tended to refute transcendental Idealism, or transcendental Egoism, such as above explained, they would unanimously say: "In that case your Refutation is quite useless, so far as we are concerned, and does not remove in the slightest degree the objections which we entertain against your doc

trine."

APPENDIX B.

ON THE TEACHING OF BUTLER.

BUTLER'S doctrine has been a subject of comment in a recent article in the Saturday Review, in which the writer expresses a good deal of dissatisfaction with it. And this sentiment appears to be shared by a numerous party connected with Oxford, who no longer regard Butler's reasonings as conclusive or triumphant. This feeling has found utterance in many ways. Thus Mr. Goldwin Smith speaks of the Analogy as a greatly overrated work; while Mr. Maurice expresses an opinion that “the religion of hoops and ruffles" exercised a depressing influence on Butler's powers, and marred the value of his labours.

Ac

The writer of the article in the Saturday Review complains that Butler, instead of defending the doctrine of Vicarious Punishment as usually taught, has substituted another doctrine in its place. cording to the doctrine usually taught, there is a real transfer of penalty from one person A, to another person B. An offence having been committed by A, the penalty due to that offence is

inflicted on B, A being thereby relieved from the penalty; and it is declared that this transfer of penalty satisfies the claims of Law or Justice, which requires that guilty acts should be punished, but does not require that the punishment should be inflicted on the guilty agent in propriâ personâ. This is the principle of vicarious punishment properly so called; that which, as we are assured, is recognised by the Chinese, and extensively used in their administration of justice.

Butler undertakes to show that Vicarious Punishment, though objected to by philosophers as irrational and unjust, is actually found to be largely employed in the observed course of Nature. To make out this, he shows (as it is exceedingly easy to do) that in the observed course of Nature, the wrong-doing of one man frequently entails evil consequences to other persons; but he does not in the slightest degree make out that the sufferings endured by these persons are a substitute for the penalty due to the wrong-doer-that they relieve him from any part of the punishment which his offences deserve.

Again, Butler devotes a good deal of labour to show that in the ordinary course of Nature the sufferings of one person may produce consequences very beneficial to other persons. Rationalists do not in the least deny this. They fully admit that in the ordinary course of Nature the sufferings of self-sacrificing persons produce beneficial results to other persons: that the sufferings of heroes,

saints, and martyrs, frequently produce results which benefit a large portion of mankind; and that the death and sufferings of Christ did this in an eminent degree. But while freely admitting this, they do not admit that in such cases there is a transfer of penalty from the guilty to the innocent, whereby the requirements of justice, human or divine, are satisfied, and the guilty relieved from the penalties which their conduct deserves.

In order to show that the cases insisted on by Butler are not really cases of vicarious punishment, the Reviewer instances the example of the drunkard, observing: "The debauched father transmits a scrofulous constitution to his innocent son; but he pays the penalties of his own debauchery in his own person equally whether he has a son or not. His son's sufferings put him in no better position than he would be in if his son did not suffer: they usually put him in a worse position."

Indeed it is evident that if there are two drunkards, one of whom, having no family, damages only himself, while the other causes ruin to a large family of children, the reproaches of conscience and the blame of mankind would, cæteris paribus, fall more severely on the latter than on the former. Whereas if the case were one of vicarious punishment, properly so called, provided the latter drunkard caused an amount of suffering to his children, equal to that which the former one caused to himself, the claims of justice would be discharged, and the drunkard

might equitably be relieved from all personal suffering. Advocates of the doctrine of Vicarious Punishment, such as the Chinese, might perhaps be willing to entertain this view of the case, but unquestionably Rationalists would not do so.

Among the most obvious cases in which the evil qualities of one man produce suffering to others, is that of bad governors, compendiously described in the proverb, "Delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi." At first sight this looks like an enunciation of the principle of Vicarious Punishment. But Rationalists do not believe that the sufferings of the "Achivi" have for their effect to relieve the "reges" from the penalties which they deserve. Suppose there are two Caligulas or Neros, equally evil in their intrinsic nature, one of whom is placed in a position where he can do little harm to his fellows, while the other ascends a throne, and causes a great amount of suffering. Rationalists do not believe that the latter will be punished by the Divine Justice less than the forAnd holding such a view, they do not regard the suffering caused by the despot as a case of vicarious punishment, i. e. as a punishment which is endured by some person vice the person by whom it was merited.

mer.

Nor, again, do Rationalists believe that in such cases the innocence of the sufferers would avail to produce the effect in question, viz. that of relieving the guilty person who caused the suffering from the penalty deserved by him. For instance,