tion, cure all our maladies, and prolong our existence to endless ages; for, as St. Paul fpeaks, if we have our fruit unto holiness, our end will be EVERLASTING life.

SERMON.

SERMON

Of the Goodness of God.

III

PSALMS xxxiv. 8.

O TASTE AND SEE THAT THE LORD IS GOOD.

BLESS

ED IS THE MAN THAT TRUSTETH IN HIM.

THE

HE titles GREATEST and BEST, have, in all ages, been applied to the Deity. We are led to this by the unavoidable fentiments and perceptions of our minds. The first and uncreated Being must be the GREATEST; and the GREATEST muft like-, wife be the BEST; for true greatnefs includes in it goodnefs. Almighty power, univerfal dominion, and infinite knowledge, confidered by themselves, can excite no other emotions than awe and terror. They have in them none of that dignity which engages veneration, except they are accompanied

with benevolence. This is the crown of all the attributes of the Deity. It is this finishes his character; and nothing can be of more importance to us than a thorough conviction of it, and juft fentiments concerning it. If we either do not believe it, or entertain unworthy apprehenfions of it as partial or capricious: Some of the principal comforts of our existence must be loft; and our religious fervices must become an abject and illiberal drudgery and fuperftition. I cannot, therefore, be better employed than in endeavouring to explain and prove to you God's goodness; and this I propofe to make my business in the prefent discourse after which, I fhall, in a future difcourfe infift particularly on the practical improvement of it.

This is a fubject of a very extenfive nature; and, were I to enter into a particular and full difcuffion of it, I fhould take up a great deal of your time. But I fhall endeav our to avoid prolixity, and aim only at making fuch obfervations as appear to me moft ufeful and important, without entering far into abftrufe inquiries.

GOODNESS, when applied to the Deity, may be considered in two views. It may fignify either the principle itself of goodness; that is, that benevolence of difpofition which leads to the communication of hap

pinefs,

pinefs, or it may fignify, the exercise of this principle in the actual communication of happiness. We use, in common language, the word goodnefs fometimes in the former of thefe fenfes, and fometimes in the latter; and it is of fome importance that we take care to diftinguish them. Much may be faid of the principle of goodness in the Deity which cannot, without great impropriety, be applied to the exercife of it in the creation and government of the world.-In particular, it may be juftly faid of God's goodnefs, in the former fenfe, that it is neceffary. His nature is benevolence; and a difpofition to communicate happinefs is infeparable from it. There is as much a phyfical impoflibility of his wanting this difpofition as there is of his wanting power or knowledge, or even exiftence. But the fame cannot be faid of his goodness in the latter fenfe. Though the difpofition to communicate happiness is necessary in him, yet the exercise of it (that is, every act proceeding from this difpofition) is perfectly free. And this is one of the chief obfervations to which I would defire you to attend on this fubject. You should always think of God's goodness as an unconftrained and free goodnefs. All its effects proceed not from irresistible neceffity, but from voluntary choice. He has it in his power not to confer on his creatures the

bleffings

bleffings they enjoy: Nor is it the least objection to this, that the principle of goodness within him is, as I have faid, neceffary. We experience in ourselves that the principles or motives of action within us are neceffary, though our actions themfelves are free. Thus, felf-love is effential to us. We can no more diveft ourselves of it than we can of our beings. But the actions derived from it are free; and we have a power not to perform them. In like manner; the preference of virtue is abfolutely neceffary; but, at the fame time, we find that we can, if we please, determine not to follow this preference. In other words; difpofitions and views, arifing from unavoidable principles in beings, are only the motives and occafions of their determinations. They only fhew how an action is to be accounted for; not its efficient caufe. This must always be the self determination of the agent.—It has, I know, been objected to this, that it tends to destroy the immutability of God's moral perfections. But no objection can be less reafonable. In lower inftances, we cannot with for any greater certainty than that which depends only on the voluntary determinations of agents in particular circumstances. It would, indeed, be intolerably abfurd to imagine that the Deity is not good immutably, because he is fo freely; or to conclude, that

he