of civil courts relative to confessions of guilt. You surely could not have been ignorant of this; and yet because the Synod did not sanction a principle directly contradicted by such practice, you affect to be greatly aggrieved! Were any civil court to practice according to the rule your would have had the Synod to establish, it would subject itself to the scorn and contempt of all honest minds, and expose itself to an impeachment on the ground of imbecility or wilful disregard of the claims of right. You have doubtless read of the feelings of deep abhorrence and reprobation that were excited in the breasts of all the pious and intelligent in Scotland, when the Justiciary Court acted on the plan, on which you would have the discipline of the Associate Church conducted. I refer to the case of James Mitchell, who was convicted and condemned to death by that unrighteous court, simply on the ground of a confession, he had formerly made, of an attempt to assassinate Sharp, the bishop of St. Andrews. When arraigned for trial, my author states, that 'Sir George Lockhart argued in behalf of the prisoner, with great judgment and learning, to the admiration of the audience, showing, that no extra-judicial confession could be allowed in court, and that his confession was extorted from him by hopes and promise of life.' (See Crookshank's History of the Church of Scotland.) But you may perhaps object to this appeal to the practice of civil courts respecting an ecclesiastical affair. I have indeed only appealed to such practice, because it is based on a common-sense principle; a principle, which I will now proceed to show you is also acted on in the matter of ecclesiastical discipline. In our Book of Discipline we have no express rule on the subject, but we have one laid down in Stewart's Collections, a book which has always been regarded as of authority in our church courts. The rule to which I refer is the following-"Probation by confession, if judicial, is the strongest of all probation; but if men confess a crime, rather from weariness of, or aversion to life, than from conscience of guilt; or, if there appear any signs of distraction or madness, then such confessions ought not to be rested upon," &c. (See Book iv. Tit. 3, sec. 5, also sec. 11.) What say you, brethren, to this rule? What now becomes of your grievance? Or is it a matter of grievance to you that the Synod did not repeal this long standing rule of the Church relative to confessions of guilt? Would you have had the Synod to establish in its place a rule admitting of no limitations or exceptions? for such was the nature of Mr. Stark's resolution, the rejection of which you lament as an awful grievance! But the rule prescribed to you in the above quotation, and which is embraced in the discipline of the Associate Church," is carefully guarded, is strictly limited. It declares that a confession of guilt, in order to be received in evidence, must be judicial; that is, it must be made by the accused in the presence of the court, after his arraignment for trial; and not only so, it must also possess certain other attributes, as you will perceive by again turning your eye on the rule. "Thus far I have been considering Mr. Stark's resolution in the abstract, and have clearly shown that the Synod would not have been justified in adopting it, which would have been the case had his appeal been sustained. Let us now consider it in the concrete, at least so far as it had a bearing on the case of Mr. Webster. And suppose for a moment, that Mr. W. did make the confession which you impute to him; was not that confession alleged to have been made before the Presbytery of Albany commenced their process against him? Consequently, it was not a judicial confession. And besides, may it not have been: extorted under a promise of favor, or under menaces, or under terror, or from a motive of fear or interest, rather than from a sense of guilt, and therefore, inadmissible by any well regulated court? And would you have the Synod to say, that a confession made under such circumstances was a sufficient evidence of guilt, and that it would be a horrible outrage to investigate the case any further! But let it be remembered that Mr. Webster, when arraigned before the Presbytery for trial, utterly denied having made the extra-judicial confession imputed to him, the truth of which denial has since been established by unimpeachable. testimony. Where then was the error of the Presbytery? And where was the error of the Synod in approving of the procedure of the Presbytery? Brethren, are you not too easily offended? "I have clearly shown that Mr. Stark's resolution, when considered in respect of its merits, as an abstract proposition can by no means stand the test, and yet, let me remark, that it was not rejected by Presbytery and Synod simply on that ground, but chiefly on the ground of its misapplication to a particular case. Even though it had contained a true proposition, from the wrong application that was attempted to be made of it, it behooved to be rejected. The thing had no business there. It was evidently presented with the intention to impede the course of justice and to screen guilt; besides in the application that was made of it, it was based on the false assumption that Mr. Webster had confessed the truth of the charges, laid in the Presbytery's libel against him. Accordingly the Synod, as you will see from their proceedings in the case, without particularly affirming or denying the principle of the resolution, proceeded to satisfy itself from the examination of witnesses, whether the resolution did really apply to the case of Mr. Webster: and the judgment of the court was that it did not. And the reason why the Synod decided the matter rather in its concrete than its abstract form, was, because Mr. Stark's 'reasons of protest,' and the Presbytery's answers' presented the subject particularly in that point of view." ART. VI. A Dislaimer. It has been a favorite theme in the Associate Presbyterian Magazine to charge the members of the Associate Presbyteries of Albany and Cambridge with a partnership-"a conjunct concern"-in Mr. Webster's pamphlet. The charge has been often repeated without specifying the individuals intended, leaving the public to fix it on all the members of those Presbyteries, if they pleased. This was an ungenerous measure, and done for effect, and not an evidence of the fact supposed. At length, however, in the 8th No. of the Magazine, and after Mr. Webster had fully exonerated all the members of those Presbyteries, the charge is repeated with specification of individuals, among whom I find I am included: An occasion is, therefore, now given for denial, and I think, justice to myself requires me to embrace it. With the merits, or demerits of that pamphlet, I have nothing to do at present; but I repel the charge of secretly assisting in a work, and leaving anVOL. XV. 36 other to bear the whole responsibility, and the odium that may be attached to it, whether justly or unjustly. Though I believe all the members of these Presbyteries innocent of the charge, yet I speak only for myself.-I did not contribute to that pamphlet, directly or indirectly. This simple statement, I trust, is sufficient; and I hope the public will require stronger evidence than that which is advanced in the Magazine to prove me guilty, viz: That because I was called by Mr. Webster to prove some of his statements, therefore I had assisted him in his pamphlet. According to this logic, a witness must always be considered an accomplice, his citation a charge, and his testimony the proof against himself. This rule may be pleaded by culprits, for if once established, there is an end to testimony, and the transgressor may proceed with impunity. But Mr. Webster never learned from me the facts which he called on me to prove; he was himself an eye and ear witness to at least the princpal part of them. And even had I communicated them to him, it would require something more to prove that I was a partner in the publication. ABRAHAM ANDERSON. ART. VII. An injurious Report corrected by Rev. G. M. Hall. MR. EDITOR, Permit me, through your periodical, to correct a report, which has been extensively circulated, tending to the injury of the cause of truth as well as my individual character. Report says, that while I am publicly upholding the decisions of the Presbytery of Cambridge and of the Associate Synod, in relation to Dr. A. Bullions, Mr. Stalker and others, I am privately and secretly encouraging them in their pernicious courses. The design of this report seems, not merely to set me up to the world as acting a double part, but also to promote a cause which is based upon falsehood and mirepresentation. If the report affected no one but myself, I should be silent, well knowing that it matters little what decision men may pass upon me; but when I reflect that it may injure the cause I have espoused, and influence the wavering, I conclude that it would be criminal to suffer it to pass unnoticed. It might be sufficient for me in this public manner, to declare that the report, as circulated here and in other parts of the church, is utterly false. The origin of the report may be traced to some private letters, written by me some five or six years since, to a near friend of Dr. Bullions, in answer to a one-sided and partial history of the trials of Dr. Bullions in the Presbytery of Cambridge. In these letters I censured the conduct of Presbytery very severely, which censure, a true history of the case showed me to be wholly gratuitous. When I first came to the North, I was reminded of these letters, by the individual to whom they were addressed. I replied, that circumstances had changed-that my opinion had changed. Though I made this statement in the presence of several individuals, who still remember it, yet it was immediately reported, that I had said that my opinion was not changed in relation to the conduct of the Presbytery. When I heard the report, I went in company with a friend to its author, and en quired whether such a statement of our conversation had been given. I was informed that such a statement had been given. I then declared, that I had never uttered the statement imputed to me. The author not only refused to testify that I had made use of the expression, but admitted that she must have been mistaken. Since that time, the report has obtained little or no credit in this part of the country. The same report has, however, been industriously circulated in the West, with another untruth, calculated to influence the minds of those who may hear it. But that which surprised me most was, the information, that