in this particular, we have no idea that the American Presbyterian Church, with her conception of a spiritual religion, will ever be induced to swerve.

"On the other hand, there is floating in the mind of the Church the impression that our baptized youth are, in such a sense, amenable to the discipline of the Church, that her authority may and should, in some way, be brought to bear upon their lives. How far this discipline should be carried, and in what form it should be administered, are precisely the points which the Church has never settled to her own satisfaction, and it is probably this want of precision and definiteness which has led to almost the universal neglect of all discipline. There is, however, lying in many minds, a painful apprehension that in this neglect the Church is criminal, and multitudes are anxously seeking their way through the difficulties which environ this whole subject. We are persuaded that the shyness of the Church in taking up the Revised Book of Discipline is, to some extent, explained by the embarrassment we have just indicated. On the one hand, not prepared to adopt the rigid discipline based by some upon a strict construction of the phraseology of the present book; on the other hand, not prepared to relax her hold entirely upon her baptized members, the Church considerately pauses to see if there be no via media between these extremes. Now, the proposition of the committee, which we understand to be a medium between these conflicting views, seems to us very nearly to meet the difficulty, and we venture modestly to suggest that if the committee, in its further deliberations, will render their middle ground a little more definite and clear, it will go far to harmonize the Church, and prepare the way for a final deliverance upon this subject. We understand their position to be, that while baptized persons are members of the Church, and are under its care and government, they are not proper subjects of judicial process; that is to say, discipline may be taken in a wide or in a narrow sense, so that they shall be under it in the one sense and not in the other. Now, if the committee shall be able to define in what form discipline shall be administered without judicial process-how the Church in the exercise of authority may take cognizance of flagrant immoralities in her baptized members, so as to distinguish between them and communicating members, they will succeed in untying the Gordian knot, and the Church will probably come without hesitation to her decision. The difficulty is a real one, to which side soever we choose to turn. The conscience of the Church is sorely tried on the one hand by the discordance between her present neglect of all discipline and the rigid requirements of the existing book; on the other hand, the nature and degree of the government and discipline recognized by the Revised Book, are so undefined as to afford no working rule by which the discretion of the Church can be guided. We greatly fear that the committee may yield to a reaction of feeling, and may expunge all this portion of the revised code. This we would de

plore, and respectfully submit, that to remand the Church to the provisions of the old book will not, in the least degree, help the matter, since the difficulty in the recognition and practice of these is fully as great as with the suggestions they have ventured in their revision."

There were several articles produced in the period, some of which will receive incidental notice in the pages to follow. It was inevitable that he should be called upon for occasional sermons and addresses. One of the ablest and most elegant of these was delivered before the Fayette Female Academy, July 28, 1859, upon "Female Excellence." He pleads for woman's cultivation in the features of elegance, of grace, of a richly stored and highly trained mind, of well regulated affections, of sincere piety, and of power to appreciate labor, and to consecrate herself to it. The address was published in pamphlet form by the Trustees of the institution.

By far the most noted occasional sermon of the period was his last "Thanksgiving Sermon," preached in 1860; but of that sermon, its reception, and influence, we shall read in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XI.

ANTE-BELLUM PERIOD IN NEW ORLEANS.-Continued.

December, 1856-May, 1861.)

THE STATE OF THE COUNTRY IN NOVEMBER, 1860.—Dr. PalMER'S VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT OF SECESSION. THE ACTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1860.-PALMER, A SON OF SOUTH CAROLINA, UNDER THE STRESS OF THE TIMES PREACHES SOUTH CAROLINA POLITICS HIS FAMOUS THANKSGIVING SERMON. THE RECEPTION ACCORDED THE SERMON BY HIS AUDIENCE, AND BY THE WIDER PUBLIC.-HIS DOMESTIC HISTORY. DURING THIS PERIOD.-HIS LABORS AS A COMFORTER.-HONORS ACCORDED HIM.

HE autumn of 1860 was a critical time in the history of

THE autumn of 1800 was country had just passed through

its most heated political canvass. A party had ridden into power which, in the belief of Southern men, and of many Northern men as well, threatened the liberties of the people, the stability and even the life, of republican institutions. For decades men had believed in the right of States to secede from the Federal Union upon provocation which they deemed to be adequate. The men of the South, generally, still maintained the right. Dr. Palmer was of this belief.

