tain as rights and liberties belonging to them. The Reply to Lord Bathurst's Note has been delayed by circumstances which it is unnecessary to detail. It is for the Government of The United States alone to decide upon the proposal of a Negotiation upon the subject. That they will at all times be ready to agree upon arrangements which may obviate and prevent the recurrence of those inconveniences stated to have resulted from the exercise, by the People of The United States, of these rights and liberties, is not to be doubted; but, as Lord Bathurst appears to have understood some of the observations in the Letter of the Undersigned as importing inferences not intended by him, and as some of his Lordship's remarks particularly require a reply, it is presumed that, since Lord Castlereagh's return, it will with propriety be addressed to him.

It had been stated in the Letter to Lord Bathurst, that the Treaty of Peace of 1783, between Great Britain and The United States, was of a peculiar nature; and bore in that nature a character of permanency, not subject, like many of the ordinary contracts between independent Nations, to abrogation by a subsequent War between the same Parties. His Lordship not only considers this as a position of a novel nature, to which Great Britain cannot accede, but as claiming for the diplomatic relations of The United States with her, a different degree of permanency from that on which her connexions with all other States depend. He denies the right of any one State to assign to a Treaty made with her such a peculiarity of character as to make it, in duration, an exception to all other Treaties, in order to found, on a peculiarity thus assumed, an irrevocable title to all indulgences which (he alleges) have all the features of temporary concessions. And he adds, in unqualified terms, that Great Britain "knows of no exception to the rule that all Treaties are put an end to, by a subsequent War between the same Parties."

The Undersigned explicitly disavows every pretence of claiming for the diplomatic relations between The United States and Great Britain, a degree of permanency different from that of the same relations between either of the Parties, and all other Powers. He disclaims all pretence of assigning to any Treaty between the 2 Nations any peculiarity not founded in the nature of the Treaty itself. But he submits it to the candour of His Majesty's Government whether the Treaty of 1783 was not, from the very nature of its subject matter, and from the relations previously existing between the Parties to it, peculiar? Whether it was a Treaty which could have been made between Great Britain and any other Nation? and, if not, whether the whole scope and objects of its Stipulations were not expressly intended to constitute a new and permanent state of diplomatic relations between the 2 Countries, which would not, and could not, be annulled by the mere fact of a subsequent War between them? And he makes this

appeal with the more confidence, because another part of Lord Bathurst's Note admits that Treaties often contain recognitions and acknowledgments in nature of perpetual obligation, and because it implicitly admits that the whole Treaty of 1783 is of this character, with the exception of the Article concerning the Navigation of the Mississipi, and a small part of the Article concerning the Fisheries.

The position that "Great Britain knows no exception to the rule that all Treaties are put an end to, by a subsequent War between the same Parties," appears, to the Undersigned, not only novel, but unwarranted by any of the received Authorities upon the Laws of Nations; unsanctioned by the practice and usages of Sovereign States; suited, in its tendency, to multiply the incitements to War, and to weaken the ties of Peace between independent Nations; and not easily reconciled with the admission, that Treaties not unusually contain, together with Articles of a temporary character liable to revocation, recognitions and acknowledgments in nature of perpetual obligation.

A recognition or acknowledgment of title, stipulated by Convention, is as much a part of the Treaty as any other Article; and if all Treaties are abrogated by War, the recognitions and acknowledgments contained in them must, necessarily, be null and void as much as any other part of the Treaty.

If there be no exception to the rule that War puts an end to all Treaties between the Parties to it, what can be the purpose or meaning of those Articles which, in almost all Treaties of Commerce, are provided expressly for the contingency of War, and which, during the Peace, are without operation? On this point, the Undersigned would refer Lord Castlereagh to the Xth Article of the Treaty of 1794, between The United States and Great Britain, where it is thus stipulated: "Neither the debts due from individuals of the one Nation to the individuals of the other, nor shares, nor moneys, which they may have in the Public Funds, or in the Public or Private Banks, shall ever, in any erent of War, or national differences, be sequestered or confiscated." If War puts an end to all Treaties, what could the Parties to this engagement intend by making it formally an Article of the Treaty? According to the principle laid down, excluding all exception, by Lord Bathurst's Note, the moment a War broke out between the 2 Countries, this stipulation became a dead letter, and either State might have sequestered or confiscated those specified properties, without any violation of compact between the Nations.

