despot against the organized, military, popular revolt of a princely subject. Justice this time sides, apparently, with morality. England returns evil for good, and loses in consequence; Russia renders good for evil, and is gaining thereby. The motives, respectively, which might and with reason be inverted, we will not probe; for we might as well question the springs of a rich man's charity.

Interesting babes!-ye twin-born in Downing-street, swathed in protocols, nursed by faction, suckled on blood!-ye Belgian and Lusitanian pets!-had ye but forms human, divine, or diabolical-a neck, a breast, an arm-anything whereon to hang a ribbon, the Czar would give ye all his " orders," for having so well served his ends. Doubtless, actuated by the infirmity of purpose, which makes men of a certain calibre unwilling to recede from an enterprize once undertaken, our ministers have said, "We will stifle these first, and then we will turn to the East, and cradle that too in our own fashion. And, in order to pave the way for ruling at Constantinople, as at Brussels and Oporto, they appointed an ambassador, who was just the man for catching a Tartar.

As usual, we are too late. We are like the timid gamester, who, while hesitating to risk a stake, sees the die turn up that would have gained him all, then throws his money down. Even so late as six months since, when the game now playing there was only begun, had we had a talented ambassador at the Porte, with authority to act firmly, he might have stretched out his arms to the south and to the north, and have said " Pasha of Egypt, thus far mayest thou come;- -Russians, respect the Ottoman territory!" But can it be credited?-while the Egyptian was traversing the footsteps of the Macedonian, with the impetus of Tamerlane, defeating army after army, and the Muscovite was linking golden fetters on the Sultan, our Admiral in the Mediterranean had his flag on board of a frigate, and our Ambassador at the Porte was on his way to Constantinople.

At the eleventh hour, what are we about? With a Russian fleet lord of the Bosphorus, and an Egyptian army approaching Scutari, the question at issue, apparently, being, whether Ibrahim Pasha shall plant his horse-tails in the Hippodrome, or the Sultan be, henceforth, a glass ball in the hands of the Russians-what are we doing?-anything to have a voice in the decision? We are;-our Ambassador is acting" circumspectly," and H. M. S. Malabar has sailed for Constantinople, with twenty pieces of cannon on board for the Sultan-twenty (formerly) 18-pounders, altered to carry 32-pound balls, with newlyinvented carriages, which our navy has rejected. Really, the originator of that magnificent present, if serious, must have been reading the "gentili stravaganze" of Ariosto, till he fancied that a few English cannon would have the effect of a gagliardo paladin," in days of chivalry. Allowing the Sultan to be in a prosperous state-the Russians north of the Danube, the Egyptians south of the Desert-such a present (without artillerymen) could only be agreeable, for he has cannon, excellent ones too; but now the idea of it is jocular,-too jocular to suppose that it has been entertained.

On the contrary, it is whispered that the Malabar merely embarked these cannon as a pretext for a line-of-battle ship going to Constantinople. A pretext!-a Russian fleet in the Bosphorus!!! Let but

the Downs and Lisbon squadrons quit their unprofitable stations and sail for the Dardanelles, with some steamers to tow the ships up in case the wind blow down the Strait, and the Russian fleet will then remain no longer in the Bosphorus than we will it. Our ministers little know the hold they have on Russia, by the power we possess of destroying with ease her fleet and naval establishments in the Black Sea. Keep Russia in fear for that, her truly vulnerable quarter, and we may regain the place in the East which we have suffered ourselves to slide from.

Thanks to the Anglo-Gallic feeling in favour of Belgium and Pedro, Russia has the game of the East pretty well in her own hands: she I will soon decide it. She will support the Sultan on his throne for the present, as being the most convenient locum tenens, and she will confirm Mehemet Ali in the sovereignty of Syria and Egypt.

