Inconsistency in ScienceFor centuries, inconsistencies were seen as a hindrance to good reasoning, and their role in the sciences was ignored. In recent years, however, logicians as well as philosophers and historians have showed a growing interest in the matter. Central to this change were the advent of paraconsistent logics, the shift in attention from finished theories to construction processes, and the recognition that most scientific theories were at some point either internally inconsistent or incompatible with other accepted findings. The new interest gave rise to important questions. How is `logical anarchy' avoided? Is it ever rational to accept an inconsistent theory? In what sense, if any, can inconsistent theories be considered as true? The present collection of papers is the first to deal with this kind of questions. It contains case studies as well as philosophical analyses, and presents an excellent overview of the different approaches in the domain. |
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Table des matières
| 1 | |
| 35 | |
| 43 | |
| 59 | |
| 81 | |
A Partial Perspective | 105 |
Inconsistency and Empirical Sciences | 119 |
In Defence of a Programme for Handling Inconsistencies | 129 |
How to Reason Sensibly yet Naturally from Inconsistencies | 151 |
Why the Logic of Explanation is Inconsistencyadaptive | 165 |
A Paradox in Newtonian Gravitation Theory II | 185 |
Inconsistency Generic Modeling and Conceptual Change in Science | 197 |
INDEX | 213 |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
accepted ACLuNl adaptive logics analysis applications approach approximate truth argued Batens Bohr Bohr's Cambridge Carnot's causal CL-derivable claims classical logic Clausius CLuN concept consequences consistent constraints construction content driven contexts contradiction Costa derived dialetheic dialetheists Disjunctive Syllogism distinction domain dynamics electromagnetic empirical epistemic equation example explanandum fifth element force formula Fraassen Giere Graham Priest gravitational hence heuristic Inconsistency in Science inconsistency-adaptive logic inconsistent set inconsistent theories inference infinitesimals interpretation Kitcher knowledge Kuhn Lakatos laws limit logic mathematical change mathematical theories Maxwell Maxwell's Meheus Modus Tollens motion negation Newton da Costa Newtonian cosmology nomological explanation observation paraconsistent logic partial structure phenomena Philosophy of Science pragmatic predicates premises Priest problem proof quantum theory quasi-truth real numbers realist reasoning Reductio ad Absurdum relations relevantists requires result role rules Russell's paradox scientific theories scientists semantic sense sentences set theory test mass theoretical true University Press vortices
Fréquemment cités
Page 3 - With them it is as though an artist were to gather the hands, feet, head and other members for his images from diverse models, each part excellently drawn, but not related to a single body, and since they in no way match each other, the result would be a monster rather than man.
Page 114 - The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it. The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man - whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory - may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge.
Page 18 - On the simulacrum account, to explain a phenomenon is to construct a model which fits the phenomenon into a theory. The fundamental laws of the theory are true of the objects in the model, and they are used to derive a specific account of how these objects behave." 104 Furthermore, "The simulacrum account is not a formal account. It says that we lay out a model, and within the model we 'derive' various laws which match more or less well with bits of phenomenological behaviour.
Page 201 - In mechanism, when two wheels are intended to revolve in the same direction, a wheel is placed between them so as to be in gear with both, and this wheel is called an "idle wheel." The hypothesis about the vortices which I have to suggest is that a layer of particles, acting as idle wheels, is interposed between each vortex and the next, so that each vortex has a tendency to make the neighbouring vortices revolve in the same direction with itself.
Page 10 - I shall suggest that it is a mark of maturity of a branch of science that the notion of similarity or kind finally dissolves, so far as it is relevant to that branch of science.
Page 165 - What scientific explanation, especially theoretical explanation, aims at is not [an] intuitive and highly subjective kind of understanding, but an objective kind of insight that is achieved by a systematic unification, by exhibiting the phenomena as manifestations of common, underlying structures and processes that conform to specific, testable, basic principles
Page 7 - Sub specie aeternitatis? or sub specie generations? I am susceptible to the esthetic charm of the former ideal — who is not? There are moments of relaxation: there are moments when the demand for peace, to be let alone and relieved from the continual claim of the world in which we live that we be up and doing something about it, seems irresistible; when the responsibilities imposed by living in a moving universe seem intolerable. We contemplate with equal mind the thought of the eternal sleep.
Page 165 - By pointing this out, the argument shows that, given the particular circumstances and the law in question, the occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected; and it is in this sense that the explanation enables us to understand why the phenomenon occurred.
Page 25 - It gives us a pluralistic, restless universe, in which no single point of view can ever take in the whole scene; and to a mind possessed of the love of unity at any cost, it will, no doubt, remain forever inacceptable.
Page 19 - ... pockets of great precision; large parcels of qualitative maxims resisting precise formulation; erratic overlaps; here and there, once in a while, corners that line up, but mostly ragged edges; and always the cover of law just loosely attached to the jumbled world of material things. For all we know, most of what occurs in nature occurs by hap, subject to no law at all.
Informations bibliographiques
| Titre | Inconsistency in Science Volume 2 de Origins (Kluwer Academic Publishers) Volume 2 de Origins (Kluwer Academic) Volume 2 de Origins: Studies in the Sources of Scientific Creativity |
| Auteur | Joke Meheus |
| Rédacteur | Joke Meheus |
| Édition | illustrée |
| Éditeur | Springer Science & Business Media, 2002 |
| ISBN | 1402006306, 9781402006302 |
| Longueur | 222 pages |
| Exporter la citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |