a view to prevent her from acquiring an undue ascendancy in the political scale of European power. With regard to the treaties that had been entered into by the East India company with the Mahrattas and the Nizam, which the right hon. gentleman had complained of, because they were offensive as well as defensive, what was the agreement of one country with a second to make war on a third, but an offensive alliance; and how in the nature of things could it be otherwise? Were not all alliances, with some modification, offensive alliances? In answer to Mr. Fox's declaration, that the treaties were grounded on the principle of annihilating Tippoo Sultan, and dividing his dominion, in order to extirpate his power, Mr. Pitt said, there was no such matter in the treaties, nor would he accede to the argument, that conquest would be worse for us than defeat. The whole idea of favouring Tippoo, who was at this time our enemy, in order to balance him against the Mahrattas, who were at present our friends, was a sort of policy which he professed, for one, he did not understand. With regard to the favoured clause in the act of parliament, which the right hon. gentleman had copied from a bill of his own, it was evident that the right hon. gentleman had not lately read it; because, in that very clause, there was a provision for the case which had happened, and, in consequence of the express words of the clause, lord Cornwallis had acted as he had done, by making the treaties with the Mahrattas and the Nizam. Mr. Pitt next took notice of what had fallen from major Maitland, with so much ability, observing, that though the hon. gentleman had first declared that there were but four powers of any consequence in India, the British, the Mysorean power, the Mahratta, and the Nizam, and had afterwards dropped the Nizam, and confined himself to three great powers (the British, Tippoo Sultan, and the Mahrattas), yet there was a fourth of some importance, not joined with the other Mahrattas; and this was the rajah of Berar. -Mr. Pitt having declared that the war was necessary and unavoidable, unless we meant to have been guilty of a violation of public faith, hinted to the House that he was persuaded that Mr. Dundas would not press his motions that evening, but would reserve them for the separate consideration of another day, against which time gentlemen might turn all that they had heard that day in their minds, and consider what had been said upon the subject on both sides of the House, when he was convinced that they would think with him, and agree that his right hon. friend had stated the argument fairly and truly. He signified his determination to move a negative upon the first resolution which was then before the House, because it contained a false statement of a fact. Mr. Fox begged leave to remind the right hon. gentleman, that when he mentioned surmises and suspicions, he alluded to what had passed in 1789, and not Tippoo's attack on the lines of Travancore, which he certainly had never considered as a surmise. With regard to what he had said of one country not being bound by any treaty to support another, under certain circumstances, he would re-state his proposition, that the right hon. gentleman might understand him. If a power acted contrary to the advice of an ally, and a war was the consequence, that ally was not bound to support the former in that war. In the case of Tippoo Saib, he had stated his right to the forts of Ayacottah and Cranganore, and the British government had advised the rajah of Travancore not to purchase those forts. Lord Fielding said, he could not subscribe to the resolutions on the table, because he did not think that the facts would bear them out. He spoke of the nature of all offensive and defensive treaties, and stated that he could not accede to the arguments that had been used respecting them. The Solicitor General observed, that Tippoo Sultan not only had no right to the two forts of Ayacottah and Cranganore, but must have been conscious that he had no right to them, because he had been in treaty with the Dutch for the purchase of them, before the rajah of Travancore bought them, and had offered more money for them than the rajah paid. The motion was then put, and negadivision; after which, ch, the a tived without other resolutions were severally read, some of which were negatived, and the previous question put and carried on the remainder. the lines of Travancore, on the 29th of December, 1789, the 6th of March, and 15th of April, 1790, were unwarranted and unprovoked infractions of the treaty entered into at Mangalore, on the 10th day of March 1784." 2. "That the conduct of the governorgeneral of Bengal, in determining to prosecute with vigour the war against Tippoo Sultan, in consequence of his attack on the territories of the rajah of Travancore, was highly meritorious." 