The committee, after consideration, recommend to the Senate the adoption of the following resolution: Resolved, That in pursuance of the message of the President of the 16th instant, the Senate advises a reference of the existing dispute between the Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain concerning the boundary line which separates Vancouver's Island and the American continent to the arbitration of a friendly power, with authority to determine the line according to the provisions of the treaty of the 15th of June, 1846, but without authority to establish any line but that provided for in the treaty. That of the three powers named by Great Britain the Senate advises that the Republic of Switzerland be chosen by the United States as arbiter. (Ex. Jour., vol. 11, p. 314.) THIRTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION. February 19, 1862. On the message of the President transmitting draft of a convention with Mexico Mr. Sumner reported as follows: The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred a message from the President of the United States, of December 17, 1861, transmitting a draft for a convention with the Republic of Mexico, with accompanying papers, and a message from the President of the United States, of January 24, 1862, transmitting a dispatch from Mr. Corwin, have had the same under consideration, and report: On the 2d of September, 1861, Mr. Seward addressed to Mr. Corwin, at Mexico, a dispatch, in which he says that the President greatly desires that the political status of Mexico as an independent nation should be permanently maintained; that the events communicated by Mr. Corwin alarmed him, and that he conceived that the people of the United States would scarcely justify him were he to make no effort for preventing so great a calamity on this continent as would be the extinction of that Republic; that he had, therefore, determined to empower Mr. Corwin to negotiate a treaty with Mexico for the assumption by the United States of the interest, at 3 per cent, upon the funded debt of that country, the principal of which was understood to be about $62,000,000, for the term of five years from the date of the decree recently issued by Mexico suspending such payment, provided that Mexico could pledge to the United States its faith for the reimbursement of this money, with 6 per cent interest, to be secured by a special lien upon all the public lands and mineral rights in the several Mexican States of Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinaloa, the property so pledged to become absolute in the United States at the expiration of the term of six years from the time when the treaty went into effect if such reimbursement be not made before that time. The President felt that this course was rendered necessary by circumstances as new as they were eventful, and which seemed to admit of no delay. Mr. Seward proceeds to say in his instructions that they are conditional upon the consent of the British and French Governments to forbear from action against Mexico on account of her failure or refusal to pay the interest in question until after the treaty shall have been submitted to the Senate, and, if ratified, then so long thereafter as the interest should be paid by the United States. Mr. Seward adds that his instructions are not to be considered as specific, but general, subject to modifications as to sums, terms, securities, and other points. Mr. Corwin, in an earlier dispatch, dated at Mexico, 29th July, 1861, and addressed to Mr. Seward, had already suggested the policy which he was now authorized to pursue, and proposed to obtain a lien on the public lands and mineral rights in the provinces mentioned by Mr. Seward. By such an arrangement, in his opinion, two consequences would follow: First, all hope of extending the domain of a separate southern republic in this quarter or in Central America would be extinguished; and, secondly, any further attempt to establish European power on this continent would cease to occupy either England or continental Europe. Afterwards, in a dispatch dated at Mexico, November 29, 1861, Mr. Corwin inclosed to Mr. Seward the project of a treaty between the United States and Mexico by which the United States was to lend to Mexico $5,000,000, payable in monthly installments of one-half million a month; also the further sum of $4,000,000, payable in sums of onehalf million every six months; the whole loan to be secured by a mortgage on the public lands, mineral rights, and church property of Mexico, for the realization of which a board of five commissioners was to be organized, three to be appointed by Mexico and two by the United States, holding sessions in the city of Mexico until the debt and interest are fully discharged. No reference was made in the proposed treaty to the consent of the British and French Governments mentioned by Mr. Seward as a condition, nor to the application of the money when received by Mexico, nor does anything on this subject appear in the accompanying dispatch. The President, by his message of December 17, 1861, submitted the draft of this treaty to the Senate for their advice. Afterwards, by another message, of January 24, 1862, he called their attention