should be saved. So far as this kind of justice says anything concerning this matter, it demands that Paul be punished according to law. And if this justice be made the rule of proceeding in the case, Paul will inevitably be cast off. This kind of justice no more admits of the salvation of Paul than it admits of the salvation of Judas. But it is said, that "justice admits of the salvation of Paul, but does not demand it." Justice to the universe does demand it, as fully as admit of it, and the universe would suffer an injury, if he were not to be saved; but justice to the universe, neither demands nor admits of the salvation of Judas. Whereas distributive justice to Paul personally, as much demands that he be not saved, as that Judas be not saved.

But if we will make a distinction between what justice admits and what it demands, the true and only distinction seems to be this; justice admits of anything which is not positively unjust; of any favor however great or manifold; whereas it demands nothing, but barely what is just, without the least favor, and which being refused, positive injustice would be done. Distributive justice then admits of the salvation of Judas or of any other sinner; as, surely, no injustice would be done Judas in his salvation; but it demands not this, as it is a mere favor, or something beyond the bounds of mere justice; or it is no injury to Judas, that he is not saved. Neither does distributive justice demand the salvation of Paul. But public justice both admits and demands both the salvation of Paul and the damnation of Judas. On the other hand, it neither admits nor demands the damnation of Paul, nor the salvation of Judas. But distributive justice, (according to the present distinction between the meaning of the words admit, and demand,) though it admits both of the salvation and damnation of both Paul and Judas; yet demands neither the salvation nor damnation of one or the other. Or, to express the same thing in other words; no injustice would be done either to Paul or Judas personally, if they were both saved or both damned. Distributive justice never demands the punishment of any criminal, in any instance; because no injury would be done him, if he were graciously pardoned. It demands only that a man be not punished being innocent; or be not punished beyond his demerit; and that he be rewarded according to his positive merit.

These observations may help us to understand a distinction, which to many has appeared groundless or perplexing; I mean the distinction of the merit of condignity and merit of congruity. Merit of both these kinds refers to rewards only, and has

no reference to punishments; and that is deserved by a merit of condignity which cannot be withholden without positive injury. That is deserved by a merit of congruity which is a proper expression of the sense which the person rewarding, has of the moral excellency of the person rewarded; which however may be withholden without positive injury. Of the former kind is the merit which every good and faithful citizen has, of protection in his person, liberty and property, and the merit of a laborer who has earned his wages. These cannot be withholden without positive injury. Of the latter kind is the merit, which some eminently wise and virtuous citizens have, of distinguishing honors or marks of esteem. If these be withholden, the proper objects of them, may indeed be said to be neglected, but not positively injured.

11. This subject teaches also, in what sense God was under obligation to accept, on the behalf of the sinner, the mediation and atonement of Christ. It hath been said, that when Christ offered to make atonement for sinners, God was under the same obligation to accept the offer, as a creditor is to accept the proposal of any man, who offers to pay the debt of another. This is not true; because in matters of property, all that a creditor hath a right to, is his property. This being offered him, by whomsoever the offer be made, he has the offer of his right; and if he demand more, he exceeds his right; and he has no more right to refuse to give up the obligation, on the offer of a third person to pay the debt, than to refuse the same, when the same offer is made by the debtor himself. All will own, that if a creditor were to refuse to receive payment, and give up the obligation, when the debtor offers payment, it would be abusive and unjust; and let any man assign a reason why it is not equally abusive and unjust, not to receive the payment, and to give up the obligation, when payment is offered by a third person.

But it is quite otherwise in atoning for crimes, in which distributive, not commutative justice is concerned. As the rule of distributive justice is the personal character of the person to be rewarded or punished, and not property; if a magistrate refuse to accept any substitute, and insist on punishing the criminal himself, he treats him no otherwise, than according to his personal character, and the criminal suffers no injustice or abuse. Nor is the magistrate under any obligation of distributive justice, or justice to the criminal himself, to accept a substitute. It is true, that the circumstances of the case may be such, that it may be most conducive to the public good, that the offered substitute be

accepted; in this case wisdom and goodness or public justice will require that it be accepted, and the criminal discharged.

This leads me to observe, that it hath also been said that when Christ offered to become a substitute, and to make atonement for sinners, God was under no obligation to accept the proposal. This, I conceive, is as wide of the truth, as that he was under the same obligation to accept the proposal, as a creditor is to accept the proposal of a third person to pay the debt of his friend. The truth is, The glory of God and the greatest good of the moral system, did require, that Christ should become a substitute for sinners; and that his offered substitution should be accepted by God. This was dictated and recommended by both wisdom and goodness. So far therefore as wisdom and goodness could infer an obligation on the father, to accept the substitution of his son, he was under obligation to accept it. But this obligation was only that of the third kind of justice before explained, a regard to the general good.

12. This subject further teaches us, that that constitution which requires an atonement, in order to the pardon of the sinner, is nothing arbitrary. That divine constitution which is wise and good, as being necessary to the good of the moral system, is not arbitrary. But if an atonement was necessary, in order to support the authority of the divine law, and the honor, vigor and even existence of the divine moral government, while sinners are pardoned; undoubtedly that constitution which requires an atonement, in order to the pardon of the sinner, is the dictate of wisdom and goodness, and by no means, of an arbitrary spirit.

13. Hence we also learn in what sense the death of Christ renders God propitious to sinners. It does so only as it supports the authority of his law and government, and renders the pardon of sinners consistent with the good of the system, and the glory of God.

Finally; this subject teaches the groundlessness of that objection to the doctrine of atonement, that it represents the Deity as inexorable. If to refuse to pardon sinners unless it be in a way which is consistent with the good of the moral system, is to be inexorable; then that God will not pardon sinners without atonement, or in a way which is inconsistent with the authority of his law, and with the authority and even existence of his moral government is indeed a proof, that God is inexorable. But if it be not an instance of inexorability, that God will not pardon sinners, unless it be in a way which is consistent with the good of the moral system, there is no ground to object to the doctrine of

atonement, that it represents the Deity as inexorable. On the other hand, that God requires an atonement in order to pardon, is an instance and proof of truly divine goodness; and if he were to pardon without an atonement, it would prove, that he is destitute of goodness and regardless, not only of his own glory, but of the true happiness of the system of his moral creatures.

SERMON IV.

THE MANIFESTATION OF THE TRUTH, THE END OF

PREACHING.*

2 CORINTHIANS 4: 2.-But have renounced the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor handling the word of God deceitfully; but by manifestation of the truth, commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God.

In the preceding chapter the apostle is describing the excellency of the gospel. He compares it with the law; and though he allows that that was glorious, yet he asserts that the gospel exceeds in glory. This is the glorious gospel which was committed to Paul and the other apostles. Hence he begins this chapter in the manner he does: "Therefore seeing we have this ministry, as we have received mercy we faint not." As if he had said, Since we have so glorious a gospel to preach, we faint not in preaching, defending, and propagating it; but under all persecutions, we persevere in this work. Nor is that all; but we have preached and propagated the gospel with integrity or honesty, not practising, in the prosecution of our ministry, any dishonest or shameful arts. The word rendered dishonesty, more properly means shame; and indeed all dishonest, crafty, deceitful arts, are truly shameful; especially in a minister of the simple gospel.

As the several expressions of dishonesty, craftiness, deceit, are but exegetical of each other, they need not be considered distinctly; the sum of what is intended by them all is included in the hidden things of dishonesty or shame.-I shall therefore,

I. Mention some of the hidden things of dishonesty probably intended in the text.

II. Inquire what it is so to manifest the truth, as to commend ourselves to the consciences of men.

III. Show that such manifestation of the truth is the proper and immediate end of preaching the gospel.

Preached November 5, 1783, at the ordination of the Reverend Mr. Timothy Dwight, to the pastoral office over the church in Greenfield; and published at New Haven.