But, Mehemet Ali! mark us. Shouldst thou feel gratitude in particular to the Czar for thy new and splendid kingdom, thou wilt be most unjust towards one of our countrymen. Thou art ungrateful in not having already acknowledged his services. We see thee frown,-thy moustaches curl in anger: thou combest indignantly thy beard with thy fingers. Mehemet Ali ungrateful!-We see thee point to Suleyman Bey (the renegade French colonel), whom thou hast made general, and whom thou dost even allow to beard thy son, the victorious Ibrahim; we see thee point to Boghoz, thy talented secretary, whom thou hast loaded with wealth;-we see thee point to thy Bim Bashis, with glittering jewels on their breasts, and splendid appointments;-we see thee point to thy sleek Capidgis and well-dressed Tartars;-and hear thee exclaim, "Is there a man that has served me whom I have not rewarded three-fold?" Yea, Mehemet Ali, there is!-that reproach falls on thee on account of a Briton, without whom thy head, with all its white appendages, might ere now have been exhibited in one of those niches, which thou hast seen at the seraglio gate. Nay, start not, Mehemet Ali!-it is true. And being true, thou canst not repay him; but thou mayest show a sense of his merits, which, by viewing them in the wrong light, thou hast hitherto underrated. Take choicest gifts: slaves from Ethiopia, horses from Araby, amulets from Mecca, coral from the Red Sea, tobacco from Gibleh, coffee from Mocha, honey from the Oasis, a giraffe and a mummy,-take all these, and with thy signet ring, lay them at his feet. And, Mehemet Ali! whenever thou recitest the namaz, repeat the mystic word "Navarino," and, saying, "God is great, and Mohammed is his prophet," add, "and Codrington was his gerent." Thus, mighty Pasha thou mayest repay, in part, thy debt to that great chief. We know thou hast hardened thy heart against him because he sunk, rather unfairly, the frigate of thy admiral, Mouharem Bey; but listen, and thou wilt confess that he far overbalanced that act. Did he not destroy the Turkish fleet? And did not the destruction of that fleet enable Diebitsch to cross the Balkan? And did not that passage fully show to the world the utter weakness of the Porte, the complete exhaustion of its forces by land and sea, and its extreme unpopularity? And did not that disclosure enable and embolden thee to revolt? Could this have happened without "Navarino?" Oh, Mehemet Ali! be wise, be just! Admire the force of destiny which built a throne for thee from the timbers of thy shattered vessels. Have the name of Codrington, in gold letters, suspended in thy Divan; and call the chief avenue.

leading to thy new capital, Damascus, by the name of "Navarino ;"and then thou wilt die with self-approbation.

But though Russia has the settlement of Turkish affairs now, simply because there is not time for any other power to interfere, it does not follow that she should retain the management of them. We may dispute it with her. Even should Russia march troops across the Balkan, at the present crisis, she will withdraw them: she may retain posts about the Gulf of Bourgas-no more. It would be imprudent for her, and at variance with her deep-laid policy, to attempt, as yet, to sit down permanently in Roumelia, exposed to the machinations and hostility of the jealous, talented Christian tribes who people it, and who would soon hate their new masters more than their old ones: for the Christians of Turkey enjoy too much freedom (no conscription, no police, no quarantine, with free trade) ever to submit patiently to a grinding, military despotism. In the meanwhile we should take a part. We may be certain that the Porte, though constrained to ask assistance of Russia, on account of no other power being able or willing to aid her, would infinitely rather be beholden to any other. We should assist the Sultan in reorganizing his empire; and for that purpose, we should have an Ambassador at the Porte, well-acquainted with the character of the Easterns,-with, too, a suite of practical men. The army should be the first thing to be considered. It should be regulated with deference to the tastes and prejudices of the people, as we have successfully practised in India; and the Sultan should be strenuously counselled to give Christian officers commands, so as to form it at once, and give it a healthy tone, until native officers could be formed. Unwillingness on the part of the Sultan to employ Christians in any higher posts than those of instructors, wherein, from a total want of authority, they could effect no good, has been a principal cause of the failure of the Nizam Dgeditt. Some of the ancient customs of Turkey, relating to internal policy and commerce, are not bad: they should be made use of and improved on, in preference to trying experiments. Above all, care should be taken in introducing Frank customs to veil them,-to shroud them with a feradjeh,—a caution which Mahmoud II. has totally disregarded in his reform, thereby rendering himself little better than an infidel in the eyes of orthodox Mussulmen; a circumstance that has greatly contributed to Mehemet Ali's success. The Sultan should also be recommended to encourage emigration from the Christian countries of Europe, affording, of course, every facility to the settlers. The emigrants would be most advantageously placed. The fertility of Turkey, and its capabilities in trade, manufactures, and mining, are well known. Such an emigration would be a great relief to part of Europe. Germany and Italy would certainly profit by it; France and England might, though, from the latter country, distance would be an objection; and the French have plenty of room at Algiers. Even at the present day, owing to the comparative lukewarmness of the Osmanleys about religion, and to their daily witnessing Christian superiority, public spirit in Turkey in Europe takes rise principally from its Christian population. How much more would it do on being increased by emigration! The Osmanleys would soon become innately tolerant, as well as exteriorly so; and the race of Othman, at present christianly inclined, might deem it wise to hear mass for the sake of the "lower U. S. JOURN. No. 54, May, 1833.

