with equal solicitude let her consult the security and permanence of her colonial trade. The mercantile marine occupied in the commerce of her colonies in the new world is the best gymnasium for all those exercises, which carry nautical skill, activity, and endurance to perfection. Even on board the East Indiaman, where subordination and discipline are so well preserved, there is, in comparison, little of the severe toil essential to the completion of the hardy seaman's character. It is, in fact, from the hands employed and formed in her trade across the Atlantic that Great Britain has actually been supplied with the choice men of her naval service. This all-important traffic, therefore, connecting as it does our North American and West Indian colonies with the mothercountry and with each other, giving employment to nearly 800,000 tons of British shipping, and 40,000 British seamen- -this invaluable commerce, let us do nothing to diminish or impair*. If rightly awake to the maritime interests of England, we would devise and adopt every means to strengthen this commercial chain, of which two links will be at once destroyed, and the remaining one weakened, by any measure fatal to the present trade, prosecuted by either class of these colonists. The strength of Great Britain on the ocean is not to be measured by the mere number of her ships of war, or of men engaged in her naval service. There have been periods when her navy, in the weight of metal and number of men, stood far below comparison with the combined force of hostile fleets, and yet could proceed rapidly, in a succession of victories, partly to annihilate, in part to appropriate, the naval power of her enemies till, in point of maritime materiel, they were reduced to equality, in the first instance, and then to contemptible inferiority. Whatever advantages hostile navies may have had in numerical superiority of force, have been, as the event has always proved, amply countervailed by the pre-eminent qualities of British sailors. Other nations had sought in vain to raise an equally "happy breed of men." In her colonial trade, England had secured the only nursery where they could be reared. How would her enemies rejoice at the parental infatuation. which abandoned it?

*Our direct trade with the North American colonies employs about 430,000 tons of shipping, and 21,000 seamen. Our direct trade with the West India colonies, along with the trade between these and the North American, employs about 360,000 tons, and 18,000 seamen. The whole Atlantic trade, then, which owes its stability, in a great degree, to our present relations with the West Indies, gives occupation to about 790,000 tons, and 39,000 men. But it should be remembered, that the shipping engaged in the trade with the Mauritius also derives employment from produce raised by slave-labour.

THE CRISIS AND CLOSE OF THE ACTION AT WATERLOO.

BY AN EYE-WITNESS.

THE History of the Battle of Waterloo has been called the "hundred times told tale," and without taking into account private channels of communication, it is true that published narratives of it have abounded both in Great Britain and on the Continent. It is, however, at the same time as true, and every military man who for professional improvement has endeavoured to understand its details especially must bear witness to the fact, that, as a whole, this "hundred times told tale" is a very unsatisfactory body of information.

The greater proportion of the printed accounts of eye-witnesses have been drawn up without sufficient reference to good surveys of the ground, or sufficient precision in details, as to numbers, times, corps, formations or positions, to be of much use to the close inquirer; and many of them bear such evident marks of having been influenced so much more by warm feelings than by sober judgment, that in the difficulty of discerning between truth and imagination, the mind is frequently led into the medium of placing a superficial value on the whole.

There is unquestionably much valuable information on the subject already before the public, but not nearly enough for the compilation of one good general narrative; and it has resulted from the combination of misstatements and deficiencies, that no such good detailed general narrative has ever yet appeared, and that the histories including these events, which have since proceeded from the standard authors of the day, and which, if left unimpeached, will be received hereafter as presenting the genuine story of the battle, are frequently incorrect or obscure, even on very prominent occurrences.

Under such impressions, united, it is fully admitted, to a desire of affixing credit accurately, in a case in which it has hitherto been misplaced, the following account of the "Crisis and Close of the Action" has been drawn up. It is not presented as free from errors or omissions, but as strictly correct in some hitherto very imperfectly known leading features, and as in general a nearer approximation to truth than any, concerning those periods, that has hitherto appeared in print-so offering a more tangible object for critical correction, with a view to final accuracy.

A correct detailed history of the whole battle would be the work of much time and many contributors*. That such a complete work is practicable, even at the present somewhat distant period, cannot be doubted, if still living witnesses would come forward to describe in detail the events which came under their immediate observation, with careful attention, and reference to some good and well known survey of the groundt.

