we have overwhelmed the French advance, it has always been by an open attack, such as the 13th at Campo Major, where, indeed, Colonel Head was drawn into a snare, when his victorious squadrons were not supported. In the passage of the Esla, a whole piquet was taken; they allowed the 15th to gallop in upon them,—the piquet was too weak to fight,-it was too late to run away. The following day the French chose to mistake the 10th hussars for Portuguese, although the hussar brigade had been lying most part of the preceding day almost in sight. A great many instances of the same kind occurred before the battle of Toulouse; in all of which the British were victorious, but not by stratagem. On the retreat to Corunna, and during the preceding few days, which formed the whole campaign, although the French cavalry was immensely superior in point of numbers, Lord Paget managed the British cavalry so well, as never to allow the French horse to be the slightest annoyance to our army, and also defeated them in many encounters. At Talavera, the French made little use of a host of cavalry, while the British cavalry, by a daring charge, rendered the most signal services. On the retreat to the lines, the French cavalry, out-numbering the British in the ratio of three to one, were kept at bay and defeated in numerous affairs. At Fuentes, 5000 French cavalry, in good condition, were retained by 1200 British, after their advance had been defeated. At Albuera, the defalcation of the Spaniards gave an opening to a brigade of hussars and lancers; but during the remainder of the day, the French were not able to make any use of their large body of cavalry. At Salamanca, the British cavalry rendered good service; and after that period, the French cavalry was in less force, and consequently never able to do anything of consequence. We are quite at a loss to understand how the maligners of the British cavalry make out their case, and improve their own intelligence. It is not difficult to find fault with anything or any body; as nothing and nobody is perfect. Now, we are far from pretending that the British cavalry is the one exception to human fallibility; but we do assert, that during that period of the Peninsular campaign in which the French cavalry always out-numbered the British in the ratio of two, three, four, or even five to one, nothing of consequence was achieved by the French; and when the numbers became equal, and finally, when we were superior in number, the French cavalry became helpless, unless well supported by infantry. That the cavalry was not enough employed, we willingly allow; but that must be attributed to a cause not affecting their merit, and one on which we do not choose to enter. We state these matters broadly; we are unable to enter the lists of logical discussion; the subject does not require it; and if we were challenged, we should answer in the words of an excellent lady, whose son's tutor sometimes corrected slight errors in her conversation :-" Now don't contradict me, Mr. Brown, for that puts an end to all argument." In conclusion, we beg to offer a few remarks on the use of cavalry. They are, probably, common-place, and not very interesting; but such as they are, we mean to wind up our sketch with them. We consider that it would increase the efficiency of the British cavalry if all the heavy dragoons carried cuirasses. There are at present but ten regiments of heavy cavalry, independent of the household brigade; and we think, that probably as great a force of heavy horse would be required in the event of a continental war. We are aware that many objections are made to the cuirass, and we acknowledge that some of them are well founded. The only material disadvantage, in our opinion, is the hardship to which the men are exposed in carrying the cuirass. We do not allude to the weight, for when the cuirass is well fitted to the shape, its weight is not oppressive; the difficulty the cuirassier has to contend with is, that cold and heat are each made more unbearable by the plates of cold iron attached to the body. This is the great objection, and the means we would employ to obviate this difficulty is, to make the cuirass of solid leather, instead of iron. It would be equally sword-proof, and little less effectual in turning a bullet; but whether it had that power or not, such an armour would give great confidence to the men, and that is the point to be attained. We feel convinced that the household brigade, as it is equipped, would set at defiance twice its number of any cavalry in Europe; and the dragoons of the line would be very little inferior to that fine body of men, if equally clad in armour. We have frequently been told, Englishmen do not require armour, but will fight as well without it. We do not mean to dispute the courage of our countrymen, though we do not admire the vain assertions we often hear of the heroism of Britons, coupled with the implication, that all others are cowards; but we feel confident that a man of very ordinary courage curiassé will be a match for the bravest man in Europe equipped as a dragoon, i. e. without his shell. We do not know of any other alteration of moment, except giving all the cavalry good and efficient arms. The second observation we would make is, that on service the same corps of cavalry and infantry should act together as much as possible. They would acquire mutual confidence; and there is an indescribable something beyond this. It is usually considered, that good whist players play best with those whom they have been accustomed to play with as partners. So the horse and foot soldier should know each other's game. The third observation is, that the officers of cavalry, instead of being restricted, should be encouraged as much as possible to acts of chivalry that by carrying off piquets, cutting lines of supply. or communication, surprising posts, charging on the skirmishers which are covering the enemy's advance, the officer may acquire more address, and secure the confidence and admiration of the men. The objection we have always heard made to this principle is, that the loss of man and horse, especially the latter, would be too great; the effect would not be sufficient remuneration-in fact, that le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle,-but we think that the moral advantage would be sufficient recompense, and the mischief done to the enemy so much gain. The expense of cavalry on service is, the providing them with forage,-compared to which, the value of the horse is nothing. During the campaign of 1811, the Royal Dragoons had about 250 mules merely to carry corn from St. Joao de Pesquiera to their quarters. Government paid a dollar for each mule and a dollar for each capatras, who conducted four or five mules; the amount for mule transport was 250 mules 250 dollars 300 dollars which, at the rate of 6s. per dollar, amounted to 90l. per diem; at this time the regiment did not bring above 450 swords into the field, so that each of those cost government about 807. per annum, merely for carrying corn forage from the Douro. The corn had previously been purchased at a great price, shipped, landed at Oporto, re-shipped into river-craft, and towed 140 or 150 miles against stream. We may have stated this matter somewhat incorrectly, as it has been done from memory; but we have no fear of contradiction in asserting, that the expense of sending horses from England was trifling in comparison to the charge of supporting them in the field. It would be very advantageous to have single squadrons of cavalry placed under the command of the general of division of infantry, in battles; a single squadron, judiciously placed, may have the most beneficial effects. In case of discomfiture, a charge of cavalry may check the advance of the enemy, and allow time for the retiring party to form; on the other hand, when a corps of adverse infantry has been driven back, they may be advantageously attacked, and at least, by being threatened, the enemy will be obliged to form, and consequently their retreat will be retarded. When the line of posts and object to be attained has been pointed out to the officers of cavalry, they should be allowed to choose their ground, and should be responsible for the posting their piquets; in the same way, patrolling should be entrusted to the cavalry officers: such is the case at present, when the duty is laborious and little credit to be gained; but when matters are otherwise, then some staff-officer appears to take it into his own hands. We found this remark on the opinion of one of the most distinguished officers of our staff, now no more. The writer had the honour to be known to him, and having been applied to, by another officer of the staff, for a party to accompany him on a reconnoissance, the writer consulted the gallant officer above-mentioned; he received for answer, "Give him no men; make the patrole yourself; you will do it just as well, and it is your business." There is one evil which we shall take notice of, and which we should rejoice to see removed. We allude to the expense of living in a British cavalry regiment. This arises from the richness of appointments, the expense of the mess, and the frequency of quartering on inns instead of barracks. The writer joined a regiment on the 24th of September (during the war). He embarked for foreign service the beginning of January, having lived at an inn during the whole of the intervening period, with the exception of about three weeks. The mischief of this expensive living is very apparent: three-fourths of the young men in the army are not able to enter the cavalry. In the British service, officers are employed in cavalry or infantry, as suits their taste and means of procuring the transfer. This is at it should be; for the principles of the service are intrinsically the same, and a good officer in one service will be equally so in the other. This is not the case on the Continent; and if the expense of our cavalry service was lessened, so as to make it attainable by a larger portion of our officers, it would be of great advantage, and would tend to place the British cavalry on that permanent station which it ought to hold, and which it will occupy when the elements of which it is composed are turned to proper account. A FEW REMARKS ON THE SIEGE OF ANTWERP. BY A POST-CAPTAIN. [A singular coincidence in the records of Land Sieges enables us, by the addition of the following characteristic contribution from an "excellent" hand, to realize in our Memorabilia of Antwerp the due combination of the United Service.] To the Editor of the United Service Journal. IN your highly interesting and elaborate account of this memorable siege, which has been compiled with so much zeal and talent, you request your readers to favour you with any additional remark or information they may be pleased to add. I therefore beg to offer you a few casual observations, which I am the more inclined to do, being of the United Service, a naval man, and, I believe, the only one of the same rank at Antwerp at the capitulation of the Citadel. It