if they are no sooner able to repay the large outlay incurred in providing for their advancement and protection, than with the power they acquire the disposition likewise to make themselves independent,-then it is clear that for three centuries Great Britain has been deeply implicated in a losing game. For the acquisition and preservation of colonial dominion, how many millions have been appropriated to the maintenance of her fleets and armies in all parts of the world! And all this, it seems, without any other return, save perhaps the satisfaction of having contributed to the spread of a really valuable civilization. Had the energies and enterprise of the British population been confined, as far as was possible, within the circumference of the United Kingdom, how far might we have risen above comparison with our present state in wealth, social condition, and political influence!

The conclusion, to which experience would lead on this point, must be found, if at all, by reference to the past history of Great Britain herself. Now, all the information from this source appears plainly to indicate, that a large proportion of our wealth and power has been derived from our colonies. Indeed, our commercial and naval preeminence is to be dated precisely from the time when we first became conspicuous for the extent and importance of our foreign possessions. Previously, nations far inferior to England in internal resources took the lead in the race of maritime and commercial enterprize. Early in the sixteenth century, Portugal had acquired, along with extensive settlements in the East, a monopoly of the European trade with that part of the world. To the almost exclusive enjoyment of the advantages of eastern commerce the Dutch succeeded, who possessed, at the same time, dominions of considerable extent in the New World. The multiplication of means, derived from these two sources, received signal illustration, when this nation, so limited in original population and territory, after bringing to a glorious close a war of half a century with the most powerful monarchy of Europe, could venture, with scarcely an interval of breathing-time, to throw down the gauntlet to England, and commence the desperate struggle, which was to decide the sovereignty of the ocean. It would be difficult to find within the whole compass of history, as it would be scepticism, to require a more convincing proof of the solid value of colonial resources. The contest for maritime superiority, it is true, at length ended in favour of Great Britain, whose naval power has ever since been progressive. But though, for so long a period, no confederacy of rival nations has been able to overthrow or even seriously disturb our supremacy, it ought likewise to be borne in mind, that our maritime strength has increased in no greater proportion than our colonial power. If our navies have long swept every sea,-no enemy risking an encounter, or else paying the penalty of presumption and rashness,—it is equally the fact, that the time is far past, when any nation could compete with England as to importance and extent of external dominions.

As far then as experience can conduct us to a decision on the point under discussion, we may safely assert that the colonial establishments of Great Britain, instead of keeping up a continual drain on her resources, have, in truth, supplied a fertilising stream, whereby the fruits of her industry and enterprize have increased a hundred-fold. When, however, the view is extended to other states, ancient or modern, to discover how the colonial system worked for them, the

difference of circumstances does not permit us to consider arguments, from their case, and applied to that of England, as the evidence of experience strictly understood. In reality, lessons of experience from history, as they are generally entitled, are no more than the probabilities of analogy. But where two nations, having the one leading feature in their character, a devotion to commerce,-are considered solely in reference to a common point of policy, which necessarily exercised great influence on their respective commercial positions, the inference from so close an analogy cannot but have great weight in determining us, if it be clearly on the one side or the other of our question. We are able, then, to refer to two states,-one eminent in antiquity, the other holding a distinguished place in modern history,—each of which, in its day, led the van in the march of commercial enterprize, and advanced to great political importance, helped on chiefly by a scheme of colonial policy, not widely different from what England has embodied, though on a vastly larger scale.

Carthage could never have lifted her head so high among the great powers of the ancient world, but for the means of elevation she possessed in her colonies. From her political system strike off all those branches, which, no part of the parent stem, grew subsequently out of conquest, and where will be found the tree of empire, that "raised its broad arms 'gainst the thunder-stroke" of Roman power? The city, with a few miles of adjoining territory, constituted the body of the state. All the rest of the Carthaginian dominions, as they were at first the result of conquest, so continued ever after external appendages, not integral portions, of the empire. Even the large extent of territory along the coast of her own continent, reaching as far as the Atlantic, was nothing else than a series of colonial dependencies on Carthage. Of her settlements in the Mediterranean, Sardinia was the most considerable; holding, among the other Carthaginian islands of that sea, a somewhat similar rank to that of Jamaica among our West India colonies. Between historical events, separated by so many ages, it is a more striking analogy, that the first introduction of the Carthaginians into Spain was owing to a commercial intercourse, such as procured the British a footing in India; and that by steps, nearly the same in both instances, the maritime intruders rose to the attainment of territorial dominion and political ascendency in distant lands. The supremacy of Carthage in the Spanish peninsula was, we are aware, of no long duration; and the blow received there was mainly instrumental to her fall. But let us recollect at the same time that, while to her were opposed the disciplined valour and ardent patriotism of the Roman armies, she was herself obliged, from the dearth of native population, to make use of foreign mercenaries, almost exclusively, in all her military operations. With such an incapacity for success, it cannot be wondered that Carthage at length sunk to the ground before an antagonist, whose iron strength and burning enthusiasm had been. formed to victory in a thousand battles. Nay, it is a forcible demonstration of the amount of resources derivable from colonies, that a state, so circumscribed in original dimensions, was yet furnished with the means of holding the empire of the seas for so many ages, and maintaining at last, with the greatest military power the world ever saw, a struggle, renewed at intervals and not decided till after the lapse of a century.