The procuring, arranging, and condensing such materials into one

*It would of course be important that such an account should be accompanied by accurate details of the whole campaign, as far as they could be procured.

The outline of the ground affixed to this narrative, is copied from the Belgian "Plan de la bataille de Waterloo," by "Craan:" the best, if not the only good survey, hitherto extensively known.

general history, might readily be accomplished by the means of a committee in London.

That such a complete work is desirable scarcely requires to be proved; for at a glance it shows itself a disgrace, that the details of one of the most decisive and important victories the world ever witnessed, fought in our own days and close to our own shores, should be imperfectly known even by the nation through which it was mainly achieved, and upon which the honour of the event itself will rest as long as time shall endure.

In all conflicts between nearly equally matched forces, there is a 'crisis' up to which all previous advantages may be forfeited, and all previous disasters may be retrieved; but after which, the success of one party, and the defeat of the other, are established beyond a change.

Modern military writers have dwelt largely upon the importance of watching, and being prepared for this critical moment; and Napoleon is reported to have said of it, that "Victory is to him who has the best reserve at hand, when it arrives."

On this principle, at Waterloo, he appears to have intended to keep the whole of his guard out of fire, during the ordinary progress of the action, to be fresh for the momentous conclusion. His purpose, however, was in part frustrated; first, by the advance of the Prussians towards Planchenois, by which he was compelled to detach, not only the 6th Corps, but also, at length, eight battalions of the Young Guard for the defence of his right flank; and again (if his own account be worthy of credit)* by a mistake in the transmission of orders, through which the Cavalry of the Guard followed in support of the attack of Kellerman's cuirassiers upon the flanks of La Haye Sainte, at about half-past four o'clock, two hours before it should have been sent into action.

Four regiments of the Old and four of the Moyenne Guard, in all sixteen battalions, however, still remained; and with theset, seconded by the strong force of infantry and cavaltry (principally of the 1st Corps,) which was in and about La Haye Sainte, and supported by the remains of the 2nd Corps from the vicinity of Hougomont, it was determined to proceed to the decisive effort at about half-past six o'clock.

At that period, therefore, the whole remaining reserve of the Guard were ordered to advance, and it left its original position near the farm of Rosomme, concentrated into columns of attack, in a hollow two or three hundred yards to its left of La Belle Alliance; and then crossing the valley, ascended the British position by the crest of a long gently rising tongue of ground, which uniting with the summit, about 500 yards to its left of La Haye Sainte, brought this body of the storm full on the front of the brigade of the 1st regiment of British Guards.

The formation of the Imperial Guard appeared to be in two columns,

"It was not the intention of the Emperor that the cavalry of the Guard should proceed to the plain; these troops were his reserve......he sent them orders to halt, but it was too late, they were already engaged, and thus at five o'clock in the evening the Emperor found himself deprived of his reserve of cavalry; that reserve which, when well employed, had so often gained him the victory."-Napoleon's Historical Miscellanies.

"The enemy's guards began to move, and with sixteen battalions, leaving La Haye Sainte a little to the right, at half-past six o'clock advanced towards the platform."-Baron Muffling, History of the Campaign of 1815.

nearly in direct echelon; the right, composed principally of the Moyenne Guard, in advance. Further to their left, the 2nd Corps prolonged the echelon to the boundary hedge of Hougomont, (of which also part of the orchard was still occupied in force by its light troops;) and further to their right, from the right flank of the Moyenne Guard almost to the Genappe road, was a crowded line of skirmishers, followed up by the infantry and cavalry, which had taken and maintained for three hours the farm of La Haye Sainte, upon the very centre of the British position. Bonaparte in person directed the advance of the Guard, until it came abreast of a hollow in the Genappe road, half way between La Belle Alliance and La Haye Sainte, in which he placed himself. Ney, who had directed the previous successful assault on La Haye Sainte, then took the immediate command of the Guard and led the attack.

To follow the statement of a well-qualified eye-witness, (Baron Muffing,) the infantry of the Guard at this point must have consisted of at least 10,000 men*, and the supporting portion of the 2nd Corps of 6000. It is not easy to ascertain the numbers of the cavalry and infantry of the 1st Corps, and of the remains of the cavalry of the Guard, which were in and about La Haye Sainte; but if it be considered that this force, at a distance from the support of its own position, and under the very points of the allied bayonets, had not only held the farm for a considerable period, but had further been continually assuming the offensive, its strength cannot be estimated at less than 6,000; making the total force brought up for this attack to have been about 22,000 men.

