The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships: Theoretical and Empirical DevelopmentsStéphane Saussier, Julie de Brux Springer, 3 janv. 2018 - 240 pages This book investigates the economic decisions behind the implementation of public-private partnerships (PPPs). The first part of the book discusses different forms of public procurement contracts, in particular in France and the UK, and provides an economic analysis of the potential advantages and pitfalls of public-private partnerships. This exploration of PPPs’ efficiency also includes an examination of the financing conditions of public procurements, as well as regulatory requirements. By reviewing empirical studies on PPPs, the second part of the book compares their advantages over purely public solutions and offers practical guidance on their implementation. Practitioners will also learn best practices on how to involve stakeholders in calls for bids. |
Table des matières
1 | |
Definitions Scope and Economic Analysis of PPPs | 14 |
An Empirical Analysis of PPPs | 110 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
adverse selection agreement analysis assess associated auctions availability contracts average award procedures Bajari bids calls for tenders cartel Chong collusion companies Competition Authority concession contracts contracting authority corruption Cour des comptes criteria debt delegated delivery option effect efficiency empirical studies European European Investment Bank ex ante ex post expertise favor firms France French guarantee Guasch highlighted implementation in-house provision incentive increase industry information asymmetries infrastructure instance investments Journal of Economics Laffont limit London underground Martimort mechanism municipalities natural monopolies OECD opportunistic behaviors Organization organizational outsourcing performance political potential PPP contracts private financing private operator private partner private sector public authority public contracts public entity public party public services Public-Private Partnerships public–private reduce regulation renegotiations risk sanctions Saussier selected specific theoretical theory Tirole traditional public procurement transaction costs transparency transport vertical agreements World Bank yardstick competition Yvrande-Billon