Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation TreatyOUP Oxford, 13 déc. 2012 - 200 pages The 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has proven the most complicated and controversial of all arms control treaties, both in principle and in practice. Statements of nuclear-weapon States from the Cold War to the present, led by the United States, show a disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty, and an unwarranted underprioritization of the civilian energy development and disarmament pillars of the treaty. This book argues that the way in which nuclear-weapon States have interpreted the Treaty has laid the legal foundation for a number of policies related to trade in civilian nuclear energy technologies and nuclear weapons disarmament. These policies circumscribe the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States under Article IV of the Treaty by imposing conditions on the supply of civilian nuclear technologies. They also provide for the renewal and maintaintenance, and in some cases further development of the nuclear weapons arsenals of nuclear-weapon States. The book provides a legal analysis of this trend in treaty interpretation by nuclear-weapon States and the policies for which it has provided legal justification. It argues, through a close and systematic examination of the Treaty by reference to the rules of treaty interpretation found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that this disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty leads to erroneous legal interpretations in light of the original balance of principles underlying the Treaty, prejudicing the legitimate legal interests of non-nuclear-weapon States. |
Table des matières
xv | |
Approach to Interpretation | xlvii |
Epochs of Policy toward Nuclear Weapons | i |
Legal Analysis of NWS Interpretations of the | cx |
Peaceful | ii |
Disarmament | iv |
Change and Continuity | xi |
2010 | xvii |
Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons | v |
15 17 18 26 40 42 50 64 | i |
Atoms for Peace | ii |
Selected US Statements 19982009 | iii |
Index | lxxvii |
INFCIRC153 62 63 93 115 | 62 |
IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces | 6 |
Law of the Sea Convention 1982 27 | 27 |
Summary Analysis of Change and Continuity Post2008 | iv |
Moscow Treaty 2002 116 118 | 21 |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
2010 Review Conference A.Q. Khan Applause Arms Control Article 31 Article IV(1 Article VI obligation Atomic Energy Agency Atoms for Peace Christopher Chyba commitment compliance context countries effective measures relating efforts enrichment and reprocessing ensure fissile material fissionable fuel bank IAEA IAEA safeguards IAEA’s inalienable right International Atomic Energy International Law Iran Iran’s legal interpretations Libya mass destruction multilateral NNWS non-nuclear weapon Non-proliferation of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty noncompliance North Korea NPT Article NPT parties NPT Review Conference NPT’s nuclear activities nuclear disarmament nuclear energy nuclear fuel cycle nuclear material Nuclear Non-proliferation Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty nuclear programs Nuclear Suppliers Group nuclear technology nuclear weapons program NWS officials object and purpose peaceful nuclear cooperation peaceful purposes Prague Preparatory Committee PrepCom President Bush proposals reactor regime Resolution Security Council statements threat treaty interpretation Treaty’s U.S. President U.S. representative United Nations uranium VCLT Article violation weapons of mass