Mr. Seward to Mr. Raasloff. [Confidential.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SIR: I have the honor to propose to you that the United States will negotiate with the King of Denmark for the purchase of the Danish islands in the West Indies, namely, St. Thomas and the adjacent islets, Santa Cruz and St. John. The United States would be willing to pay for the same five millions of dollars in gold, payable in this country. Negotiation to be by treaty, which, you will of course understand, will require the constitutional ratification of the Senate. Insomuch as you propose to visit Copenhagen, the United States minister at that place will be instructed to converse with you or with your Government on the subject; but should your Government conclude to negotiate, the proceeding will be expected to be conducted here and not elsewhere. Accept, sir, the renewed assurance of my high consideration. His Excellency, GENERAL RAASLOFF, etc. WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Mr. Seward to Mr. Yeaman. No. 18.] DEPARTMENT of State, SIR: The accompanying transcript of a confidential communication of this date addressed by me to General Raasloff, his Danish Majesty's minister plenipotentiary accredited to this Government, I send to you, thinking it possible that the Danish Government may wish to confer with you upon the subject to which it relates. Except in this contingency, however, you are instructed not to allude to the matter, which, under all circumstances, is to be kept strictly confidential. I am, sir, your obedient servant, GEORGE H. YEAMAN, Esq., etc., Copenhagen. WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward. No. 52.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: Owing to an unusual delay in the mails, caused, it is alleged, by stormy weather on the Belts, it was not until late in the evening of Saturday, the 19th, that I received from Mr. Moran, secretary of legation at London, a note of the 14th, containing a translation of your dispatch in cipher of the 12th. This was the more annoying, as I received on the 18th letters mailed at London on the 15th. The translation inclosed to me by Mr. Moran reads: "Tell Raasloff haste important." I immediately called at General Raasloff's house, but owing to his being out Saturday evening and indisposed the next morning from cold, it was not until 12 o'clock yesterday, the 20th, that I had an interview with him, when I delivered him your message verbatim. He observed he had been extremely engaged about his official duties of late and would be for some time to come, but would give this matter his attention. In reply to my inquiries he observed he thought the matter was making progress, but that Count Frijs, being cautious and a little slow in such things, felt some hesitation about taking the final step. I asked if there were any impediments other than the objections or hesitation felt in the Danish cabinet. He assured me none. He then remarked there was a difficulty at Washington he had thought of, which was: Congress would adjourn before the matter could be brought to a close, and asked about the proposed law convening the next Congress on the 4th of March. I told him I had no advice that it had passed, but even if it did not, yet if this business were sufficiently progressed the President could request the Senate to remain a short time, as had been often done. He replied, But there would be no House to appropriate the money." I answered I thought there could not possibly be any difficulty about that, as Congress would assuredly not refuse the necessary appropriation to execute the treaty. He still seemed to be under the DENMARK, CESSION OF ISLANDS. impression it would be better if there could be means of closing all matters connected with it immediately after the two Governments had agreed. Of course, all these views were expressed as being pertinent in the event the Danish Government agreed to treat a matter about which he does not assume to speak positively. I have not the least means of judging whether the Danish Governinent is shaping its course with the view of getting a better offer from you, or whether you have There are occasions when one already offered all that you think you properly can. matter can be made to help another, and other times when each can be best attended to by keeping them separated. And it is probable this Government would especially wish to avoid the appearance of being influenced in the matter by the pendency of a claim preferred by the United States. But if your proposition is not at an early day accepted as made, and you should still deem time important, and that upon the whole it might be better to vary the offer a little than to fail in the object, I submit that you consider whether the matter would be improved by offering to give a stated sum, whatever your judgment may approve. and a full release and discharge from the Butterfield claim, the United States assuming to settle that claim either on a given basis or by an agreement with the claimants, the consideration as to Denmark being the discharge. If at any time this course should appear to you to have any advantage, it would afford a good opportunity for respectfully conveying to His Majesty's Government the conviction of the President that it is "impossible" for the Government of the United States to abandon the claim, accompanied by the friendly assurance that it desires to avail itself of every possible means of an arrangement of the claim. It may be that the Government of the United States would thus not pay more in the end than it could afford. rather than fail entirely, in a separate transaction. And it may also be that the Danish Government, seeing the claim will not be abandoned, and must be met, will find it quite possible to pursue a modified course, and would be glad of being furnished a specious or plausible foundation for assuming that it had got rid of the claim by dint of negotiation, without real loss of money, and in the end got its fair and reasonable price for the cession. If this did not succeed, it would probably do no harm, being done after having waited a reasonable time for an answer to your definite offer, now pending, and its rejection would seem to give them good ground for as peremptory a demand as a powerful government would wish to make of a weak one. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, GEO. H. YEAMAN. Secretary of State, Washington. No. 56.] Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: Yesterday I received a note of the 9th instant from Mr. Adams, of London, giving a telegraphic dispatch received by him from you the day before, in the following words: "Please send the following in writing to Mr. Yeaman, at Copenhagen. Confidential dispatch received. Want yea or nay, now. We can read Danish politicians here, as well as Danish politicians can read American in Copenhagen.' I immediately sought an interview with General Raasloff, and opened the conversation by a reference to the subject-matter, and asked him what progress was made. He replied, "None material" since we had talked of it on the reception of your former telegraphic dispatch. Referring to Count Frijs, the minister of foreign affairs, he observed, "He intends to do it, but does not feel quite ready yet," and proceeded to observe that for either there was a desire to await the further development of some "events in Europe." I asked, "What?" but neither received or expected a definite answer, the remark was made for a purpose and as a part of a plan, or it was a reference to contingencies which he ought not in his view to specify. I then intimated to him that my Government. would like a more prompt answer than he appeared to indicate would be had. To this he replied: "Something more definite and positive I answered that I is wanted from the other side-from your Government." He said that he thought the proposal contained in your confidential note to him was quite explicit, and that I could not see very well how it could be made more so. regarded that, and it was so regarded as pro forma only; that the terms mentioned were out of the question, which you very well understood, and that if it was indicated, even approximately, what sum might be expected, a conclusion could be had much sooner. I expressed surprise at these views taken of so plain a note after so long a time. He then added that the note was only intended to open negotiations and not to fix the price; that there were objections and difficulties to be overcome here; it was an unpleasant thing, and the price received would have a good deal to do in overcoming objections and diminishing the unpleasantness of the transaction; that some of the cabinet were willing for the matter to be consummated and others were not, but even with those who were willing the smallness of the price offered was an objection to opening negotiations, as they feared it would be construed as an implied willingness to accept something like the sum offered. I then told him that I had not taken such views of the proposition, and that I must now express to him the substance of a dispatch just received from you, "that the Government wants yea or nay, now." He asked if he could see the dispatch. I told him I would repeat to him so much as referred to the matter of the conversation, and then read him the words, "want yea or nay, now." He said he was just going to a cabinet meeting, and would communicate the message to the other members of the Government. I purposely delayed the delivery of your message until I had sought to elicit his statement of the progress and present condition of the business and the views of the Danish cabinet in relation to it, thinking these would be communicated more freely before the reception of a demand for a categorical answer. In a different form this might have had the disadvantage of leaving less room for a retreat from the advanced intimations to an acceptance of the proposition as made. But this consideration has no weight here, for it was a mere conversation with only one member of the Government, and he not the one having its foreign relations in his charge; so that if the Danish Government is really willing or intends in any event to accept the proposal as made, and if all the balance is a mere temporary policy, there is not a particle of difficulty in their way. I deem it sufficient for me to put you in possession of the facts, confident that your own conclusions will be more correct than any suggestions I could offer. And, I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, SIR: Your dispatch of the 13th of March, No. 56, has been received and is approved. Congress has been in session more than three months and has just now adjourned. The Senate can hardly be expected to remain in session longer than ten days. I give you now a copy of my original private note to General Raasloff, written on the 17th day of July, 1866. The delays which have occurred at Copenhagen have thus prevented direct overtures in regard to the object specified in that note. A contingency has come in which it is desirable to know what are the present prospects of negotiation. A special session, either of the Senate or of Congress, may possibly occur during the summer. You will ascertain from General Raasloff whether the United States may expect to be favored with a communication, formal or informal, from the Government of Denmark concerning the matter within a short time. If he shall answer in the negative, you will then say that you are authorized to submit to the minister for foreign affairs an offer for the purchase of the Danish West India Islands in the terms of the note before referred to. You will make such a communication to the minister for foreign affairs in a confidential manner and will communicate his reply. I am, sir, your obedient servant, Mr. YEAMAN. WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward. [Extract.] No. 63.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, Copenhagen, April 24, 1867. SIR: I have the honor to state that yesterday evening I had an interview with General Raasloff upon the subject of your dispatch, No. 36, and that he assured me that he thought a communication would be made soon; that he would renew the subject in the cabinet and keep me advised, and that he thought the prospects better now than they had been. Upon these assurances I deem it proper to wait a reasonable time before addressing the minister of foreign affairs upon the subject. General Raasloff renewed the subject of the price, which I told him I had no authority to discuss. He said the amount named was not more than half, and laughingly added that Mr. Seward understood his people too well to risk his reputation by offering as much in the beginning as he really intended to give. * Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington. * Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward. No. 64.