Being a South Carolinian, the belief came to him as an inheritance; but it had become his, also as a student of American history. The political faith which he entertained at this time, he expounded, early in the year 1861, in rejoinder to the somewhat confused teachings of the Rev. Dr. Robt. J. Breckenridge, on secession. After certain preliminaries he said:

"The dispute is whether this sovereignty (jus summi imperii) resides in the people as they are, merged into the mass, one undivided whole; or in the people as they were originally formed into colonies, and afterwards into States, combining together for the purposes distinctly set forth in their instruments of Union. Dr. Breckenridge maintains the former thesis; we defend the latter; and in the whole controversy upon the legal right of secession this is the cardo causae. "What, then, is the testimony of history? We find the first Continental Congress, at New York, in 1765, called at the suggestion of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, and composed of deputies from all the Colonial Assemblies represented therein. We find, in 1773, at the instance of the Virginia House of Burgesses, the

different Colonial Assemblies appointing Standing Committees of Corspondence, through whom a confidential communication was kept up between the Colonies. We find the votes in the Continental Congress of 1774, at Philadelphia, cast by Colonies, each being restricted to one only. We find in the celebrated Declaration of Independence, in 1776, 'the Representatives of the United States, in General Congress, assembled,' publishing and declaring 'in the name and by the authority of the people of these Colonies.' We find the Articles of Confederation, matured in 1777, remanded to the local legislatures, and ratified by the several States-by Maryland, not until 1781. The circular in which this form of confederation was submitted, requests the States 'to authorize their delegates in Congress to subscribe the same in behalf of the State,' and solicits the dispassionate attention of the Legislatures of the respective States, under a sense of the difficulty of combining in one general system the various sentiments and interests of a continent divided into so many sovereign and independent communities.1 We recite these familiar facts to show that during the first period of our history, embracing the revolutionary struggle, the people were accustomed to act, not as an organic whole, but as constituting separate States, and combining for common and specified ends. Indeed, it could not be otherwise. Upon throwing off their allegiance to the British crown, and the sovereignty reverting to themselves, they were not destitute of a political organization through which to act. They had existed as organized, though not independent, communities before. What more natural, in their transition to new political relations, than to stand forth the communities they actually were? As separate Colonies they had been dependencies of the British crown: when that dependence was thrown aside, in whom could the original sovereignty reside, but in the people, who were now no longer Colonies, but States-in which form of existence the people are first represented to our view? The fact that they combined against a common foe, and to secure their independence together, does not impeach their inherent sovereignty. It remains perfectly discretionary with them-that is, with the people, as States-to determine how much of this sovereignty they will retain, and how much they will surrender, in the arrangements afterwards made. In the language of Chief Justice Jay, quoted by Mr. Story, 'thirteen sovereignties were considered as emerging from the principles of the Revolution combined by local convenience and considerations-though they continued to manage their national concerns as 'one people.' We accordingly reverse Dr. Breckenridge's proposition; we are not 'one Nation divided into many States,' but we are many States uniting to form one nation.

"But let us see how the matter stands from the period of the old Confederation to the adoption of the present Constitution, in 1787.

'Story's History of the Confederation.

When the former was found to be breaking down from its own imbecility, and the necessity of a more perfect union was becoming apparent, it is curious to see how the pathway was opened through the almost accidental action of State Legislatures. In 1785, commissioners were appointed by the States of Virginia and Maryland to form a scheme for promoting the navigation of the River Potomac and the Chesapeake Bay. As they felt the need of more enlarged powers to provide a local naval force, and the tariff of duties upon imports, this grew into an invitation from Virginia to the other States to hold a convention for the purpose of establishing a general system of commercial relations-and this, at length, at the instance of New York, was enlarged, so as to provide for the revision and reform of the articles of the old Federal Compact. Thus grew up, by successive steps, the Convention which met at Philadelphia in 1787, by which the present Constitution was drafted, submitted to Congress as the common organ of the States, and by it referred for ratification to these States respectively. Here we have the same great principle of the sovereignty of the people, as they are States, clearly recognized. The tentative efforts toward improving the interior commercial relations of the country, are initiated by two State Legislatures; by a third, a Convention of Delegates from all the States is suggested; and the new Constitution is finally debated and ratified by separate Conventions of the people in each-North Carolina withholding her assent till 1789, and Rhode Island till 1790. This historical review seems, to us, conclusive of the point in hand. The people-not as one, but as thirteen-revolt from the English yoke; because only as thirteen, and not as one, did they ever owe allegiance. The people-not as one, but as thirteen-unite to carry on a defensive and successful war; granting to the Continental Congress just the powers they saw fitneither more nor less-as their common agent. The people-not as one, but as thirteen-prepare and adopt Articles of Confederation, under which they manage their common concerns for seven years. And finally-not as one, but again as thirteen-they frame and adopt a permanent Constitution; under which they have lived for seventy years, and have grown from thirteen to thirty-four. But suppose

the two dilatory States, which withheld their assent to the Constitution for two and three years, had withheld it altogether. What then? Why, says Dr. Breckenridge, 'they would have passed by common consent into a new condition, and have become, for the first time, separate sovereignty to any State, ‘except as they are united States.' How, then, but not separate in the sense of being distinct. But he has denied sovereignty to any State, ‘except as they are United States.' How, then, shall these two States, who, by supposition, refused to be united, become sovereign? 'By common consent,' says Dr. Breckenridge, 'they will pass into that condition.' But on what is this common consent to be based? Why not coerce them into the Union, if the people is one