3. ing for action, he wrote a letter to the rajah of Travancore, complaining of the purchase of the forts, and stating his rig to their exclusive possession. When be had received an answer on these points which left him no longer any room for complaint, and deprived him of every pretext for asserting his right, he had re course to a second expedient. Ha trumped up a story of an encroachme on his boundaries, on which to found. further pretext of quarrel, and justify ha resolution to commence hostilities. No thing can be conceived more clear, pre cise, and temperate, than the answer of lord Cornwallis to the letter of Mr. Hallond, which contained an account of the transaction. He proceeds with the great est caution; he makes every necess "That the treaties entered into with the Nizam on the 1st of June, and with the Mahrattas on the 7th of July, 1790, are wisely calculated to add vigour to the operations of war, and to promote the future tranquillity of India; and that the faith of the British nation is pledged for the due performance of the engage-provision for the situation of affairs, a ments contained in the said treaties." requires every proper information, before he should form his resolution, or adost any definitive line of conduct. He wa firmly persuaded, that if Mr. Holl General Smith rose and remarked, that, had written, at that time to Tippoo, that in consequence of having most attentively war would have proved the consequence examined the papers upon the table, he of an attack upon the lines, he wound was now convinced of the justice of the have desisted from his attempt, hostiuities war, and of the policy of the measures would not have taken place, and the prewhich had been adopted; nor could he sent calamities would have been avertel reflect upon the last, without adding that Much had been said concerning the the system of government pursued by ture of civil and military government. earl Cornwallis stood, if possible, even Had the government in India been higher than it was before in his opinion. tary, Mr. Hollond must have been tred In order to form a just idea of the inten- by a court-martial for disobedience to or tions of Tippoo Sultan, and the princi- ders. Mr. Hollond's letter appeared 10 ples upon which he acted, it was neces- him unintelligible. After the conduct sary to take a retrospect of his former pursued on the part of Tippoo, he tauk conduct. From the papers it would ap- to him as if he was pacifically inclined. pear, that it was his determined resolu- and perfectly disposed to observe the tion to attack the lines of Travancore. treaty, and mentions the attack of the He had summoned the fort of Cranga- lines, of which he was the author, asa nore to surrender. There could be no circumstance which must have happened doubt that the Dutch had a right to sell without his orders or concurrence. Fa these forts, and that the rajah was fully such language, at such a crisis, he owned at liberty to conclude the purchase. he was entirely at a loss to account. The Perhaps, however, it might be thought defence of the lines of Travancore ap that the British government ought to peared to him of equal importance with have been consulted in the conduct of the defence of the walls of Madras. Tra this transaction: and if, in this respect, vancore was the most material of all there appeared any omission, or any want passes. If it should fall into the hands of proper deference, he was more wil- of Tippoo, the Carnatic lay immediately ling to impute it to the influence of some open to an invasion, and the whole of our mistake, than to any intentional neglect possessions in that quarter became et or disposition to offend. The conduct of tirely within his power. Besides, the Tippoo was insidious, and plainly indi- tack on the lines was a breach of the cated a desire to seize upan every pre-treaty; it was an insult to the honour of text of quarrel, and a determined reso- a great nation. The security of our set lution to commence hostilities. Whilst tlements in the East depended be was collecting his forces, and prepar- on character as on force. At present, we Mr. Dundas having moved the first resolution, which was seconded by Mr. Pitt, as much were respected; but in order to preserve | of opinion that Tippoo came ill provided that respect, it was necessary that we should act with vigour. There was no doubt that justice formed the first principle of action; but it could not be denied that resistance to insult was also necessary. On these principles, he was of opinion, that no other part could have been acted by lord Cornwallis, than that which he really pursued: and, however he might join with him in lamenting the calamities with which the war was attended, he still must give his approbation to the motives from which it had originated. War, in the circumstances of the country, appeared to him necessary and unavoidable. - Mr. St. John remarked, that however great his regard might be for the personal character and private virtues of lord Cornwallis, he could by no means concur with resolutions for approving of the present transactions in India, on which an expense of millions, and the lives of many thousands, might yet be dependant. Much of the evidence which had been produced to justify the resolutions, appeared to him foreign to the question; and from the strictest attention to the papers on the table, he had been led to form a full and deliberate opinion, that the war at present carried on in India was impolitic needless, and unjust. Before he should proceed to state his reasons for this opinion, he would point out the defects of the evidence which