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: The course of political affairs here convinces me that the delay which has so far occurred in the matter of your former confidential communications to General Raasloff and myself is unfortunate, and I have to submit that I deem it eminently important that the negotiation should be concluded with the present Government, and as soon as possible. The Rigsdag, whose consent is necessary under the constitution to any such treaty as the one you propose, will adjourn about the 1st of July not to meet again until October, though a called session could be had without much delay if it were deemed necessary. General Raasloff thinks a ratification can be carried, but thinks there should not be too great an interval of time between negotiation and submission, as such things nearly always, by some means, come to the knowledge of others, and it is quite plain that England, France, and Spain would use all possible efforts to thwart the design. This view of the attitude of those powers has all along occurred to me, and as he mentions it as a thing to be guarded against it may be even of more importance than I had supposed. I am satisfied that the delay has not been all on the General's part, but has been owing to the real difficulty he has met in bringing the cabinet to submit to any proposition on the basis of your letter to him. Another reason why I deem time of importance is that he has recently told me that his military measures, now before the Rigsdag, will be made a ministerial question, and that if defeated not only he but all the cabinet will go out. What might be the views of another cabinet is very uncertain. At the best it would be a disadvantage to have to begin anew. Another cause that may possibly change the ministry in a few months is the attitude of the present Government in relation to France and Prussia. In the event of war the cabinet is decidedly in favor of the neutrality of Denmark, but early French successes (if they happen), active French influence, and the urgent demands of the indignant and enthusiastic National or Scandinavian party might drive the Government into war, and in so doing drive the present cabinet out of office. I can scarcely form an opinion whether the war party, the so-called National party, would, if in possession of the Government, be more or less willing to negotiate; but it would certainly be more under the influence of France, and we have had sufficient evidence that France does not very earnestly seek to promote our interests. I will try to see General Raasloff once more before writing to Count Frijs, and if possible in time for the next steamer, as he tells me there is a cabinet discussion of it soon. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington. GEORGE H. YEAMAN. Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward. [Confidential.] No. 65.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: Yesterday evening I had a protracted interview with General Raasloff. There had been a cabinet discussion the previous evening, and he was expected to communicate to me the views expressed and the partial results then attained. I learn from him in substance that the present cabinet will treat, if there can be an agreement upon the terms-that is, the price-though one member is so much opposed he will resign if the matter is effected, and that there is no doubt felt of a confirmation by the Rigsdag of whatever the Government may do in the matter. I renewed my inquiry if I might expect that my Government would hear from his own upon the subject in a short time and in a tangible form. I told him I was explicit in this inquiry, because the execution of my own further instructions depended upon his answer. He replied that this week or next at furthest he thought a communication would be made; that it was intended to have the matter before the council for final action next Friday, and if that could not be done then certainly on the Friday following. I can not see, in this state of case, that an immediate note from me to Count Frijs would hasten matters any. The General had much to say in regard to the various political considerations connected with the affair and of the difficulties that are in the way, and seemed quite explicit in expressing the views of the cabinet on these subjects. The political difficulties are opposition here, an opposition more of sentiment than anything else, and the disapprobation of the western powers, England and France. This he thought amounted almost to a positive danger to Denmark in the alienation and discontent it would effect. But he hoped for compensation in a nearer alliance with Russia and the United States. He admitted the difficulty of giving definite or effective expression to this in a treaty, but said it ought to follow as a consequence, and if any trouble grew out of the transaction the United States would have to stand by Denmark. I said I thought it would naturally strengthen the amity between the two States, but that as to trouble it was wholly an affair between them; that no other Government could make trouble out of it without an affront to the United States, and then it would become our own quarrel. He gave more importance to this idea than I think it deserves, but I do not think he exaggerates the opposition that England and France would feel and express to the transaction. A practicable difficulty at present in the way, he said, was that there is now nobody at Washington to conduct the affair for his Government. I asked when they would send a minister, and repeated to him the opinion which Count Frijs had expressed to me that it would be done soon. He said the matter had frequently been conversed of between him and the count and several names mentioned, but nobody agreed upon yet. I observed that I had supposed that if the matter was matured before a minister went to Washington it would be done by conferring special and full power upon the consul-general, at present clothed with a diplomatic character. To this he replied very emphatically in the negative. He again expressed his own views and, unofficially, the views of the cabinet about the price. I told him I had nothing to communicate on that subject but what he had already from you, but that since he had repeatedly mentioned it as a difficulty I would be obliged if he would communicate frankly conclusions so far as they had been reached on that subject. He replied he would express an opinion without making any statement that would bind his Government. His opinion was distinct and positive. He said that nothing could be done on the present offer, and he was satisfied that three times the amount would insure success, and he was not certain that less would. I have an opinion, based on this and an expression used by him in a former conversation, heretofore reported to you, that $10,000,000 is about the amount this Government would expect to be offered and feel justified in accepting. I then asked him what was the material and specific difficulty felt by the cabinet in making a communication or an offer on the subject in response to your note. He replied that there was so great a feeling against making a definite offer, against saying as an offer that the Government would sell for a definite sum, that he did not believe that any communication would come in that form. He thought that when it came it would be rather an intimation of a willingness to treat and an expression of unwillingness to accept the terms offered, and would leave the matter in that form open for renewed proposals from the United States; that if other propositions were made and found acceptable the matter would be accomplished, otherwise not. It is distinctly his opinion that the feeling of the cabinet is that offers must come from the United States, and will not come from Denmark. |