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revelation; but he does not leave the matter there. He not only makes no attempt to shew a correspondence between what revelation teaches on these important subjects, and the conclusions of natural science, but he takes every opportunity, as far as his ability extends, of turning the latter, openly or covertly, into a weapon of attack against the credibility of the former. We have already seen how far he has attempted this in regard to the scriptural doctrines of the original perfection, the fall and the consequent degeneracy, of man, and we have seen that he has signally failed in this attempt. We shall afterwards have occasion to consider other instances of the same kind, in the conclusions he has drawn with regard to the paradisaical state, and his views respecting death, and the future prospects of the human race. These need not be farther anticipated

here.

Even though he had merely been silent on these subjects, and had confined his attention strictly, as he professes to do, to the present life, and to what lies within the province of the senses, I would have considered such a view of man, and his relations to other objects, to be eminently defective, inasmuch as it omits by far the most important of these objects and relations. The omission is inexcusable. Mr Combe cannot allege that speculation on these subjects, in a general way, is unphilosophical; for the most eminent philosophers of ancient times, Socrates, Plato, and others, who were ignorant of a revelation, shewed that, by the light of natural reason alone, man could arrive at conclusions, very nearly, if not altogether, amounting to demonstration, on the subject of a future state, as well as on the existence of a God. And it will be afterwards shewn, that the natural arguments for both are greatly strengthened by the discoveries of Phrenology. Taking into view,

then, both these peculiarities in Mr Combe's system,—the arguments for a future state omitted, which plainly lay in his way, and to which he has himself referred in other publications, and the arguments openly stated, or covertly insinuated, against it, which lay entirely out of his way,we can only surmise his determination to be, to exclude it as something that is absurd and incredible, or which, if believed at all, is to be believed without evidence; and which, therefore, must be unworthy of the consideration of a rational being.

I shall pass over what he says respecting man as a physical and organized being, as there is nothing in regard to these upon which we materially differ. He has pointed out some correspondences between our bodily frame and external objects, evincing a wise and benevolent adaptation of the one to the other, as many other authors have done before him. This is a most interesting subject, and is still far from being exhausted, many minute correspondences existing which have not yet been adverted to; but enough has been done in this field of inquiry to establish beyond all dispute or cavil the infinite wisdom, power, and goodness of the Creator. This, as Lord Bacon says, is an excellent argument, and has been exceedingly well handled by diverse, and I do not see that there is any thing in Mr Combe's views which has added much either to our knowledge or conviction on the subject.

Leaving, therefore, those points on which there is no difference of opinion, I proceed at once to the consideration of the mental faculties of man. And here, as I stated in the preface, I adopt substantially the same system as Mr Combe, namely, that which has been gradually evolved and deduced from the observations and discoveries of Gall and Spurzheim. Like him, I assume this doctrine to be founded in truth, and " con

sider it to afford the clearest, the most complete, and the best supported system of human nature which has hitherto been taught." I have, therefore, taken it for the basis of my views, but it will be seen that the conclusions I draw from it are very different from his. The public will now have an opportunity of judging which of these are the most sound and philosophical.

As I am here arguing with a believer in Phrenology, I need not enter into a statement of the evidence on which it is founded. I have here Mr Combe on my side. He considers the evidence sufficient, and so do I. He has, in his various writings, stated the evidences originally adduced by the founders of the science, and added many original observations of his own, confirming and illustrating their views. He has strenuously, and I think successfully, answered the common objections to the doctrine, as leading to materialism, atheism, and fatalism. It is, therefore, unnecessary here to enter into these objections, and various others, which have been refuted over and over again, and which the opponents of the system seem to have at last abandoned.

As to those who are unacquainted with the science, who have not examined its evidences, and have not as yet adopted its doctrines, I may propose the scheme of the faculties which it exhibits as one which corresponds with what we find in nature. Let it be adopted, if they will, as a theory, which, as far as it goes, explains a great number of the mental phenomena; and it does not appear that they can reasonably object to it, until they are able to produce a better, or one which shall explain the phenomena more perfectly. To those who wish to study the subject, to examine the evidence, and judge for themselves, I must refer to the original works of the discoverers, Gall and Spurzheim, and to those of Mr Combe himself, so far as they treat of the evidences; but

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above all, I must recommend the careful and diligent observation of nature after the method pointed out by these writers, there being no possibility of ariving at any fixed or sound belief on the subject, without such careful and continued observation.

I shall now proceed to the enumeration of the faculties, as revealed to us by phrenological observation. Mr Combe has, in his work, gone over the whole of them two or three times; first stating them as divided into propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties; next, giving a view of these as compared with each other, and in order to prove the supremacy of the moral sentiments and intellect; and, lastly, stating them as compared with external objects. It is needless at present to follow him through all his details. I shall therefore adopt, as the basis of my remarks, his first enumeration, giving his statement of the faculties, their uses and abuses, in his own words, and afterwards adding any thing which I may think material to be noticed, which he has either omitted, or stated more positively than the observed facts appear to me to warrant.

"ORDER I.-FEELINGS.

"GENUS I.-PROPENSITIES, common to man with the lower animals.

"THE LOVE, OF LIFE.

"APPETITE FOR FOOD.- Uses, nutrition.-Abuses, Gluttony and drunkenness."

Note. This last appears to me to be a mistake. I would say that the abuses of this faculty are gluttony and epicurism. Drunkenness, or the abuse or excess of stimulating and intoxicating substances, such as spirits, opium, tobacco, and the like, pro

ceeds from a different cause. It arises from the love of excitement, and depends, not upon one, but upon the whole organs of the brain, which are all, without exception, subject to the exciting effects produced by these substances.

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"1. AMATIVENESS, produces sexual love.”

6.2. PHILOPROGENITIVENESS. Uses: affection for young and tender beings.-Abuses: pampering and spoiling children."

Note. The peculiar objects of this feeling seem to be the young of our own species in general, but particularly our own offspring. It is generally stronger in the female than in the male, which is evidently a wise provision, as the principal care of young children necessarily devolves upon the female. Its abuse in pampering and spoiling children, arises solely from ignorance; for when properly enlightened by intellect, there can be no doubt that this faculty would lead us to consult the permanent welfare of the child, in preference to the indulgence of his present wishes and immediate feelings.

"3. CONCENTRATIVENESS.-Uses: It gives the desire of permanence in place, and renders permanent emotions and ideas in the mind. · Abuses: aversion to move abroad; morbid dwelling on internal emotions and ideas, to the neglect of external impressions."

Note. This faculty was originally termed inhabitiveness,

because its organ is found to be large in men and animals who are attached to particular spots, and averse to change of place. This is the sole function attributed to the faculty by Gall and Spurzheim. Mr Combe is of opinion that its proper function is the power of concentrating various faculties upon one subject, or in the performance of one act, and that the aversion to motion is only a consequence of

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