because the way is longer, the coaling stations are fewer, and opportunities easier for the enemy's torpedo craft to evade the British destroyers. In the narrow waters of the Mediterranean the numerical superiority of our warships would make itself felt with a more certain and decisive hand than in the wide seaways of the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Looking at this question from a strategical point of view only, it may be noted that Germany has no naval base in the Mediterranean, but has a well-equipped one in the Cameroons; while the French are installed at Goree as strongly as at Oran and Biserta. Naval opinion has ceased to 'wobble' on this question, the writer of this chapter having the best reasons for stating that two distinguished naval authorities-Prince Louis of Battenberg and Lord Charles Beresford-have, since the completion of the Admiralty shipbuilding programme, both changed the views which they formerly held, and now believe not only in the necessity, but in the practicability of protecting British commerce along the Mediterranean route during time of war. The last word will, however, always depend on the 'fleet in being.' Battleships, as Lord Nelson used to say, are the best 'negotiators of peace.' As long as the present balance of naval strength is maintained in England's favour, and there be no more drifting to leeward, the trade routes of the Empire, not in the Mediterranean only, but everywhere else, will remain secure.

CHAPTER V

THE SUEZ CANAL

IN criticizing the administration of the Suez Canal Company, it must be remembered that we are dealing with a monopoly which has been created by the genius and energy of the French people. It is true that the English Government acquired, by a masterful stroke of unique statesmanship, a large share in this monopoly ; but the French own twice as much of the share capital of the canal as the British Government-the approximate figures being £65,000,000 French, as against £31,000,000 English capital-and consequently possess the inherent right and vested interests of original and predominant partnership.

The Managing Council of the Suez Canal consists of twenty-two French and ten English directors, three of whom, Sir John Ardagh, Sir Henry Austin Lee, and Mr. Anstruther, represent the British Government; the other seven directors, chief among whom is Sir Thomas Sutherland (chairman of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company), representing the British ship-owners.

French and English interests naturally clash, the French directors wishing to increase their shareholders' dividends, the English directors wishing to reduce the rates of transit. How high those rates are may be gathered from the fact that since the purchase of the Khedive's shares by Lord Beaconsfield's Government in 1875, there has been paid into the British Exchequer some £10,000,000 in dividends and interest, the original cost of the shares being only £4,000,000. As nearly threefourths of this sum comes into the Exchequer out of the pockets of British ship-owners, the latter complain, not without reason, that they are taxed for the benefit of those who do not use the Canal. The British directors admit the force of the complaint, but being in a minority of two to one, they are always liable to be outvoted when propositions are made for reduction of dues.

Their influence has, however, not been without results. The original tariff, which was 10 francs per ton in 1870, and was raised to 13 francs in 1874, was, in 1877, reduced by franc a year till it became, by process of reduction, 9 francs, remaining at that figure till 1893. In that year, owing to the continually increasing traffic, the Council agreed, after considerable pressure from the British directors, to a further reduction of franc; but after that time no further reduction took place till January 1 of this year, when the tariff was again lowered by 75 centimes, bringing the rate of dues down to 7 francs per ton. If the traffic continues