VI. λον ποίκιλο μα Τέκτονος σοφοῦ. hazard, but with art framing it; how could this SERM. most fair comprehension of all fair things be not the lawful issue of art, but a by-blow of fortune; of fortune, the mother only of broods monstrous and misshapen? If the nature of any cause be discoverable by its effects; if from any work we may infer the workman's ability; if in any case the results of Kéos xawisdom are distinguishable from the consequences of a TixovOS chance, we have reason to believe, that the Architect Eurip. of this magnificent and beautiful frame was one incomprehensibly wise, powerful, and good Being; and to conclude with Cicero, Esse præstantem aliquam Cic. ii. de æternamque naturam, et eam suscipiendam, adorandamque hominum generi pulchritudo mundi, or- "AITOTIXdoque rerum cœlestium cogit confiteri; the sense of Epitheton which saying we cannot better render or express, than in St. Paul's words; The invisible things of God Rom. i. 20. by the making (or rather by the make and constitution) of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that, I adjoin after him, they are inexcusable, who from hence do not know God; or knowing him do not render unto him his due glory and service. * Οὐδὲν τῶν καλῶν εἰκῆ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε γίνεται, ἀλλὰ μετά τινος τέχνης δη popyoions. Plut. de Plac. i. 6. y Quod si mundum efficere potest concursus atomorum, cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur urbem non potest, quæ sunt multo minus operosa, et multo quidem faciliora? Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 37. Nat. Deor. pag. 89. ̓Αριστοτέχ νας. Dei. Pind. I Believe in God, SERMON VII. THE BEING OF GOD PROVED FROM THE GEN. i. 27. So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him. SERM. THE belief of God's existence is the foundation of VII. all religion, if which be not well laid in our minds by convincing reasons, the superstructures standing thereon may easily be in danger of being shaken and ruined; especially being assailed by the winds of temptation and opposition, which every where blow so violently in this irreligious age. No discourses therefore can perhaps be more needful, (or seasonably useful,) than such as do produce and urge reasons of that kind, apt to establish that foundation. Of such there be, I conceive, none better, or more suitable to common capacity, than those, which are drawn from effects apparent to men's general observation and experience, the which cannot reasonably be ascribed to any other cause, than unto God; that is, (according to the notion commonly answering to that name,) to a Being incomprehensibly wise, powerful, and good. VII. Of such effects there be innumerably many in this SERM. sensible world among things natural, more strictly so called, that is, subsisting and acting without immediate use of understanding or choice; the constitutions and operations of which (being evidently directed according to very much reason, and to very good purpose) do evince their being framed and ordered by such a Being; as I have formerly, with a competent largeness, endeavoured to shew. But beside those, there is exposed to our observation, yea subject to our inward conscience, another sort of beings, acting in another manner, and from other principles; having in them a spring of voluntary motion and activity; not, as the rest, necessarily determined, or driven on, by a kind of blind violence, in one direct road to one certain end; but guiding themselves with judgment and choice, by several ways, toward divers ends; briefly, endued with reason, to know what and why; and with liberty, to choose what and how they should act; and that this sort of beings (that is, we ourselves, all mankind) did proceed from the same source or original cause, as it is in way of history delivered and affirmed in our text, so I shall now endeavour by reason (apt to persuade even those who would not allow this sacred authority) to shew. Indeed, if the eternal Rom. i. 20. power and divinity of God may, as St. Paul tells us, be seen in all the works of God; the same peculiarly and principally will appear observable in this masterpiece, as it were, of the great Artificer; if the meanest creatures reflect somewhat of light, by which we may discern the Divine existence and perfections; in this fine and best polished mirror we shall more clearly discover the same: no where so VII. SERM. much of God will appear as in this work, which was designedly formed to resemble and represent him. This then is the subject of our present Discourse, That in man, well considered, we may discern manifest footsteps of that incomprehensibly excellent Being impressed upon him; and this doubly, both in each man singly taken, and in men as standing in conjunction or relation to each other: considering man's nature, we shall have reason to think it to have proceeded from God; considering human societies, we shall see cause to suppose them designed and governed by God. I. Consider we first any one single man, or that human nature abstractedly, whereof each individual person doth partake; and whereas that doth consist of two parts, one material and external, whereby man becomes a sensible part of nature, and hath an eminent station among visible creatures; the other, that interior and invisible principle of operations peculiarly called human: as to the former, we did, among other such parts of nature, take cognizance thereof, and even in that discovered plain marks of a great wisdom that made it, of a great goodness taking care to maintain it. The other now we shall chiefly consider, in which we may discern not only onμeia, but ouμara, of the Divine existence and efficiency; not only large tracks, but express footsteps; not only such signs as smoke is of fire, or a picture of the painter that drew it; but even such, as the spark is of fire, and the picture of its original. 1. And first, that man's nature did proceed from some efficient cause, it will (as of other things of nature) be reasonable to suppose. For if not so, then it must either spring up of itself, so that at some de VII. terminate beginning of time, or from all eternity, SERM. some one man, or some number of men did of themselves exist; or there hath been a succession, without beginning, of continual generations indeterminate, (not terminated in any root, one or more, of singular persons.) Now generally, that man did not at any time in any manner spring up of himself, appears, 1. From history and common tradition; which (as we shall otherwhere largely shew) deliver the contrary; being therein more credible than bare conjecture or precarious assertion, destitute of testimony or proof. 2. From the present constant manner of man's production, which is not by spontaneous emergency, but in way of successive derivation, according to a method admirably provided for by nature. 3. Because if ever man did spring up of himself, it should be reasonable that at any time, that often, that at least sometime in so long a course of times, the like should happen, which yet no experience doth attest. 4. There is an evident relation between our bodies and souls; the members and organs of our bodies being wonderfully adapted to serve the operations of our souls. Now in our bodies (as we have before shewed) there appear plain arguments of a most wise Author that contrived and framed them; therefore in no likelihood did our souls arise of themselves, but owe their being to the same wise Cause. Also particularly, that not any men did at some beginning of time spring up of themselves is evident, because there is even in the thing itself a repugnance; and it is altogether unconceivable that any thing, which once hath not been, should ever come to be without receiving its being from another: and |