to it again in the following language: I have heretofore submitted to the Senate a request for its advice upon the question pending by treaty for making a loan to Mexico, which Mr. Corwin thinks will, in any case, be expedient. It seems to me to be my duty now to solicit an early action of the Senate upon the subject, to the end that I may cause such instructions to be given to Mr. Corwin as will enable him to act in the manner which, while it will most carefully guard the interests of our country, will at the same time be most beneficial to Mexico. Meanwhile, Great Britain, France, and Spain, by a convention dated at London, October 31, 1861, have entered into an alliance the declared object of which is "to demand from the authorities of the Republic of Mexico more efficacious protection for the persons and properties of their subjects, as well as a fulfillment of the obligations contracted by the Republic of Mexico." The high contracting parties engaged not to seek for themselves in the employment of coercive measures any acquisition of territory nor any special advantage, and not to exercise in the internal affairs of Mexico any influence of a nature to prejudice the right of the Mexican nation to choose and to constitute freely the form of its government. They further declare that, desiring that the measures they intend to adopt should not bear an exclusive character, and being aware that the Government of the United States, on its part, has, like them, claims to enforce upon the Mexican Republic, they agree that this Government shall be invited to accede to this convention. Mr. Seward, in a dispatch dated at Washington, December 4, 1861, declined to become a party to this convention, saying "that the United States prefer, as much as lies in their power, to maintain the traditional policy recommended by the Father of their Country, confirmed by successful experience, and which forbids them to make an alliance with foreign powers." In pursuance of this convention, the naval and military forces of the three great powers have assembled at San Juan d'Ulloa, and the flags of the three powers now float over the castle. The Government of Mexico has rallied the people to resist these powers, and there is at this moment the prospect of a prolonged and exhausting contest. The occasion seems now to have arrived when the aid proposed by Mr. Seward in his dispatch of September 2, 1861, may be of decisive importance to Mexico. To the United States it would also be of great importance if it could be the means of removing from Mexico the pressure of these hostile armaments and in placing a neighbor republic in a more tranquil and independent condition. If the allied powers simply desire security for their claims, and nothing else, then a reasonable provision of this nature ought to be satisfactory, so far as any question arises from the claim. The debt of Mexico to the allied powers may be stated, in round numbers, as follows: Of course any payment or guaranty of this large mass on our part is out of the question, nor was it contemplated by the United States in the original instructions to Mr. Corwin. It was proposed to make such payment as would afford present relief to Mexico and would secure the forbearance of the allied powers. To this end Mr. Seward offered to assume the interest of the Mexican debt for the term of five years. But the claims in the foregoing list, which are not funded and are entitled "immediate," it is understood, are pressed with equal energy by the allied powers. If these were satisfied, and provision were made for the interest, the United States would have the following liabilities: Payments, immediate, or, say, at three, six, and twelve months, as follows: To England, say six and twelve months' drafts of Mexico on United States.. To France. say six and twelve months drafts of Mexico on United States. Total cash or three, six, and twelve months. $1,000,000 700,000 500,000 2,200,000 Interest, say semiannual drafts of Mexico on the United States: Certain other outstanding claims of the allied powers are not included in either of these lists. It has been proposed that these should be provided for by a sinking fund, at the rate of 10 per cent for ten years, as follows: Sinking fund for claims, 10 per cent per annum for ten years: To England (claims), per annum To France (Pennaud agreement), per annum To Spain (claims), per annum $400,000 80,000 350,000 150,000 980,000 The assumption of all these liabilities for a long period would throw upon the United States a burden too great for the present moment, although, perhaps, not out of proportion to the anticipated advantages. If anything be done on our part, it must be more moderate. The offer of Mr. Seward for five years, if accepted, would throw upon the United States a responsibility sufficiently large; and this responsibility ought to be kept within a limitation of which $15,000,000 should be a maximum. But there are two conditions which must be required by the United States before the assumption of any such responsibility. The first is the assent of the allied powers, and the acceptance on their part of the friendly offers of the United States. Unless these allied powers are parties to the transaction it would