The portion of the allied position, of which the front was the arena of the concluding struggle, is nearly the left half of the chord which subtends the angle between the two great roads.

It was occupied, beginning from the left, first, by a brigade of Brunswickers; next, by Sir Colin Halkett's brigade of the 30th, 33d, 69th, and 73d regiments; then Major General Maitland's brigade of the 1st Guards, and lastly, projecting beyond it to the right, but engaged in the decisive contest, stood Major General Adam's brigade of the 2nd and 3d, 95th, the 52d and 71st regiments. Of these, Maitland's and Halkett's brigades, having occupied nearly the same ground from the commencement of the action, and having been hotly engaged on the 16th at Quartre Bras, were now very much reduced and exhausted; and the battalions of the 95th, not complete at first, by covering a part of the front, and by losses previously sustained in opposing the skir mishers of La Haye Sainte, had become very small as compact bodies. From the want of sufficient cover from the enemy's artillery, in the regular course of the line, the two centre brigades were posted considerably to the rear of those on the flanks; the connexion between the right of the Guards and the left of the 52nd being kept up by the reserves of the 95th.

The Duke had perceived the concentration of heavy columns to the right of La Belle Alliance, and to oppose a more solid resistance to their

evidently approaching attack, had ordered all the infantry corps, between the two great roads, to be formed from two deep into four deep lines. Vivian's, Grant's, and the remains of the household, Ponsonby's and Dornberg's brigades of cavalry were, at the same time, brought together to the right centre, and posted in the hollows in the rear of the infantry.

Soon after these precautions were completed, but too late to afford any material information, a French officer of cuirassiers rode into the right of the 52nd as a deserter, and said that Napoleon was on the point of advancing to a desperate attack, at the head of his whole army.

A heavy cannonade from both positions announced that the columns of attack were in movement. A brigade of guns, thirty paces in advance of the right of the 52nd, (perhaps the only remaining efficient ordnance on this portion of the front,) disregarding the enemy's artillery, played incessantly with unerring aim on the close, deep, approaching masses of infantry; changing as the distance diminished from round shot to canister, and finally to double charges. The columns, as they neared the summit, became impatient under this destructive cannonade, and a furious fire of musquetry opened in return from their front and left flanks; while swarms of skirmishers, rushing out from the hollows of La Haye Sainte, prolonged the attack towards the front of the Brunswickers. The artillerymen, under these close and flanking fires, could not long stand to their guns, but either lay beneath them, or retired behind the abrupt dip of the hill; two or three brave fellows now and then springing up to hastily load, fire, and drop again behind the cover.

In a few seconds, the headmost companies of the Imperial Guard, with rattling drums, and deafening shouts of "Vive l'Empereur," crowned the very summit of the position-their dead bodies, the next day, bore unanswerable evidence to the fact. The fire of the brigade of British Guards then opened upon them, but they still pressed forward, and at the next moment, contiguous columns from the hollows of La Haye Sainte following up their skirmishers, closed on the front of the Brunswickers, and beat them back in confusion*. Some artillery of Chasse's Dutch brigade, posted near to the Genappe road, then came into play. The Brunswickers were rallied and fronted by the Duke in person; but men who have once been turned form but a doubtful barrier against a still advancing enemy.

The fate of the crisis quivered on the beam. The two very weakened and exhausted centre brigades, good as they were in composition, could scarcely be expected to stand before the overwhelming and principally fresh force, which was desperately closing on their front and left flanks; and in their rear was no infantry that could be depended upon.

Meanwhile, the 52d had remained entirely concealed by the abrupt reverse dip of the hill; although so much more in advance than the Guards, that the head of the imperial column had nearly reached the

"About seven in the evening Bonaparte made a last effort, and putting himself at the head of his guards, attacked the above point (the centre) of the English position with such vigour, that he drove back the Brunswickers who occupied part of it; and, for a moment, the victory was undecided, and even more than doubtful. The Duke, who felt that the moment was most critical, spoke to the Brunswick troops with that ascendency which every great man possesses, and made them return to the charge.”—General Alava's Spanish Official.