The Undersigned believes that there are many exceptions to the rule by which the Treaties between Nations are mutually considered as terminated by the intervention of a War. That these exceptions extend, to all engagements contracted with the understanding that they are to operate equally in War and Peace, or exclusively during War; to all engagements by which the Parties superadd the sauction of a

formal compact to principles dictated by the eternal laws of morality and humanity; and, finally, to all engagements which, according to the expressions of Lord Bathurst's Note, are in the nature of perpetual obligation. To the first and second of these classes may be referred the Xth Article of the Treaty of 1794, and all Treaties or Articles of Treaties stipulating the abolition of the Slave-trade. The Treaty of Peace of 1783 belongs to the third.

The reasoning of Lord Bathurst's Note, seems to confine this perpetuity of obligation to recognitions and acknowledgments of title; and to consider its perpetual nature as resulting from the subjectmatter of the Contract, and not from the engagement of the Contractor. While Great Britain leaves The United States unmolested in the enjoyment of all the advantages, rights, and liberties, stipulated in their behalf in the Treaty of 1783, it is immaterial to them, whether she founds her conduct upon the mere fact that The United States are in possession of such rights, or whether she is governed by good faith and respect for her own engagements. But if she contests any one of them, it is to her engagements only that The United States can appeal, as the rule for settling the question of right. If this appeal be rejected, it ceases to be a discussion of right; and this observation applies as strongly to the recognition of Independence, and to the Boundary Line, in the Treaty of 1783, as to the Fisheries. It is truly observed, by Lord Bathurst, that, in that Treaty, the Independence of The United States was not granted but acknowledged. He adds, that it might have been acknowledged without any Treaty, and that the acknowledgment, in whatever mode made, would have been irrevocable. But the Independence of The United States was precisely the question upon which a previous War between them and Great Britain had been waged. Other Nations might acknowledge their Independence, without a Treaty, because they had no right or claim of right to contest it; but this acknowledgment, to be binding upon Great Britain, could have been made only by Treaty, because it included the dissolution of one social compact between the Parties, as well as the formation of another. Peace could exist between the 2 Nations only by the mutual pledge of faith to the new social relations established between them, and hence it was that the stipulatious of that Treaty were in the nature of perpetual obligation, and not liable to be forfeited by a subsequent War, or by any declaration of the will of either Party, without the assent of the other.

In this view, it certainly was supposed by the Undersigned that Great Britain considered her obligation to hold and treat with The United States as a Sovereign and Independent Power, as derived only from the Preliminary Articles of 1782, as converted into the Definitive Treaty of 1783. The Boundary Line could obviously rest upon no other foundation. The Boundaries were neither recognitions nor ac

knowledgments of title. They could have been fixed and settled only by Treaty, and it is to the Treaty alone that both Parties have always referred in all discussions concerning them. Lord Bathurst's Note denies that there is, in any one of the Articles of the Treaty of Ghent, any express or implied reference to the Treaty of 1783, as still in force. It says that, by the stipulation for a mutual restoration of Territory, each Party necessarily "reverted to their Boundaries as before the War, without reference to the title by which their Possessions were acquired, or to the mode in which their Boundaries had been previously fixed."

There are 4 several Articles of the Treaty of Ghent, in every one of which the Treaty of 1783 is not only named, but its stipulations form the basis of the new engagements between the Parties, for carrying its provisions into execution. These Articles are the IVth, Vth, VIth, and VIIth. The Undersigned refers particularly to the IVth Article, where the Boundaries described are not adverted to without reference to the title by which they were acquired, but where the stipulation of the Treaty of 1783 is expressly assigned as the basis of the Claims, both of The United States and of Great Britain, to the Islands mentioned in the Article.