be productive only of embarrassment and loss, without accomplishing any permanent good to the United States or to Mexico. The other essential condition is that security should be given by Mexico to the United States for the liabilities assumed. It is not too much to expect such security, nor is Mexico, as is well known, disinclined to give it. Her creditors are now foreclosing their demands upon her at the cost, perhaps, of her national existence, and she turns to the United States for help. Not merely friendship, but a continental policy, affecting, perhaps, our own cherished interest, prompts us to afford such help, so far as in our power. In asking for security we shall simply follow the rules of prudence, whether between nations or individuals. The security proposed by Mr. Corwin on the public lands, minerals, and church property of Mexico would render necessary the appointment of a board of mixed commission for the management and disposition of this property. This necessity seems to add to the complications of such a security. The security proposed by Mr. Seward on the public lands and mineral rights in the several provinces of Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinaloa is simple, and it is understood that in some of this territory there is a vast mineral wealth. The province of Lower California is unquestionably the territory of Mexico most interesting to the United States in a military and naval point of view. Another security, perhaps less manageable, but more interesting still, would be the right of way across the isthmus of Tehuantepec, with a mortgage on the adjoining public lands of the isthmus. Estimated by its pecuniary value, this security would not be large; but there can be no doubt of its political and commercial importance. Still another security would be a pledge by Mexico of 25 per cent, or, perhaps, a larger percentage of the customs or other revenues. But it is not easy to say positively at this distance from the scene of operations, and with the information before the committee, what is the most practicable form of security. Perhaps it is advisable to leave this matter to the careful discretion of our minister at Mexico, under instructions from the President, with the explicit understanding that the United States declines any territorial acquisition, and seeks the consolidation of Mexico without dismemberment of any kind. Such are the main features of the question on which the President has asked the advice of the Senate. With more precise information on matters of detail it might be proper for the Senate to enter upon details in its answer. But such information, especially with regard to the actual relations, now daily changing, between Mexico and the allied powers, can be obtained only on the spot. It is evident, therefore, that the Senate can do little more than indicate an opinion on what has already been done, and declare the proper principles on which a negotiation with Mexico should be conducted, without presuming to fix in advance all its terms. Much must be left to the discretion of our minister there, and to the instructions which he will receive from the President. The committee recommend the passage of the following resolution: Resolved, That in the changing condition of the relations between Mexico and the allied powers, and in the absence of precise information, it is impossible for the Senate to advise the President with regard to all the terms of a treaty with Mexico so as to supersede the exercise of a considerable discretion on the part of our minister there, under instructions from the President, but that, in answer to the two several messages of the President, the Senate expresses the following conclusions: First. The Senate approves the terms of the instructions to our minister at Mexico as contained in the dispatch bearing date September second, eighteen hundred and sixty-one. Secondly. The Senate does not advise a treaty in conformity with the project communicated by our minister to Mexico in his dispatch of November twentyninth, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, as the same fails to secure in any way the application of the money in quest on to the demands of the allied powers, or either of them, and therefore can be in no respect satisfactory to them. Thirdly. The Senate advises a treaty with Mexico providing for the assumption of the interest on the debt from Mexico to the allied powers for a limited period of time, and also for the payment of certain immediate claims by these powers, the whole liability assumed to be kept within the smallest possible sum, it being understood that the same shall be accepted by the allied powers in present satisfaction of their claims, so that they shall withdraw from Mexico, and that the same shall be secured by such mortgage or pledge as shall be most practicable, without any territorial acquisition or dismemberment of Mexico. (Ex. Jour., vol. 12, pp. 122, 126.) February 19, 1862. On the treaty of extradition with Mexico, Mr. Sumner reported as follows: Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty between the United States of America and the United Mexican States for the extradition of criminals, concluded at Mexico the eleventh of Decem |