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empire;" if it did not, it would probably think it prudent to retire to Russia, leaving Stamboul to the king of Greece.

Turkey in Europe must become essentially Christian, and have a Christian ruler. It only remains to be seen who is to have the moulding of her destinies. Great Britain can and ought to do it. If she abstain from the task, Russia will undertake it. And when Russia has got possession of the Turkish provinces in Europe, on what tenure will the throne of Greece be held? That throne,-token of sorry policy, to raise which, Turkey, England's ally, was ruined; and Russia, her rival, aggrandized to an extent she could not otherwise have attained in half a century.

MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS OF GERMANY.

No. IV.

PRUSSIA.

Composition of the Army.

THE Prussian army may not inaptly be termed " a school of military instruction for the whole nation," every subject of the kingdom being required to perform a limited period of service in its ranks.

It is not intended to enter into a minute detail here of the peculiar system by which the military power of Prussia is sustained, lest the observations which it would be necessary to introduce in explanation of the subject, might seem to trench inconveniently upon a memoir that appeared in one of the earliest numbers of this Journal, wherein the resources of Prussia are in part developed with much exactness.

Upon this portion of our survey it will suffice, therefore, briefly to observe that every able-bodied man in the country, from the age of seventeen to fifty, is available for military duty.

At twenty a native of Prussia enters the regular army for a space of three years, unless favoured by a regulation subject to certain conditions, limiting his period of service to only one year.

From twenty-three to twenty-five, inclusive, he belongs to the warreserve, whence he enters the first ban of the landwehr, and continues in it until the expiration of his thirty-second year; he is then required to serve another seven years in the second ban of the landwehr.

After the fortieth to the fiftieth year, he ranks in the landsturm, or levée en masse of the whole population, which further includes those individuals between the ages of seventeen and twenty, who are able to bear arms, but who do not volunteer in the army of the line.

One corps of guards, and eight army corps, two of which form an army division, constitute the permanent force of the kingdom. They are distributed through the several provinces in the following order :

Two divisions, each containing a brigade of infantry and one of cavalry,two regiments respectively.

One reserve regiment.

One battalion of chasseurs, of two companies.

Two brigades of landwehr, comprehending four regiments of infantry, and

twelve squadrons of cavalry.

One brigade of artillery.

A detachment of pioneers.
A company of workmen.

One reserve landwehr battalion.

Two regiments of foot guards and two of grenadiers (Emperors Alexander and Francis).

One Neuchatel battalion of chasseurs or riflemen.

One battalion of chasseurs.

One reserve regiment.

Four landwehr regiments of infantry.

One battalion and one squadron of instruction.

A company of non-commissioned officers.

Four garrison,-two division and two invalid companies.

One supernumerary company of invalids, at Potsdam and Werder.

A brigade of artillery, with a pioneer detachment, and a company of work

men.

Besides the above there are, as will be shown presently, six regiments of cavalry of different denominations, including two of landwehr.

The infantry of the line reckons forty regiments, with eight regiments of reserve, four detachments of chasseurs, and four of riflemen, each consisting of two companies. (Whatever distinction prevails between the chasseurs and rifle corps must be regarded as rather nominal than real, the duties and general equipment of these troops being precisely similar.)

Thirty-two regiments of provincial landwehr, and four combined reserve landwehr regiments.

With the exception of the reserve regiments, which possess two musketeer battalions only, every infantry regiment in the service contains three battalions, two musketeer and one fusileer, or twelve companies