2. That the obligation to obey a positive law arises solely from the authority of the lawgiver.

Our obligation to obedience arises not from the nature of the law, but from the authority and will of the legislator. If God commands a thing which was before indifferent, it is as much a law as if it were ever so good in its own nature. As soon as we are satisfied that an institution is divine, it is our duty to observe it, although we may not see its necessity or utility. The command to Abraham to sacrifice his son was a positive order, and a very strange one too; seemingly opposite to some moral orders given out before; and yet his disposition to obey, when he was sure of a divine warrant in the case, has placed him at the head of all the believing world; as hero of faith, the father of the faithful, and the friend of God.

"Moral precepts," says the learned Bishop Butler, are precepts, the reason of which we see; positive precepts are precepts, the reason of which we do not see. Moral duties arise out of the nature of the case itself prior to external command; positive duties do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external command; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command, received from Him, whose creatures and subjects we are." Analogy of Religion, Part 2, ch. 1.

The pious Jonathan Edwards, whose praise is in all the churches, justly observes: "Positive precepts are the greatest and most proper trial of obedience; because in them the mere authority and will of the legislator is the sole ground of the obligation, and nothing in the nature of the things themselves; and, therefore, they are the greatest trial of any person's respect to that authority and will." Sermons, p. 232. Imp. Sub., p. 79.

Sermons on

The words of Dr. Sherlock shall close this observation: "What is matter of institution depends wholly upon the divine will and pleasure; and, though all men will grant that God and Christ have always great reason for their institutions, yet it is not the reason, but the authority, which makes the institution. Though we do not understand the reasons of the institution, if we see the command, we must obey; and though we could fancy a great many reasons why there should be such an institution, if no such institution appear, we are free, and ought not to believe there is such an institution because we think there are reasons assigned why it should be." Preserv. against Pop., Title 9, p. 419.

3. The law of the institution is the only rule of obedience. From the preceding observations it is evident that positive institutions in religion derive their whole being from the sovereign pleasure of God, and that his pleasure can be known only from his revealed will. It follows, therefore, that we cannot know anything about the precise nature, the true design, the proper objects of them, or the right mode of their administration, farther than the Scriptures teach, either in plain, positive precepts, or by clear example. For, as Dr. Goodwin observes: "There is this difference between doctrinal truths and institutions, that one truth may be, by reason, better fetched out of another, and more safely and easily, than institutions. For one truth begets another, and truth is infinite in the consequences of it; but so institutions are not." Works, vol. 4. Government of the Church of Christ, ch. 4, p. 21.

Moral duty may be proved by illation; for a genuine inference from a moral principle, relating to things of a moral nature, has all the certainty of the principle itself; and it is a just observation of Dr. Bellamy, that "the

inspired writings of the Old Testament consider these two maxims, that we must love God with all our hearts, and our neighbour as ourselves, as first and fundamental principles and all the various duties which they urge respecting God or our fellow-men are but so many inferences and deductions from them." True Religion Delineated, p. 143. But, when positive duties are under our notice; when either the manner of performing those duties, or the proper subject of them is before us, the case is greatly altered. For, the inquiry being entirely into the sovereign pleasure of God, concerning an article of human duty, which absolutely depends on a manifestation of the divine will, the nature of the case forbids our expecting any intelligence relating to it, except that which arises from divine precept or Scriptural precedent.

How strong and just is the language of Dr. Sherlock to the present purpose: "I would not be thought wholly to reject a plain and evident consequence from Scripture; but yet I will never admit of a mere consequence to prove an institution, which must be delivered in plain terms, as all laws ought to be; and, where I have no other proof but some Scripture consequences, I shall not think it equivalent to a Scripture proof. If the consequence be plain and obvious, and such as every man sees, I shall not question it: but remote, and dubious, and disputed consequences, if we have no better evidence, to be sure, are a very ill foundation for articles of faith or ordinances of worship. Let a Protestant, then, tell such disputants that, for the institution of sacraments and for articles of faith, he expects plain, positive proofs that, as much as the Protestant faith is charged with uncertainty, we desire a little more certainty for our faith than mere inferences from Scripture, and

those none of the plainest neither." Preserv. against Pop., vol. 2. Appendix, p. 23.

On this principle all Protestants proceed, when contending with Roman Catholics about their claims of prerogatives and their numerous rites, viz., that nothing short of an explicit grant, a positive command, or a plain example in the New Testament can prove their divine origin. Instances might be multiplied: a few shall be given hereafter. In like manner do Non-conformists demand of Episcopalians, saying-" Produce your warrant for this, that, and the other from our only rule of faith and practice, a divine precept or an apostolic example relating to the point in dispute." So, when Moses was directed to make the Tabernacle, nothing was left to his wisdom, prudence, or judgment; but "see, saith the Lord, that thou make all things according to the pattern shewed to thee in the mount." Heb. 8: 5. Nor does it appear from the records of the Old Testament that, when Jehovah appointed any branch of ritual worship, he left either the subjects of it or the mode of administration to be inferred by the people from the relation in which they stood to himself, or from general moral precepts, or from any branch of his moral worship, nor yet from any other well-known positive rite; but he gave them special directions relating to the very case; and those directions they were bound to regard, whether they appeared in a pleasing or a painful light. I shall close this observation in the words of the pious and learned Bishop Taylor: "All positive precepts, that depend on the mere will of the lawgiver, admit no degrees nor suppletory and commutation; because in such laws we see nothing beyond the words of the law, and the first meaning, and the named instance; and, therefore, it is that in individuo which God points at; it is that in which he

will make the trial of our obedience; it is that in which he will so perfectly be obeyed, that he will not be disputed with nor inquired of why and how, but just according to the measures there set down: So, and no more, and no less, and no otherwise. For, when the will of the lawgiver be all the reason, the first instance of the law is all the measures, and there can be no product but what is just set down. No parity of reason can infer anything else; because there is no reason but the will of God, to which nothing can be equal, because his will can be but one." Ductor Dub., B. 2, ch. 3, § 18.

4. The law of a positive institution must be so plain and explicit as to stand in no need of any other assistance to understand it but the mere letter of the law. As a rule must be straight, not bent nor crooked, if we would draw direct lines by it, so must laws be plain, and expressed in words whose signification is well understood, for they are for the direction of the common people as well as for the learned. They must be as the words of a father to his family. Hence our Pedobaptist brethren, in their arguments against popish traditions and superstitions, consider it not only necessary that a positive law should be plain, but nothing less than blasphemy to suppose that either Christ or his apostles delivered their mind in words or expressions that are ambiguous, or cannot easily be understood. I will not multiply quotations, but select only a few.

"The term institution," says Dr. Goodman, "implies a setting up de novo, or the appointing that to become a duty which was not knowable; or at least not known to be so before it became so appointed. For this word institution is that which we use to express a positive command by, in opposition to that which is moral in the strictest sense and of natural obligation. Now, it is