it was sent there by one so famed for honesty-honest enough, I suppose, to believe that he had sent it so far that I could not contradict it. I declare the report and the addition utterly false.. ARGYLE, March 20, 1839. Yours, GEORGE M. HALL. ART. VIII. Some Interrogatories put to A. R. MR. EDITOR, In your March No. of the Religious Monitor, I see in the 2d Article, another effort to save slavery from the charge of being "essentially oppressive and tyrannical." Such attempts are not strange, coming from the mouths of Clay and Calhoun, men, whose names are "written in the earth;" who walk by sight, and are quiet or alarmed, as the things of this world may go well or ill; and are strangers to that faith that views the union between God and the soul of such superior importance, that compared with it all social and political "unions" are as nothing, and even to be disregarded, when they would interpose between the believer and his God. But it is to me passing strange, to see a man battling for the right and duty in some cases to "enslave," apparently under the banner of that MAN who said, "that he that is greatest among you shall be your servant." That he may be preserved "from sinking," I offer for his consideration the following interrogatories :Were not some of the Jewish laws exceptions to the general rules of the law of nature? If aye-Were not the rules regulating the servi tude obtained from the heathen, like the law of usury, and the extermination of the nations of Canaan, founded on such exceptions? If aye-Did not these exceptions cease with that nation? If aye-Why refer to them to show that "tyranny and oppression" are not essential to slavery? Without special authority, would it not have been "essentially tyranny and oppression" for Joshua to have drenched his sword with the blood of the men, women and children of Canaan? Could we reason now from the case of Joshua, that it would not be "essentially tyrannical and oppressive," if we were to enter Canada and commence an indiscriminate destruction of human life? What more authority have we for enslaving the Africans, under the judicial laws, than we would have from the same laws to exterminate the Canadians? What does the writer mean in saying that slavery is not of God, and yet puts a case in which he says, that it would be an act of mercy, &c. to "enslave" a person? Can we "enslave" without slavery? If slavery be not of God, then it must be sin. If sin, is there any other correct "remedy" than immediately ceasing to commit it? Wherein does such immediateism differ from abolition? Can we conceive of as great an evil as to be "let alone" in sin? Is not the right of personal liberty an absolute and inalienable right given us by our Creator, prescribed in the law of nature? Can slavery exist in any sense, without infringing on that right? Are not the violations of the law of nature "essentially tyrannical and oppressive?" But how hard is it to reason self-evident truths, the violation of which is self-evidently wrong? It requires the meekness of Moses to keep in temper arguing with those who are still willing to "enslave" a human being. If Jesus were on earth, would you in any case "enslave" him? If not, how dare you "enslave" his "image," and perhaps a member of his mystical body? "He that toucheth you toucheth me." Slavery, in all its "phases," should be regarded as sin; sin, in its conception and its growth; sin, in the relation which necessarily deprives the slave of of his personal liberty, and without which it can not exist, therefore, necessarily wrong. LOGAN. ART. IX. Family Government-By DR. HUMPHREY. HOW SHOULD IT BE ADMINISTERED? This is one of the most important inquiries in the whole range of domestic education. Children must early be brought under absolute parental authority, and must submit to all the rules and regulations of the family during the whole period of their minority, and even longer, if they choose to remain at home. The master of a family who, from any cause, fails to rule his own house, fails in one of the essential duties which he owes to God, and to the children whom God hath given him. Want of patience, want of wisdom, want of what is called a faculty, does not excuse him. "If any man lack wisdom, let him ask it of God, who giveth unto all men liberally, and upbraideth not." But how is the great duty to be discharged? What are the means to be used-what the measures to be adopted and steadily pursued, for the attainment of the end? This is a branch of the subject, which I have merely glanced at. I have insisted, some will think too strenuously, perhaps, that the thing must be done-that children must be governed; but I have not yet told how. Perhaps I shall fail to answer the question wisely, in the remarks which I am about to offer. They are my own thoughts, however, and they are not put forth hastily, however far short I may fall in doing justice to the subject. My first remark is, that in the government of children, regard should always be had to their age, constitutional temperament, and such other diversities, as often exist in the same family. At first, you can not reason with the restive little creature in your arms at all. It is too young to understand any of your appeals to its conscience, or its heart; but not too young to show a bad temper; and therefore not too young |