The words with which the Article begins are, Whereas it was stipulated by the ILd Article in the Treaty of Peace, of 1783, between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, that the Boundary of The United States should comprehend all Islands," &c.

It proceeds to describe the Boundaries as there stipulated: then alleges the claim of The United States to certain Islands, as founded upon one part of the Stipulation, and the claim of Great Britain as derived from another part of the Stipulation; and agrees upon the appointment of 2 Commissioners, "to decide to which of the 2 Contracting Parties the Islands belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said Treaty of Peace of 1783." The same expressions are repeated in the Vth, VIth, and VIIth Articles, and the Undersigned is unable to conceive by what construction of language one of the Parties to those Articles can allege, that, at the time when they were signed, the Treaty of 1783 was, or could be considered at an end.

When, in the Letter of the Undersigned to Lord Bathurst, the Treaty of 1783 was stated to be a compact of a peculiar character, importing in its own nature a permanence, not liable to be annulled by the fact of a subsequent War between the Parties, the recognition of the sovereignty of The United States, and the Boundary Line, were adduced as illustrations to support the principle; the language of the abovementioned Articles in the Treaty of Ghent, and the Claim brought forward by Great Britain at the negotiation of it, for the free navigation of the Mississippi, were alleged as proofs that Great Britain herself so considered it, excepting with regard to a small part of the single Article

relative to the Fisheries, and the right of Great Britain was denied, thus to select one particular stipulation in such a Treaty, and declare it to have been abrogated by the War. The Answer of Lord Bathurst denies that Great Britain has made such a selection, and affirms that the whole Treaty of 1783 was annulled by the late War. It admits, however, that the recognition of Independence, and the Boundaries, were in the nature of perpetual obligation; and that, with the single exception of the liberties in and connected with the fisheries, within British Jurisdiction, on the Coasts of North America, The United States are entitled to all the benefits of all the stipulations in their favour, contained in the Treaty of 1783, although the stipulations themselves are supposed to be annulled. The fishing liberties, within British Jurisdiction alone, are considered as a temporary grant, liable not only to abrogation by War, but, as it would seem from the tenour of the argument, revocable at the pleasure of Great Britain, whenever she might consider the revocation suitable to her interest. The Note affirms, that "the liberty to fish within British limits, or to use British Territory, is essentially different from the right to independence, in all that can reasonably be supposed to regard its intended duration. That the grant of this liberty has all the aspect of a policy, temporary and experimental, depending on the use that might be made of it, on the condition of the Islands and places where it was to be exercised, and the more general conveniences, or inconveniences, in a military, naval, or commercial, point of view, resulting from the access of an independent Nation to such Islands and places."

He

The Undersigned is induced, on this occasion, to repeat his Lordship's own words, because, on a careful and deliberate review of the Article in question, he is unable to discover in it a single expression indicating, even in the most distant manner, a policy, temporary or experimental, or having the remotest connection with military, naval, or commercial, conveniences or inconveniences to Great Britain. has not been inattentive to the variation in the terms by which the enjoyment of the fisheries on the main ocean, the common possession of both Nations, and the same enjoyment within a small portion of the special Jurisdiction of Great Britain, are stipulated in the Article, and recognized as belonging to the People of The United States. He considers the term right, as importing an advantage to be enjoyed in a place of common Jurisdiction, and the term liberty, as referring to the same advantage, incidentally leading to the borders of a special Jurisdiction. But evidently neither of them imports any limitation of time. Both were expressions no less familiar to the understandings than dear to the hearts of both the Nations, Parties to the Treaty. The Undersigned is persuaded it will be readily admitted, that wherever the English Language is the mother tongue, the term liberty, far from including, in itself, either limitation of time, or precariousness of tenure, is