B 2

if they are no sooner able to repay the large outlay incurred in providing for their advancement and protection, than with the power they acquire the disposition likewise to make themselves independent,-then it is clear that for three centuries Great Britain has been deeply implicated in a losing game. For the acquisition and preservation of colonial dominion, how many millions have been appropriated to the maintenance of her fleets and armies in all parts of the world! And all this, it seems, without any other return, save perhaps the satisfaction of having contributed to the spread of a really valuable civilization. Had the energies and enterprise of the British population been confined, as far as was possible, within the circumference of the United Kingdom, how far might we have risen above comparison with our present state in wealth, social condition, and political influence!

The conclusion, to which experience would lead on this point, must be found, if at all, by reference to the past history of Great Britain herself. Now, all the information from this source appears plainly to indicate, that a large proportion of our wealth and power has been derived from our colonies. Indeed, our commercial and naval preeminence is to be dated precisely from the time when we first became conspicuous for the extent and importance of our foreign possessions. Previously, nations far inferior to England in internal resources took the lead in the race of maritime and commercial enterprize. Early in the sixteenth century, Portugal had acquired, along with extensive settlements in the East, a monopoly of the European trade with that part of the world. To the almost exclusive enjoyment of the advantages of eastern commerce the Dutch succeeded, who possessed, at the same time, dominions of considerable extent in the New World. The multiplication of means, derived from these two sources, received signal illustration, when this nation, so limited in original population and territory, after bringing to a glorious close a war of half a century with the most powerful monarchy of Europe, could venture, with scarcely an interval of breathing-time, to throw down the gauntlet to England, and commence the desperate struggle, which was to decide the sovereignty of the ocean. It would be difficult to find within the whole compass of history, as it would be scepticism, to require a more convincing proof of the solid value of colonial resources. The contest for maritime superiority, it is true, at length ended in favour of Great Britain, whose naval power has ever since been progressive. But though, for so long a period, no confederacy of rival nations has been able to overthrow or even seriously disturb our supremacy, it ought likewise to be borne in mind, that our maritime strength has increased in no greater proportion than our colonial power. If our navies have long swept every sea,-no enemy risking an encounter, or else paying the penalty of presumption and rashness, it is equally the fact, that the time is far past, when any nation could compete with England na to importance and extent of external dominions.

As far then as experience can conduct ne

under discussion, we may safely ass

of Great Britain, instead of

resources, have, in truth, fruits of her industry and When, however, the vi modern, to discover h

difference of circumstances does not permit us to consider arguments, from their case, and applied to that of England, as the evidence of experience strictly understood. In reality, lessons of experience from history, as they are generally entitled, are no more than the probabilities of analogy. But where two nations, having the one leading feature in their character, a devotion to commerce,- -are considered solely in reference to a common point of policy, which necessarily exercised great influence on their respective commercial positions, the inference from so close an analogy cannot but have great weight in determining us, if it be clearly on the one side or the other of our question. We are able, then, to refer to two states,-one eminent in antiquity, the other holding a distinguished place in modern history,-each of which, in its day, led the van in the march of commercial enterprize, and advanced to great political importance, helped on chiefly by a scheme of colonial policy, not widely different from what England has embodied, though on a vastly larger scale.

