Page 298 - First, the Unit-ed States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
Page 305 - Our objective, in the first instance, is to support our interests over the long run with a sound foreign policy. The more that policy is based on a realistic assessment of our and others' interests, the more effective our role in the world can be. We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the...
Page 205 - Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.
Page 4 - If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don't want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances.
Page 36 - To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation. Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this.
Page 66 - This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

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À propos de l'auteur (1982)


John Lewis Gaddisis the Robert A. Lovett Professor of History at Yale university, a winner of the Bancroft Prize, and a preeminent expert on the Cold War.

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