"Prevenient grace descending had removed. The stony from their hearts."‡ Shelley says: "Th' inheritors of unfulfilled renown Rose from their thrones, built above mortal thought, Goethe says: "Das Unzulängliche Hier wird's Ereigniss; Zieht uns hinan.” The above examples suffice to show that though the mode of expression in question is not usual in colloquial English, yet it is freely employed by writers of very different kinds, and sanctioned by such high authority, that it were vain to denounce it as illegitimate or unmeaning. Metaphysicians therefore cannot be blamed because they talk about "the Finite, "the Infinite," "the True," "the Ibid., book xi. * Paradise Lost, book x. † Ibid. Divine," &c.; and it is quite unwarrantable to infer from their use of such expressions that Metaphysics are about void abstractions. It is quite possible that some metaphysicians may have lost their way, and propounded doctrines concerning abstractions which they were incapable of interpreting into truth concerning any thing existent or conceivable. According to the simile above noticed, such writers are unable to cash their notes; and have fallen into a state of metaphysical insolvency. Schopenhauer particularly accuses Schelling and Hegel of having gone astray in this manner; and censures them in consequence with great asperity. Again, the Platonic theory of Ideas is sometimes censured as a vain reverie about mere abstractions. But many able philosophers wholly dissent from this view. Kant regards the theory in question as in the main profound and valuable. Schopenhauer, who detests speculations about abstractions, and who pursues Schelling and Hegel with biting invective because he thinks they have indulged in it, highly admires Plato's theory of Ideas, regarding it as essentially agreeing with the Kantian doctrine. And Schopenhauer can hardly have been prejudiced in favour of Plato, since he vehemently dislikes and condemns his Theism.* It is quite likely that in many cases philosophers have gone astray, and lost themselves in a maze of abstractions, admitting of no profitable See Note B. interpretation. Just in the same way mathematicians sometimes lose themselves in a maze of symbols, and produce results which they cannot profitably interpret. But the errors of metaphysicians and mathematicians who have gone astray must not be confounded with the nature of metaphysics and mathematics. Both these make use of abstractions: but the purpose of both is to obtain a knowledge about really existing things. When, therefore, philosophers dispute concerning the Finite, the Infinite, the Relative, the Absolute, &c., the profitableness of the dispute will depend upon the mode in which the expressions are interpreted. We shall find different expositors proposing a great variety of interpretations. Sometimes it is said that "the Infinite" and "the Absolute" mean infinite and absolute being; and that this signifies abstract being apart from any attribute-unpropertied, unconditioned, undetermined. Thus the Infinite so explained is held to be neither real nor unreal, neither active nor inactive, neither conscious nor unconscious, &c. Sometimes, again, the Infinite is explained as signifying a being or object of which every possible attribute is predicated in an infinite degree; which is infinitely real and infinitely unreal; infinitely active and infinitely inactive; infinitely good and infinitely bad; infinitely powerful and infinitely weak, &c. Now when the Infinite and the Absolute are thus explained, it is quite useless to make them subjects of discussion; and the so-called Metaphysic, which busies itself about them, should be dismissed, as dealing with void abstractions. But it would be perfectly wrong to conclude that statements about "the Finite," "the Infinite," &c. are necessarily illegitimate; that all writers who discourse about them deal with meaningless abstractions. If a writer wishes to say that every thing which we can imagine is Finite; that we cannot imagine any thing that is Infinite, any Infinite thing, or quality, or object, he may with perfect correctness express this by the compendious statement, "The Finite alone is imaginable; the Infinite is unimaginable." In like manner he may correctly say, "The Finite only is conceivable; the Infinite is inconceivable;" meaning thereby to express that we can conceive only finite objects, and cannot conceive any infinite thing or object. We must not suppose that because the expressions "the Finite," "the Infinite," "the Phenomenal," ""the Human," have a singular form, and are made to agree with verbs in the singular number, that therefore what is said about them is said only about a single thing or object. In saying that "the Finite is not able to comprehend the Infinite," we assert that no finite mind can comprehend any infinite object: but the number of Finite minds or intelligent beings concerning whom this incapacity is asserted may be exceedingly great. So we may say in the singular "the Fi nite exists," though admitting the existence of many finite objects; or again, we may say "the Infinite exists," while we may recognise the existence of many infinite things, or of many infinite persons. In a similar manner, we say in the singular "the nation rejoices," or "the nation mourns;" meaning thereby that a great number of persons rejoice or mourn. The perplexities which have been caused in recent debates by the use of expressions of the form above considered show that explanation concerning them is not uncalled for; and this must be my excuse for having dwelt on the subject somewhat at length. What has been said above concerning the attacks on Metaphysics is in a great measure applicable to similar attacks made against "Ontology." Ontology, it is said, is void and vain; since it is discourse about rò őr, about naked being devoid of attributes, unpropertied and unconditioned; and discourse about such an empty abstraction must be nugatory. To ov, however, need not be interpreted as signifying naked being without attribute. It may be used to signify that which is, as opposed to rò φαινόμενον οι τὸ δοκοῦν, that which merely seems to be. If a philosopher wishes to express that we cannot know any thing as it really is, that we can know only seeming or appearance, he may express this by saying that we can know only phenomena, and cannot know τὸ ὄν οι τὸ ὄντως ὄν. In this state |