cannot be expected that a sailor could detail the modus operandi of a siege; and as you have followed the operations so closely and scientifically, any further attempt would be superfluous. I fully agree with you, that it is extraordinary how few military men, and I may add naval, availed themselves of this opportunity of witnessing what must have been alike gratifying, if not instructive, to all arms of the service. It might have proved beneficial if at least two of the cadets from Sandhurst had been sent over under one of the senior students, who are commissioned officers. It would have been considered an event in the annals of the college; and on their return they could have elucidated, in the most pleasing and instructive form, the scientific details of a siege which doubtless will be studied in this admirable establishment. I reached Antwerp at a highly interesting epoch,-five days previous to the capitulation of the Citadel. On leaving Brussels, and approaching the scene of action, I was struck, as I think other amateurs must have been, with the total absence of all bustle on the road; and I could almost say there appeared a provoking want of some soul-stirring indication of the approximation of the Grande Armée. On descending from the diligence at night, at Malines, I perceived the heavens illumined by the flashing of artillery and the bursting of shells, and I heard the distant roar, which the rumbling noise of the diligence on the eternal pavé had previously prevented. I may en route remark, the roads are generally better here than in France, and the country much more highly cultivated. As the gates of the city were closed, I was obliged to sleep at Malines, and in the morning I passed about sixty fourgons with provisions for the army, each having a spare wheel*, and drawn by four small horses of the Brittany breed, in excellent condition, generally greys, remarkably handsome, and well adapted for the service; this conveyed a sensible impression of the All the wheels were of the same diameter, as were also those of the artillery. The carriages of the French artillery are of the latest English pattern. gigantic extent and highly effective state of the French matériel. I met with no other indication of what was going on until I reached the Grand Quartier Général at Berchem; here, on the right, was a park of artillery and a regiment en bivouac under straw huts, and the whole place in motion. The direct road to the city was pronounced exceedingly dangerous, as shot from the Citadel were frequently crossing it. A Belgian who was in the coupée, a civilian, and who, as sailors would say, probably had not made his will, got out of the diligence and made a détour to the right. Although it was very cold, I let down the glass, truth to tell, not only to have a better view, but in case of accidents while passing two windmills, a well known spot where several had occurred. A laden chariot in our company was struck by a shot, and at the same moment a French soldier passed with his left arm held up by a comrade, the hand having just been carried off. I was inside the city in a few minutes after this, and having procured a carte de sûreté in exchange for my passport, from the mayor, and in thanking him observed, I now consider myself bomb-proof, I proceeded outside the gates, and entered the trenches through the kindness of a French Captain O'Farrell, and a Belgian Captain Bormann, aides-decamp to General Neigre, of the French artillery. I am indebted to your Journal, and French officers on the spot, for an account of the occurrences previous to this time. I As General Chassé appears to have been naturally anxious for the good opinion of the Duke of Wellington and the British army, perhaps may be excused in noticing a general, I won't say common report, current among French officers present at the siege, which I am induced to do, as in page 298 of your Journal, General Chassé is in some measure censured for not patrolling his front, or, as sailors term it, not keeping a good look-out a-head. The report went to say that a serjeant of the Dutch piquet in advance heard the French breaking ground during the night of the 29th November, and went more than once to his officer to state what he had heard, who, instead of ascertaining the truth, as it was his duty to do, treated the serjeant's statement as a delusion, natural to occur to one in his advanced position. So far for the report in question, which, if true, probably the officer was lulled into a neglect of duty, from a conviction that nothing at the time justified an overt act of hostilities, which breaking ground is generally admitted to be; consequently General Chassé must be allowed to have so far gained experience from the siege in 92, when the first night's operations were undiscovered, as to have ordered a vigilant look-out by an advance piquet. For the sake of humanity it is as well that the Dutch engineers did not discover that the trenches were opened until nine o'clock the next morning: there might otherwise have been a few more French shacos to spare, but the Citadel would have been taken tout de même. The well-known fact, though not mentioned in your Journal, that a Belgian officer laid, and Belgians solely worked, the mortier monstre, cannot be considered but as a breach of neutrality; and as a more gallant kind of breach-that in the bastion Toledo-was so near accomplishment, it is to be regretted that it was ever permitted *. A crowd * It may be mentioned, as a proof of General Chassé's assertion, that Fort |