had been brought forward on the other side. It had been asserted that Tippoo had, for several years, entertained intentions of attack. This assertion depended on the faith of a Subadar of the rajah of Cochin, who had been in the camp of Tippoo, and whose evidence, as he must have entered into his service for the purpose of betraying him, was not entitled to much credit. Had Tippoo entertained a previous intention of attack, might it not be supposed that he would have put his armament on a much better footing? Mr. Powney's letter of the 4th of January says, that Tippoo's army consisted only of 12,000 regular troops, 16,000, irregular, and 6000, cavalry, and that his inactivity after the action of the 29th of December could be attributed only to his wanting means to accomplish his plan. Subsequent intelligence did not lead Mr. Powney to alter that opinion; for on the 17th of January he writes that, from the general tenour of intelligence from Tippoo's army, he was both with guns and ammunition. The ra jah of Travancore himself gives a similar account of the strength of Tippoo's army. He begins his letter of the 1st of March to general Meadows by saying that Tippoo had, two months before, attacked his lines with an army of 15,000 men, so that it could not be affirmed that he had collected a numerous and regular force from a previous intention of commencing attack, and it was more probable that he had only acted from the operation of circumstances. All the arguments, then, adduced to prove his previous intentions of hostilities, from the circumstance of his having in readiness a formidable army, amounting to 100,000 men, fell to the ground. Nor does it appear, from the letters to lord Cornwallis, that he had any intention of attacking the lines previous to the purchase of the forts. Let it then be considered in what circumstances these forts were purchased. The Dutch sold them merely to get rid of a dispute. The rajah of Travancore had only purchased a disputed right. The letter of the council at Cochin indicated a suspicion of their own right as they said that they supposed it unnecessary to to enter into the question of the dispute, the very point which, of all others, it was most incumbent for them to explain. He would read an extract from a letter which contained a history of these forts. They had been the subject of dispute between Hyder Ally and the Dutch: Hyder Ally had got possession of them, which he retained after an accommodation had taken place with the Dutch, but having afterwards evacuated them, they were again garrisoned by the Dutch. This information was confirmed by the third report of the secret committee, of which the right hon. gentleman was the chairman. That report gives an account of the treaty which Mr. Hastings had concluded with Mr. Ross, the director-general of the Dutch company in Bengal in 1781. The preamble to which treaty states, that the Dutch forts on the coast of Malabar, were actually then attacked by Hyder Ally. It therefore appears, that, for many years past, the'right to possess these forts had been disputed between the Mysore government and the Dutch. What, therefore, the rajah of Travancore purchased was this dispute. But supposing that the right to possess these forts had never been disputed between the Dutch and Tippoo! even when the rajah of Tra- | The first letter of lord Cornwallis had vancore could not have been entitled to be attended with like that, then ambassador stated that he could not support the a jah in his purchase, and if he persisted in retaining it, he must abide by the conse quences. Such seemed to be the resut of his own judgment. But afterwards ei ther from the instructions of the board et control, or from his own idea that the re volution in France presented a favourabl opportunity for exterminating Tippoo, as he could not then receive support from his French allies, he had adopted a different line of conduct. The present situation ofthe affairs of the East India company was certainly by no means favourable to war. They had engaged in it with the incumbrance of a debt of sixteen millions. Loans of money had been advertised for its support at Fort St. George, at the rate of 10 per cent. interest, and at Fort Wil liam at the rate of 12 per cent. No per son could deny that a war, conducted under such circumstances of expense, must be ruinous in its consequences. The army of general Meadows was supported at an expense of 240,000l. per month The remaining detachments, under the command of col. Hartley, col. Kelly, de. could not be computed at a less sum; so that the whole expense amounted to six millions a year. The credit of the East India company was connected with the credit of the nation. In several of the expenses which it had incurred, it was countenanced by the nation, and it could not be doubted, that in defraying these, it must be supported from the same quar ter. It ought, then, to be considered whether approbation should be given to measures attended with such expenses, which ultimately must fall on the nation. It ought to be considered whether such a sacrifice of expense should be made on a point in which the interests of the East India company were alone concerned. The present war in India, it had been