Carthage could never have lifted her head so high among the great powers of the ancient world, but for the means of elevation she possessed in her colonies. From her political system strike off all those branches, which, no part of the parent stem, grew subsequently out of conquest, and where will be found the tree of empire, that "raised its broad arms 'gainst the thunder-stroke" of Roman power? The city, with a few miles of adjoining territory, constituted the body of the state. All the rest of the Carthaginian dominions, as they were at first the result of conquest, so continued ever after external appendages, not integral portions, of the empire. Even the large extent of territory along the coast of her own continent, reaching as far as the Atlantic, was nothing else than a series of colonial dependencies on Carthage. Of her settlements in the Mediterranean, Sardinia was the most considerable; holding, among the other Carthaginian islands of that sea, a somewhat similar rank to that of Jamaica among our West India colonies. Between historical events, separated by so many ages, it is a more striking analogy, that the first introduction of the Carthaginians into Spain was owing to a commercial intercourse, such as procured the British a footing in India; and that by steps, nearly the same in both instances, the maritime intruders rose to the attainment of territorial dominion and political ascendency in distant lands. The supremacy of Carthage in the Spanish peninsula was, we are aware, of no long duration; and the blow received there was mainly instrumental to her fall. But let us recollect at the same time that, while to her were opposed the disciplined valour and ardent patriotism of the Roman armies, she was herself obliged, from the dearth of native population, to make use of foreign mercenaries, almost exclusively, in all her military operations. With such an incapacity for success, it cannot be wondered that Carthage at length sunk to the ground before an antagonist, whose iron strength and burning enthusiasm had been formed to victory in a thousand battles. Nay, it is a forcible demonstration of the amount of resources derivable from colonies, that a state, so circumscribed in original dimensions, was yet furnished with the means of holding the empire of the seas for so many ages, and maintaining at last, with the greatest military power the world ever saw, a struggle, renewed at intervals and not decided till after the lapse of a century,

B 2

Venice is another state whose history testifies that, for a large proportion of its wealth and power, a nation may be indebted to its colonial appendages. The original territory of this ocean-queen comprised little more than the small islands where she had first seated herself at the head of the Adriatic; but her colonies spread largely along the borders of this sea, through various parts of Greece, and among the numerous islands of the Levant. These were the grand sources of that strength she so often put forth to secure Christendom against the inroads of the Mohammedan. Confined to her first narrow seat, Venice could never have had "her thirteen hundred years of freedom," nor stood at the head of those states which have enjoyed the longest period of independent and extensive power. It was her colonies that so long animated her system with the vigour of youth,-that, in the same spirit with which she had stayed the tide of Saracen conquest, enabled her to stand forth, many ages later, "Europe's bulwark 'gainst the Ottomite." Even so late as the beginning of last century, the Morea still owned the supremacy of Venice; and, but thirty-six years ago, did the Ionian Islands, now under British dominion, cease to be Venetian colonies.

Thus, in the history of Venice, not less than that of Carthage, we have signal proof of the durability, as well as greatness of national power, which has been based on colonial resources. And yet, in each instance, the fabric of empire, which rose so high and swelled to such dimensions, rested on a foundation so narrow, so disproportionate to the superincumbent structure, that the first violent internal commotion, or the first fierce shock of hostility from without, seemed likely to tumble the whole to the ground. We have seen notwithstanding that, down even to our own times, the sceptre of foreign dominion still remained within the grasp of Venice. With regard to Carthage, the stability of her power attracted even the notice of Aristotle, who was at pains to trace back the working of her political constitution through the five hundred years of its previous existence. This profound political philosopher, a title recognized as his due, even in the estimation of modern self-complacency,-looked on the Carthaginian structure of government, as an almost perfect model; and we, the advocates of colonies, rejoice to find ourselves supported by so competent a judge, in his strongly expressed approbation of a political system, in which the colonial was a prominent department.

Whether, then, we consult the history of Great Britain herself, or of other states, which have stood in analogous situations, the whole weight of evidence from these sources goes to establish the proposition, that colonial dependencies are the grand upholders, the main supports, of commercial prosperity, naval strength, and political importance in maritime nations. The mere acquisition of foreign settlements, does, we know, presuppose some degree of naval power; but yet we must insist on the point, that no people ever attained supremacy on the seas but by the help of colonial dominion, or long retained that supremacy, when once stripped of their most valuable colonies.

There, perhaps, never was a man that made practical use of history to the same extent as Napoleon. No one better appreciated the value of the sentiment, "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be: and that, which is done, is that which shall be done; and there is no