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armaments of the two Republics; such decisions having been adopted owing to the initiative and good offices of His Britannic Majesty :

Art. I.-In order to remove all cause of fear and distrust between the two countries, the Governments of Chili and of the Argentine Republic agree not to take possession of the warships which they are having built, and also for the present to make any other acquisitions. The two Governments urthermore agree to reduce their respective fleets, according to an arrangement establishing a reasonable proportion between the two fleets. This reduction to be made within one year from the date at which the present agreement shall be ratified.

Art. II. The two Governments respectively promise not to increase their maritime armaments during five years, unless the one who shall wish to increase them shall give the other eighteen months' notice in advance. This agreement does not include any armaments for the purpose of protecting the shore and ports, and each party will be at liberty to acquire any vessels (maquina flotante) intended for the protection thereof, such as submarines, etc.

Art. III. The reductions (i.e. ships disposed of) resulting from this agreement will not be parted with to countries having any dispute with either of the two contracting parties.

Art. IV.-In order to facilitate the transfer of the pending orders, the two Governments agree to increase by two months the time stipulated for the beginning of the construction of the respective ships. They will give instructions accordingly.

An agreement of this kind is more feasible as among States whose navies are small and of comparatively recent origin, than as among States whose navies are composed of vessels of many and widely different ages. It is difficult to see, in the latter case, on what principle the proportionate fighting value of the respective fleets could be assessed. The breaking-up or sale of obsolete warships is a diminution of the paper effective of a navy, and their purchase by another State a paper increase. of theirs. Even comparatively slight differences in the ages. of ships may make great differences in their fighting value. It would obviously be a hard task to establish "a reasonable proportion," such as provided for in Art. II. of the ChiliArgentine Agreement, as between large and old-standing navies like those of Europe.

On the other hand, as regards military power, it seems, sometimes, forgotten in the discussion of the question of armaments, that the conditions of the present age differ entirely from those of the time of the Napoleonic wars. With conscription a national army corresponds numerically to the numerical proportion of males in the national population. Great Britain, without conscription, has no means of raising troops in any such proportion. Thus, so long as she

refrains from adopting conscription, she can practically only carry on defensive warfare, and the object of her navy is therefore necessarily defensive, unless it act in co-operation with a foreign conscript army. As there are only three such armies available for the purpose of a war of aggression, the negotiation of contingent arrangements does not seem too remote for achievement by a skilful and well-meaning diplomacy.

In all humility, and speaking on such a matter as a mere "outsider," the writer suggests that among possibilities agreement as to a maximum tonnage for vessels of war seems as feasibile as one respecting a maximum calibre of their guns.1 If not, is it not possible that Great Britain, France, and Germany, being on friendly terms with each other, might arrange some equation of naval armament, not by way of a binding contract, but by way of friendly collaboration, to keep the expenditure on their respective navies within reasonable limits? The question cannot, however, be finally and successfully dealt with without taking into consideration the requirements of the growing sea-borne trade of a nation which is obliged to rely for the coaling of its fleets, official and commercial, on foreign and possibly hostile ports of call. So long as the closing of these ports by Great Britain and France would paralyse German sea-borne trade, and make nearly every German ship in case of war with this country

"As idle as a painted ship Upon a painted ocean,"

we shall probably have to reckon with a policy in which the creation of a powerful navy has a definite object. If that object could be attained by a pacific "give and take" arrangement, proportional reduction of armaments might form part of the combination.

1 Compare Vau No. 3, adopted at The Hague Conference of 1899, p. 254.

Judging by Prince von Bülow's declaration in the Reichstag on April 30, 1907, no measure in the sense of a contractual reduction of armaments is likely to result from the second Hague Conference. The formation of an international expert committee, to consider the subject and report upon it to a later Hague Conference, might be a means of giving at least partial satisfaction to public opinion, which in most countries does not seem convinced that a serious effort is being made to arrest and still less to reduce military and naval expenditure.2

2 See suggested Form of Agreement, p. 182.

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States, and are also in the nature of agreements for the maintenance of the status quo.

The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of August 12, 1905, in setting out its objects as follows:

"(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India;

"(b) The preservation of the common interests of the Powers in China, of insuring the independence and the integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

"(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in such regions,"

is a treaty for the maintenance of the status quô in certain parts of Asia, in which the parties to it have dominant interests. The same principle underlies different other self-denying arrangements and declarations made by the Powers with reference to Chinese integrity.

The Treaty of Algeciras is essentially a generalisation of the Franco - German agreement of September 28, 1905, by which all the Powers represented agree to respect the territorial integrity of Morocco, subject to a possible intervention limited to the purpose of preserving order within it. The Conference and Treaty are of the greatest value for international stability as an acknowledgment by the Great Powers of the common rights of all States, great and small without distinction, in the available markets of the world, an assertion of the principle that they cannot be closed for the benefit of any single nation.

With these precedents and current instances of tendency to place the territorial relations of the Powers on a permanent footing of respect for the existing status quô, it seems possible for an International Conference to go beyond the mere enunciation of principles, and to take a step towards their practical realisation, by agreeing to respect the territorial status quô throughout the world during a period of years. Such an agreement would necessarily be coupled with a provision for the calling together of the Powers at the instance of any Power whom circumstances compelled to interfere with it, and for arbitration, in accordance with the Rules laid down in the Treaty on any question of its construction (interpretation), or on any details. of carrying out its provisions.1

1 See suggested form of treaty on the subject, p. 153.

XXII

PRINCIPLE OF THE "OPEN-DOOR"

THE discussion on the question of the "open door" in connection with the Morocco difficulty, has been useful in calling general public attention once more to the undesirability of allowing any single Power to exclude other nations from trading on territory, over which it may be called to exercise a protectorate, especially if equality of treatment of foreign trade was practised by the authority ruling over the territory in question before the practical annexation which goes by the name of protectorate.

The habitable parts of the world are a limited area, exclusion from any of which is a diminution of the available markets of the nations excluded. Every Power is, therefore, rightfully interested in the prevention of such exclusion.

The United States Government in 1899 called attention to the subject as regards China, without, be it said however, going into any question of principle.

In a communication to the Foreign Office, dated September 22, 1899, Mr. Choate reminded Lord Salisbury that the British Government, while conceding to Germany and Russia the possession of "spheres of influence or interest" in China, in which they were to enjoy special rights and privileges, particularly in respect of railroads and mining enterprises, had at the same time sought to maintain the "open-door" policy, that is, to secure to the trade and navigation of all nations equality of treatment within such "spheres." The maintenance of this policy, Mr. Choate said, was equally desired by the United States Government. Though the latter would not commit itself to the recognition of any exclusive rights of any Power within, or control

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