admitted, was the result of misconduct; and they were now to determine whether that misconduct ought to be supported at so dear a rate. It had been objected to Mr. Fox's India bill, and falesly objected, that many of the prerogatives of the Crown were put into the hands of the commissioners appointed by that act; but argued that the board of control were de tually invested with the power of making war or peace, and that even without the concurrence of either the king or parlia ment; but when that argument was used, any more degradation when Mr. Pitt proposed his bill, "Honour's but an empty bubble, * it was t [1930 it was little thought that events would so | state, were not at all dangerous. They soon show how well it was founded. All we can do now is, to lament the many calamities which this exercise of power in the board of control will bring on our possessions in India, and the heavy expenses which the British nation will have to bear. He could by no means concur with a resolution of approving measures in a transaction, which he deemed impoli were divided into two parts perfectly distinct. There subsisted between themselves a number of little discussions and divisions of interest. Before they could become formidable, it was necessary that they should unite. But this was less probable, as the principal part of the Mahrattas was governed by five chiefs of equal power, each of whom it was neces tic, unnecessary, and unjust, and produc-sary should consent to any declaration Live of such mischievous and dangerous of hostility. Among this number we always had it in our power to secure consequences Colonel Macleod said, that lord Corn-such a degree of influence as would pre wallis had, for four years, been engaged n serving his country, in a climate not the most favourable to health. During that time, he had brought the affairs of government into the most flourishing situation, and had established the state of credit upon a footing highly respectable. He was just upon the eve of reurning, when a cruel and treacherous yrant, a determined enemy of the Briish name, began, by his hostile attempts, o embroil the affairs of India. How loes lord Cornwallis act upon this occasion? He foregoes his own prospects of case and retreat: he undertakes the mangement of public affairs; he faces the storm, and assumes upon himself the whole responsibility. Some had praised ord Cornwallis at the expense of his predecessor: but his merits needed no bil: he was not under the necessity of adopting the maxim of those who, when they entered upon the government, deDarted, in every thing, from the practice of their predecessor, and thought proper even to reverse the head on the coin, a naxim which at present, to many gentlenen in this country, might be an object of hopeful expectation At this part of he speech there was a cry of "chair! chair!" when the Speaker reminded the hon, member that the subject now under Consideration was the conduct of lord Cornwallis, so far as it related to the present war in India, and that there was no occasion to introduce any mention of his predecessor, or any insinuation which was perfectly foreign to the quesion. vent the probability of such an event. It had been stated, that the character of Tippoo ought to be laid aside in considering the present question. So far from agreeing with this opinion, he regarded it as the main hinge on which the discussion depended. He was an implacable and inveterate enemy of the British name, inveterate from religion, inveterate from ambition, and a restless desire of conquest. His enmity to the British was not less strong and rooted than that of Hannibal to the Romans, and could not be gratified till it had effected their utter destruction. Great as the expense was which had been incurred this year, he could not answer but that a great armament would prove necessary to be maintained at the same expense every year, till Tippoo should either have received some effectual blow, or be altogether crushed. As to the argument that had been urged, of attacking Tippoo at a time when he could not be supported by the French, if such was one of the motives of the war, he did not see how it was not perfectly fair to take the advantage. It had been said, that another motive of the war was, to divide his territories. Such a partition among the princes, who now languished under his tyranny, would be an event highly desirable. If it was considered that Hyder Ally had dispossessed the Hindoos of a territory extending no less than 500 miles, it would certainly appear an act of justice to restore the native princes, who had, in consequence of the usurpation, | been reduced to the greatest distress and Colonel Macleod, having apologised, | extremity, to their original dominions. proceeded to state, that the power of the Iahrattas was not, as had been sugested, likely to be rendered too formidble, so as to destroy the balance of ndia, by any diminution of the power of Tippoo. The Mahrattas, in their present [VOL. XXVIII.] The Zamoren, whose court had once boasted so much splendor and magnificence, had come to his camp, and in what situation?-to beg a little rice for his own support, and that of his family. He, it may be supposed, was not insensible to [4Q] |